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I.

INTRODUCTION
A. THE BACKDROP

At the June, 1966, annual meeting of the National Association of
Insurance Commissioners (NAIC), the advertising committee adopted
a highly controversial resolution which, if implemented, could lead to
the substantial curtailment of the operations of unauthorized1 mail
order insurers.2 The resolution proposed that no insurer, other than
those operating under surplus lines law, be permitted to solicit or write
business in states where it is not authorized to do so. 3 This resolution
reflects a sense of immediacy in regard to the problem of unauthorized
insurers-the subject of this article.
Shortly before the NAIC meeting, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of a state statute purporting to regulate
and tax unauthorized insurers despite the company's assertions that
the state had no such jurisdiction.' Several states have intimated that
they will follow Wisconsin's lead and enact comparable legislation2
In California, recent interest in the question of unauthorized
insurers stems from two sources. First, a California District Court
of Appeal, following the decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court, upheld the power of California to enjoin three foreign (out-of-state) unauthorized insurers from doing business in the state until they procured
the necessary certificate of authority.6 Second, a proposal was introduced in the Calfornia legislature to tax premiums on California risks
7
insured with unauthorized insurers.
Although the NAIC has endured problems caused by unauthorized
insurers for more than half a century, s it now seems to be afflicted

I The

terms unauthorized and unlicensed are used interchangeably in this article.

2 2 PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION

OF INSURANCE COMIIISSIONERS

_(1966) (hereinafter referred to as PROCEEDINGS). See The National Underwrtier, June 25, 1966, p. 1.
3 This resolution is quoted p. 155 infra.
4Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287
(1966). This case and statute will be discussed in some detail throughout this
article.
5 See survey of state insurance departments conducted by the NAIC Subcommittee of the Advertising of Insurance Committee To Study NAIC-FTC
Resolution, 2 PROCEEDINGS.- (1966) ; and an address by N.Y. Superintendent
of Insurance Stern, given before the Section of Insurance, Negligence and
Compensation Law, A.B.A. Annual Meeting, in New York, N.Y. Aug. 9,
1966, p. 14. See also The Baltimore Sun, July 24, 1966.
r California v. United National Life Ins. Co., Pioneer Life Ins. Co., and National Liberty Life Ins. Co., Civ. No. 30330-30332 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App., 2nd
App. Dist., Div. 4, Sept. 14, 1966).
7 This represents an attempt to avoid the loss of revenue through the placement of group coverage on California lives with an unauthorized company.
Action on the bill was deferred pending further study. Life Insurance Association Monthly Report, Aug. 16, 1966, p. 3. This bill has generated substantial
concern to the group insurance companies because of the possible effect on
group insurance crossing state lines. Ibid. A special Life Insurance Ass'n. of
America-American Life Convention joint committee is studying this question.
Life Insurance Association Monthly Report, July 15, 1966, p. 2.
8 See p. 145 infra; and Park, The Evasion of State Laws by Mail Order Insurance Companies, 4 MICH. L. REV. 257 (1906).
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with a "new sense of urgency." 9 This may be attributable, in part, to
the belief that the Wisconsin case, if affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, opens the door for the first time to the constitutional
exercise of state control over unauthorized mail order insurers. Even
more important, however, may be the feeling that the failure of the
states to act affirmatively on the NAIC resolution will expose their
inability or unwillingness to solve a regulatory problem of long standing. The resolution, in effect, challenges the states and their insurance
commissioners to act. The sense of urgency is reflected and caused by
the continuing and intensifying debate as to state versus federal regulation. 10 Supporters of federal regulation find comfort in the assertion
that the states are incapable of regulating a business which transcends
state lines and in the allegation that there are regulatory gaps, which
the states cannot constitutionally fill."1
During the past several years, there has been an increase in the
interaction of federal and state regulation of insurance. An example
was the attempt of the Securities and Exchange Commission, in the
1964 amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, to extend
federal registration, proxy and insider trading requirements to overthe-counter securities, including those of insurance companies. This
was averted only by promulgating comparable requirements at the
state level.' 2 While numerous-other illustrations could be cited," perhaps the most potent illustration of federal-state interaction is the current congressional exploration into multi-state taxation of interstate
commerce. On October 22, 1965, a bill was introduced in the House of
Representatives to establish a system for taxation of interstate commerce by the several states.' 4 This bill excluded insurance companies 1
with the proviso that the Secretary of the Treasury shall study the need
9The National Underwriter, May 7, 1966, p. 24 (editorial). Contra, Probe,

Sept. 5, 1966, p. 1.

10 For a discussion of state versus federal regulation, see generally address by
H. Clay Johnson, President of Royal Globe Insurance Group, Annual Meet-

ing of American Insurance Association, May 19, 1966, as reported in The
National Underwriter, June 4, 1966, p. 1; and an address by California Commissioner of Insurance R. S. L. Roddis, Annual Meeting of Insurance Brokers
Society of Northern California, June 14, 1966.
11 See Johnson, supra note 10; The National Underwriter, May 7, 1966, p. 24
(editorial); address by Senator Dodd at NAIC Convention, June 18, 1963;

The National Underwriter, Mar. 28, 1964, p. 1 reporting on the NAIC Zone
2 Meeting; Probe, Apr. 18, 1966.

12 For a summary discussion of this episode see Hanson and Farney, New Life

Insurance Companies: Their Promotion and Regulation, 49 MAR(Q. L. REv.
175, 309-10 (1965).
13 See Stern, supra note 5, pp. 1-6: Washington Insurance News Letter No.
'1

871, Sept. 12, 1966, pp. 1-3; The National Underwriter, Oct. 29, 1966, p. 15.
H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965). See generally Special Subcommittee

on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce of the Committee on the Judiciary,

Report on State Taxation of Interstate Commerce, Vol. 4, H. R. Rep. No. 952,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).

15 H.R. 11798, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. §607 (1965).
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for uniform taxation rules of income derived from interstate activities
of excluded companies and that he shall report his findings and recommendations within two years.16 A modified bill was introduced July 25,
1966,17 which also excluded insurance corporations.' s However, instead
of the prescribed two year Treasury study of the taxation of excluded
corporations, there is a general provision for a four year continuous
evaluation by the Committee on the Judiciary of the progress made by
the states in resolving interstate commerce tax problems. If substantial
progress is not made, the Committee "shall propose such measures as
are determined to be in the national interest."' 19 Little imagination is
needed to envision the potential extension of this "evaluation" precedent
to the general subject of insurance regulation of interstate commerce. 2'
If this or something comparable should occur, the ability of the states
to regulate unauthorized insurers would come under close scrutiny.
This is a powerful incentive to those who favor state regulation of
insurance to implement some effective means to cope with unauthorized
insurers, if possible.
B. SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
In examining particular regulatory and taxation problem areas, two
questions naturally arise. First, is the solution to the problem within
the ability of the individual states to effectuate? This is crucial in the
state versus federal regulation debate.
The federal government moves into a vacuum. Federal government can't displace effective state regulation,
but it can
21
displace poor or ineffective state regulation.
Second, if the states do possess such ability, is it preferable to a
solution at the federal level? This article is concerned solely with
the first question. We do not propose to debate the pros and
cons of state versus federal regulation. Our inquiry is focused on the
ability of the states to cope with problems posed by the insurance
business which transcend state lines. To determine the regulatory
competence of the states, we shall study unauthorized mail order insuance companies located in the United States, 2 particularly accident and
health companies.
H.R. 11798, supra note 15 at §531. See generally Statement of the American
Life Convention and Life Insurance Ass'n. of America, joint General Bull.
No. 1227, Feb. 15, 1966.
17H.R. 16491, 89 Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
1s H.R. 16491, supra note 17, at §506.
19 H.R. 16491, supra note 17, at §401.
2i0 One company's statement in support of the Treasury Department Study under
the first bill would seem to logically suggest that result. See The National
Underwriter, March 19, 1966, p. 2; and Probe, April 4, 1966.
21 Address by former Michigan Insurance Commissioner Mayerson, National
Ass'n. of Independent Insurers Convention, Nov. 16-19, 1964, p. 14.
2A related but distinct problem is exercising control over alien insurers who are
domiciled outside of the United States.
16
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The ability or inability of the states to regulate and tax is dependent
upon the answers to at least four questions. (1) Do the states possess
constitutional authority to regulate and/or tax unauthorized mail order
insurers? That is, do they have legislative jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the regulation or tax? (2) If so, is there a method by which
the states can make effective their regulation? (3) Do the states
have sufficient personnel and monetary resources to administer the
laws enacted and the regulations promulgated? And, (4) are the states
willing to enact, promulgate and effectively enforce appropriate statutes
and regulations?
Our inquiry shall be devoted to (1) and (2), i.e., to the problems of
jurisdiction and enforcement. However, (3) and (4) should be kept
in mind whenever evaluating the state's regulatory ability.
To evaluate the ability of the states to cope with regulatory
problems, we shall review some of the abuses and questionable practices associated with mail order insurers. Since many of these arise in
connection with accident and health insurance, attention will be focused
on this area for illustrative purposes. As a backdrop, it is first necessary
to look at the regulation of health insurance in general before examining mail order regulation in particular.
II.

EVOLUTION OF HEALTH INSURANCE
REGULATION
A. GROWTH OF HEALTi INSURANCE
Accident and health insurance had its inception in the 1840's or
1850's. Initially, policies provided benefits only in the event of disability
due to accidental causes. These policies were severely restricted and
were for small amounts of indemnity. In 1890, policies providing sickness coverage for certain specified diseases were offered. After the
turn of the century, the business moved into an era of progressive
liberalizations. As financial and actuarial principles became better
known, accident and health insurance achieved more acceptance and
23
became generally available.
During the depression in the 1930's, hospital and surgical expense
insurance had its first great impetus. The economic uncertainties of the
period caused the general public to seek coverage for their health care
costs. While initiated earlier by insurance companies, coverage was
first successfully promoted on a service plan basis, e.g., Blue Cross
and Blue Shield. This was, at least in part, due to the interest of
23SOCIETy OF ACTUARIES, HEALTH INSURANCE PROVIDED THROUGH INDIVIDUAL
POLICIES 1 (1963) (hereinafter cited as ACTUARIES); KLINE, REGULATION OF

MAIL ORDER ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE 29 (1949), prepared for the
New York Insurance Department (hereinafter cited as KLINE) ; Address by

E. J. Faulkner, President, Woodmen Accident and Life Company, Insurance
Regulation Institute Zone Four, National Association of Insurance Commissioners, in East Lansing, Michigan, Feb. 12, 1958, p. 1 (hereinafter cited as
Faulkner).
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hospitals and doctors in prepayment of their fees.m Since then, health
insurance protection has grown in amount and types. 25
B. THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF REGULATION
The inception and early development of insurance regulation took
root prior to the firm beginnings of the accident and health insurance
business, a relative newcomer to the industry. A major factor in the
evolution of regulatory control was the widespread use of the corporate form of business organization which was well adapted to the
insurance business. It served as a useful device to pool funds of small
investors and to assure continuity of management. Furthermore, limitation of liability encouraged investment of capital in the business. However, with the emergence of the corporation, the insured's bargaining
power gradually diminished. Consequently, the corporate form, at least
in part, stimulated the demand for governmental regulation of the in26
surance business.
A second factor in the development of insurance regulation was the
increasing popularity of insurance in the first half of the nineteenth
century: When insurance was confined to shipowners and merchants
of considerable wealth and experience, the insurer and insured could
bargain at arms length without the need for governmental action to
require solvency and prudent management. After the Civil War,
insurance became an economic device for persons of moderate means.
Small policyholders, possessing neither the time nor the means to safe27
guard their interests, out of necessity turned to government regulation.
A third factor contributed to the development of insurance regulation. Insurance companies were a source of revenue. The earliest
insurance legislation in several jurisdictions can be traced to taxing
statutes.

28

Initially, in most jurisdictions, the sole regulatory devices were
periodic reports and publicity as to the financial condition of the
insurer. This information was to serve as data for legislative action
and judicial relief. It also was to focus the insuring public's attention
on the insurer's financial condition, thereby enabling each person to
determine the safety of the enterprise with which he elected to do
business. However, such disclosure did not prove to be an effective
method of protecting the insuring public. The average individual in the
last century had difficulty drawing intelligent conclusions from financial
statements even if they were clear and truthful, which was not always
24 Faulkner 1.
25 See AcTUARIES 3-4.
26

PATTERSON, THE INSURANCE COMMISSIONER IN THE UNITED STATES

271d. at 521.
28 Id. at 524.

520 (1927).
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the case. Consequently, this approach was supplanted by continuous
29
supervision through independent administrative agencies.
Excluding purely revenue statutes and provisions for filing documents in some local dignitary's office who was not intended to exercise
administrative supervision, the early statutes typically vested supervisory
authority in the state's fiscal officer, e.g., the treasurer or comptroller,
since they presumably were more expert in financial matters. When regulatory licensing developed from revenue licensing such a person was
the natural choice to be given supervisory authority. Several states,
however, vested supervision in the secretary of state.3"
The next phase in insurance regulation was the establishment of
independent administrative agencies whose sole function was to regulate
the insurance business. The beginning of effective state supervision is
commonly associated with the appointment of Elizur Wright as one
31
of two members of the Massachusetts board of insurance in 1858.
However, New York in 1859 first conferred fairly extensive powers
upon a single superintendent of insurance. Connecticut and Massachusetts followed suit in 1865 and 1866 respectively, as did several other
states in the ensuing years. The creation of a separate independent officer
whose sole function was to enforce the insurance laws signified a recognition that the insurance business was of sufficient magnitude,
importance and complexity to require the full time of one man and
3 2

his staff.

In the case of Paul v. Virginia,33 the state system of regulation
withstood a serious constitutional challenge to its authority to regulate
the insurance business. A Virginia statute required a deposit of securities from foreign insurance companies as a condition to licensing.
Paul, an agent representing noncomplying companies, was fined. The
companies urged that insurance was interstate commerce and hence
protected by the "commerce" clause of the United States Constitution.
The United States Supreme Court held that the policies were not effective until delivered. This was considered to be a local transaction
governed by local law. Hence, the Court established the principle that
insurance was not commerce. 35 Thus fortified against the exercise of
29

Id. at 525, 529.

30 Id. at 529-31.
31

INVESTIGATION

OF

CONCENTRATION

OF

ECONOMIC

POWER,

prepared for the

Temporary National Economic Committee, Monograph No. 28-A, 76th Cong.,
3d Sess. 64 (1941).

32

PATTERSON, op. Cit. supra note 26, at 536.

33 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
34 "The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, .. ." U. S. CONST. art. I, §8.
35 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 182-185 (1868). Accord, Hooper v.
California, 155 U.S. 648 (1895); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S.
389 (1900); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Deer Lodge County, 231 U.S. 495
(1913).
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superseding federal legislation, state regulation of insurance grew into
a comprehensive system.
Accident and health insurance throughout the years has been under
the general state regulatory laws applicable to all insurers, e.g., requirements dealing with corporate existence, financial solvency, and general
company practices. Nevertheless, it was recognized that this type of
insurance differed in many respects and presented special regulatory
problems.3 6 State regulation aimed specifically at the accident and health
business can be broken down into four main categories: (1) regulation
of the contract, (2) regulation of the insurers' conduct, (3) regulation
of the cost of the protection to the policyholder, and (4) regulation of
the insurer's financial integrity.
C. REGULATION OF THE CONTRACT
With the substantial growth of health insurance in the early 1900's,
many persons came to look upon it as an economic necessity. Numerous
types of policies were offered to cover a broad range of contingencies.
During the early years of health insurance there existed almost no requirements as to the form and content of the policies. The insurer
needed to concern himself only with the general law of contracts. As
might be expected, some undesirable practices developed. Insurers frequently raised hypertechnical defenses to avoid liability, and used obscure provisions to deny benefits which could reasonably be expected
from reading the advertising or the insuring clause. 37 Often policy
forms were "complex of provision and technical and obscure in
38a
phraseology.
1. The Uniform Standard Provisions Law (1912)
Some states imposed restrictions to counteract such abuses. There
resulted a heterogeneous mass of legislation and regulation which tended
to impede development and increase the cost of the business, as well as
cause some unintelligible contracts for the public.

39

At the 1908 meeting

of the National Convention of Insurance Commissioners (the predecessor of the NAIC), a resolution called for the formulation of standard
policies. 4 The claim practices of many companies gave further impetus to the standard provision movement, and subsequently, the Superintendent of Insurance of New York reported:
The broad result of the investigation, however, led to the
conclusions that-through what was frequently a hypertechnical
construction of so-called protective clauses in the contract, the
taking advantage of the policyholder when he was suffering from
injury or illness or of the beneficiary during the period of bereavement to force adjustments at less than the full obligation,
36 See KLINE 30-31.
37 A CTUARIES

40.

38 Faulkner 6.
39 ACTUARIES 40.

40 1908 PROCEEDINGS 278.
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and generally, a perhaps natural but at the same time deplorable
callousness in the claim departments of the companies-the
companies which furnished insurance to the industrial masses
against disability due to illness or accident were, generally
speaking, subject to severe criticism. 41
Finally, in 1912, the NAIC adopted the model Standard Provisions
Law.

43
By 1950, twenty-seven states enacted standard provisions laws.

A brief synopsis of the uniform law serves to emphasize its scope.
Section 1 prohibited the issuance of an accident and health policy
until certain conditions were met, including filing a copy of the policy,
of the classification of risks and of the premium rates. Furthermore,
no policy could be issued until 30 days after the filing unless the commissioner gave his prior approval. Section 2, among other things,
required that the policy state when the insurance would take effect and
terminate, that a specified minimum size type be used, that exceptions
be printed with at least the same prominence as the benefits to which
they apply, and that circumstances which result in the reduction of the
indemnity be prominently printed in bold face type. Section 3 required
that each policy contain certain standard provisions in the words and
order prescribed by the statute. The standard provisions relate to, among
other things, changes in occupation, changes in the contract, reinstatement, time of notice of claim, sufficiency of notice, furnishing of forms
to the insured, proof of loss, right of examination of the insured, time
within which payments will be made, cancellation of policy at the request of the insured, and time period within which a suit may be brought.
Section 4 prohibited provisions touching upon certain areas (e.g., cancellation, reduction of indemnity), unless the standard provisions were
employed. However, the insurer at its option could omit such provisions.
Section 5 prohibited provisions which would conflict with the standard
or optional standard provisions. Section 6 provided that a false statement in the application for a policy should not bar the right to recovery
unless it was intentionally made to deceive or it had materially affected
the acceptance of the risk or the hazard by the insurer. Section 11 prohibited discrimination between individuals of the same class in the
amount of premium charged, the benefits payable, or in terms or conditions of the policy.
By 1943, the insurance commissioners formally recognized that
many aspects of policy approval required administrative interpretation.
Individual interpretations resulted in conflicting regulations among the
various states. To achieve a higher degree of uniformity, the NAIC,
working in conjunction with an Accident and Health Industry CommitAs quoted in KLINE 32.
1912 PROCEEDINGS 117. Minor changes were made in 1917, 1917
27-29.
43Faulkner 6.
41

42

441943 PROCEEDINGS 123.

PROCEEDINGS
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tee, developed The Official Guide which set out rules for interpretation
4
of the Standard Provisions Law. 5

2.

The Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness
Policy Provisions Law (1950)
By the late 1940's, it became apparent that the Standard Provisions
Law (1912) was too inflexible. Insurers could not draft provisions in
a manner more favorable than that permitted by statutory language.
For three years the commissioners and the industry developed a model
law, known as the Uniform Individual Accident and Sickness Policy
Provisions Law, to replace the Standard Provisions Law. The new
model act was adopted by the NAIC in June, 1950.46
The new act recognized the evolution of the health insurance business since 1912. Unlike its predecessor, which required the use of the
prescribed words, the 1950 Act permitted variations where the statutory
requirements were inappropriate to the coverage provided. Furthermore, it permitted modification of wording, upon the commissioner's
approval, where such provisions were "in each instance not less favorable in any respect to the insured or the beneficiary." 47 In general, the
new Uniform Act, while similar to its predecessor, was more liberal
and flexible in behalf of the policyholder. 4 By 1960, the Uniform Act,
or a comparable act, had been enacted in all jurisdictions. 49
3. Uniform Accident and Health Regulatory Law
Prior to the adoption of the Uniform Accident and Sickness Provisions Law, the NAIC in 1946 recommended an Accident and Health
Regulatory Law. 50 Although this law did not focus directly on the
content of the policy, it did so indirectly by requiring the filing and
approval of policy forms. No policy could be issued until 30 days after
the filing of the form unless the commissioner had given his prior
approval. However, after 30 days the policy could be issued without
specific approval but subject to disapproval if, among other things, the
policy
contains a provision or provisions which are unjust, unfair,
inequitable, misleading, deceptive or encourage misrepresentation of such policy. 51
45

46

PROCEEDINGS 35. The Official Guide can be found at KLINE 174. The
Official Guide was revised in 1945 and again in 1946. 1945 PROCEEDINGS 195-97,
and 1946 PROCEEDINGS 269. See KLINE 34-36.
1950 PROCEEDINGS 414. The model act is reproduced in full, id. at 399414.

1944

4
Id. at 401.
48

ACTUARIES
49 ACrUARIS

40-41;

Faulkner

7.

41. However, the text further notes that several states have made
changes or additions so that the resulting body of law is far from being uniform. "In fact, policies conforming strictly with the minimum requirements
of the Uniform Law would be acceptable without modification in less than
half of the states." The principal variations as enacted are shown at 180-181.
50 1947 PROCEEDINGS 213-19.
51 Section C. The proposed legislation may be found at 1947 PROCEEDINGS 218-19.
E.g. N.Y. INS. LAW §154(1).
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This was an adaptation of the mandatory filing and approval or disapproval of policy forms already required in several states.5 2 Now,
practically all states require that policy forms be filed with the super5 3
visory authority, either by statute or by regulation.
One area which has commanded particular attention has been
renewability and cancellation provisions. Some persons and legislatures
deemed it unreasonable to permit the insurer to cancel or refuse to
renew a health insurdnce policy which had been in force for a period
of years. Consequently, several states promulgated laws or regulations
limiting the insurer's freedom of action. Such restrictions have generally been accomplished by (1) deleting the option to use a cancellation
provision such as the Uniform Law permits, and (2) permitting the
insurer to reserve the right to refuse renewal only as of an anniversary
54
of the date of issue.
A policy will frequently exclude losses resulting from accident,
sickness or abnormal physical condition antedating the commencement
of coverage. Although being sound in concept, pre-existing condition
provisions have been the source of dissatisfaction to some policyholders
who disclaimed knowledge of their existence. As a safeguard several
states give the policyholder the right to surrender the policy within ten
days of its delivery and to a refund of premiums paid. This requirement, sometimes referred to as the "10 day free look," assures the
policyholder an opportunity to become familiar with the policy provisions.

55

The provisions of the Uniform Standard Provisions Law were not
designed to cover either the amount or duration of benefits. Some
policyholders and supervisory officials were dissatisfied in that benefits
frequently were too limited in scope. As a result, in 1949, California
enacted what is known as the "Minimum Benefits Law" 56 which was
intended to prevent the issuance of "insurance economically unsound
to the insured." The statute set down in considerable detail criteria for
determining whether, within the meaning of the law, a benefit is of
"real economic value to the insured." 57
In 1947, the NAIC appointed a Minimum Benefits Committee to
consider whether statutory provisions should be recommended as to
minimum benefits.5 8 The Committee was discharged on its own recommendation in 1953 after recommending a "bench mark" test for use
52 KLiNE 40. Some states require advance approval before the policy can be
53

issued as distinguished from automatic approval if no action is taken within
a specified time. DICKERSON, HEALTH INSURANCE 441 (1959).

ACTUARIES 47.
54

ActuAtoEs 44-45. See generally 1 PROCEEDINGS 135-37 (1953); 2 PROCEEDINGS

55

286-98 (1956); and Faulkner 9-10.

ACTUARIES 45.
56 CALIF. INS. CODE,

57 See ACTUARIEs

§102915(7).

45-46; Faulkner 9-10; and KLINE 41.

58 1948 PROCEEDINGS

67.
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by state departments in considering the relation between benefits and
premiums charged.59
D. REGULATION THROUGH SUPERVISION OF INSURER'S CONDUCT
A second principal area of state regulation affecting accident and
health insurance is the supervision of practices peculiar to this business.
Of course, substantial control is exercised through the required policy
provisions of the Standard Provisions Law, the Uniform Individual
Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions Law, and the Statement of
Principles.6"
In an attempt to satisfy the requirements of the McCarran Act,61 the
NAIC and the All Industry Committee focused attention on the adoption of legislation at the state level similar to that in the Federal Trade
Commission Act. In 1947, as a result of the joint efforts of both groups,2
6
the NAIC recommended the All Industry Fair Trade Practices Act
which was designed to make illegal unfair method's of competition and
unfair and deceptive acts in the insurance business. This act has been
adopted in some form by every state. 3
The model act can be divided into two parts. The first part defined
certain acts and practices as being unfair competition and deceptive.
These include (1) misrepresentation and false advertising as to policy
contracts, (2) false information and advertising generally, (3) defamation, (4) boycott, coercion or intimidation, (5) false financial statements, (6) stock operations or contracts promising profits as inducement to insurance, (7) unfair discrimination, and (8) rebates. 64 The
Act empowered insurance commissioners to issue cease and desist orders, and provision is made for judicial review.6 5
The second portion of the Act pertains to what are commonly referred to as undefined acts. Recognizing the impossibility of anticipating every conceivable unfair or deceptive practice, the commissioner
was authorized to hold hearings and make appropriate conclusions as
to whether acts, other than those specifically defined in the statute, are
also unfair or deceptive. 6 In most states the commissioner refers his
67
findings to the attorney general for appropriate legal action.
To further improve the policing of policy provisions and advertising,
the NAIC, in 1948, adopted a "Statement of Principles" which consisted of a series of guideposts for both the commissioner and the in59 2 PROCEEDINGS 542-44
60 Faulkner 14.

(1953).

Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.A. §§1011-1015 (1963). For discussion of the McCarran Act, see pp. 200-203 infra.
62 See 1947 PROCEEDINGS 380-413.
63 1 PROCEEDINGS 150 (1960).
64 All Industry Fair Trade Practices Act §4, 1947 PROCEEDINGS 393-95.
65All Industry Fair Trade Practices Act §§7, 8, 1947 PROCEEDIN;S 397-98.
66AI Industry Fair Trade Practices Act §9, 1947 PROCEEDINGS 398-99.
6159

67

E.g., WIS. STAT. §207.09 (1965).
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dustry. These principles pertained to the construction of policy forms,
particular policy provisions, and the advertising and solicitation of material. 68 The Statement was recommended with a view towards its implementation, under the commissioner's rule-making power, in conjunction with the Fair Trade Practice Acts. 69 In 1955, the NAIC recommended to the several states Rules Governing Advertisements of Accident and Sickness Insurance7 0 which established certain standards aimed
at "truthful and not misleading (advertising) in fact or implication."'"
In addition to rules covering specific items, the insurer must maintain
a file containing copies of its advertisements, with a notation on each as
to the extent of the advertisement's distribution. Furthermore, the insurer must maintain the file for three years and file a statement of
compliance with the state insurance department. More than thirty states
have adopted these rules 72 in a continuing effort to curb misleading and
deceptive practices.
E. COST OF ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INSURANCE
A third principle area of concern to regulatory officials is the premium rates charged. 73 After the enactment of the McCarran Act,74 the
NAIC and the All Industry Committee explored the possibility of rate
regulation in the accident and health field patterned after the fire and
casualty rate regulatory bills. 75 After intensive consideration, this approach was rejected for several compelling reasons. The rate structure
in the accident and health, unlike the fire and casualty business was
primarily competitive, thereby requiring less supervision. Standard
forms are uncommon in health insurance. Furthermore, whereas fire
and casualty rates tend to be local in nature--i.e., based upon the experience in individual states-the same forms and rates are used on a
nationwide basis in the health insurance business. Such a system is not
readily subject to local rate structure regulation.7 6 In addition, there
was the practical consideration that the administration of such rate
regulation would be virtually impossible because of the multiplicity of
77
policy forms.
These factors were carefully reviewed by the committee which
drafted and recommended to the NAIC the Accident and Health Regulatory Law discussed above. Consequently, this uniform law, in addition
to requiring the filing of policy forms and premium rates, provided
68 1949 PROCEEDINGS 299, 309-14.
69 1949 PROCEEDINGS 299-300.
70 1 PROCEEDINGS

128-37 (1956).

71 Section 2, id. at 132.
72 1 PROCEEDINGS 82 (1962).
73 Faulkner 15.

74 See pp. 200-203 infra.
751947 PROCEEDINGS 175-76, 214-15; AcrUmA-ES 48; Faulkner 16.
76 ACTUARIES 48; Faulkner 16; KLINE 36-37.
7 Faulkner 16-17.
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that the commissioner could disapprove a policy if it was unfair or
misleading,7 8 or

therein are unreasonable in relation to
if the benefits provided
79
the premium charged.
Although this provision gave the insurance commissioner broad regulatory powers, "it is not a 'rate regulatory' bill"80 but rather a "police
power" to enable the commissioner to cope with exceptional situations. 8 '
F.

ASSURING FINANCIAL INTEGRITY

If an insurer is to pay legitimate claims, both current and future, it
must possess the all important characteristic of financial integrity. Much
of state regulation is focused on compelling such an attribute.
Health insurance can be written by casualty companies, by life
companies, or by a company writing only accident and health business.
Consequently, a health insurer may organize under either the casualty
or the life section of the law. If the company is to take the stock form
of organization, it must meet the state's capital and surplus laws. In
most states, the requirement for writing health insurance ranges from
$100,000 to $200,000 of capital plus a surplus at least equal to 50 per
cent of the minimum capital requirements.8 2 Requirements for mutual
companies are defined in terms of the number of applications and
premium for insurance and a minimum amount of surplus.8 3 Some

states require, as an additional safeguard, deposits of securities with the
insurance commissioner to the extent of 25 to 100 per cent of the
minimum capital.8 4
Requirements for licensing out of state (foreign) insurers are essentially similar to the standards imposed on domestic insurers, however,
they may be more or less strict.85 On occasion states may require foreign
securities without being given credit for
and alien insurers to deposit
86
deposits in other states.
The initial capital, surplus and securities deposit requirements constitute one facet of state regulation aimed at protecting the policyholder
from an insurer's financial inability to pay claims. Regulation of reserves, investments and methods of valuation also contribute to insurer
solvency. Furthermore, insurance commissioners possess the power and
duty to conserve assets of companies on shaky financial ground. They
can examine the company's financial reports and actual operations. In
7 See pp. 186-87 supra.

79 1947 PROCEEDINGS 218.

so KLINE 38.

81 Faulkner

17.

DICKERSON, op. cit. supra note 52, at 439.
83 Ibid.
82

84 Id. at 439-40.
85Id. at 440.
86 Ibid. This can have quite a restrictive effect in the aggregate.
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some situations, they may limit the writing of new business or actually
step in as a conservator, liquidator or rehabilitator of the company-"'
This brief review of the regulation of accident and health insurance
suggests that a substantial body of law has developed, particularly in
the last fifty years, to curb abuses and specific practices engaged in
by some insurers. While it cannot be said that all problems have been
solved, today insurance commissioners possess several regulatory tools
which can be applied to companies licensed to do business in the state.
III.

ABUSES OF MAIL ORDER ACCIDENT AND
HEALTH INSURANCE COMPANIES
The next question is whether these regulatory tools are applicable to
and effective against the problems generated by the operations of unauthorized mail order insurance companies. The disreputable practices
of some accident and health insurers are illustrative. Of course, it must
be recognized that not all mail order insurers should be tarred with
the same brush. There are many such companies whose conduct is
consistent with the high standards of the insurance industry and who
do provide much needed insurance protection and offer exceptional
value.

A.

THE SCOPE AND GENERAL NATURE OF THE ABuSES

Accurate and reliable figures as to the amount of mail order insurance written are difficult to come by. Over the past several years various
estimates put mail order insurers' share of the accident and health insurance premium from above 6 per cent to less than 1 per cent, of which
only part is attributable to irresponsible insurers.8 s While the amount of
mail order business written by irresponsible insurers may seem to be
relatively small when compared to the total amount of business written
by the accident and health insurance industry (based upon incomplete
statistics), resting the case here is not enough. Complaints about such
insurers "do occur often enough to have caused serious concern to state
insurance officials, the Post Office Department, the FTC, and the
Better Business Bureaus," 89 and these practices which are complained
of harm not only the policyholder, but reliable insurers as well in both
business and reputation. As one study concluded, "the problem which
these carriers create is out of all proportion to their number or the
amount of business which they transact." 90 Thus, the "size of the problem ...

appears to be considerable from the available evidence." 91 This

I
87 Ibid.
88 See KLINE 26-27; McCarter, Recent Misleading and Deceptive Mail Order
Accident and Health Insurance Policies and Advertising, 23 INS. COUNSEL J.
82, 86 (1956) (hereinafter cited as McCarter) ; The National Undenvriter,
Feb. 13, 1965, p. 24; and 2 PROCEEDINGS 489, 498 (1960).

89 KLinE 13.

9o Id. at 27, See Bohlinger, Mail-OrderAccident and Health Insurance, 1949 INs.

L. J. 264, 266.

91 McCarter

86.
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conclusion received recent support from both the NAIC survey92 and
93
the National Underwriter survey of the insurance commissioners.
Forty-six states noted complaints regarding unfair or deceptive advertising by unauthorized mail order insurers, although in most states the
complaints were directed at a few companies.94
Certain characteristics have been found to be common among irresponsible mail order insurers. 95 These include (1) qualification in the
domiciliary state only, generally one in which insurance department
supervision is handicapped by inadequate powers, limited funds or
local politics; (2) specialization in accident, health, hospitalization or
sometimes, life insurance policies of an extremely limited type issued
for small premiums; (3) flamboyant advertising which, if not actually
fraudulent, is deceptive and misleading, aimed at the most gullible portions of the insurance buying public; (4) financial resources inadequate
for the volume or character of the business written; (5) loss ratios
so low and expenses and profit ratios so high as to indicate an inferior
product, although ratios of this type may also reflect exceptionally good
underwriting or favorable economic conditions; (6) sharp claim practices, e.g., refusal to answer or acknowledge claims, tender of "compromise" offers obviously not in accordance with the policy terms, undue reliance on technicalities written into complicated policies; (7)
avoidance of customary sales methods (such as use of established
agencies) and utilization of large scale direct mail campaigns; and (8)
unwillingness to disclose operating and financial data to reputable private insurance reporting agencies.
The plight of the victims of such companies has been well described.
Sometimes prospective policyholders are misled or deceived
in such a way, for the sake of increasing the insurer's sales, that
the purchasers are led to buy policies which actually do not
cover their insurance needs. Often they are led to believe that
they are buying more insurance than is actually the case. This
results in their having a false sense of security, and they make
no further plans for the 'rainy days' in their lives when they
might suffer from sickness or accident. They relax, thinking they
have purchased their needed insurance protection. Usually their
thoughts are not found to be false until after a loss is suffered
and no insurance check appears to help them through their
crisis. Then it is too late.9 6
92 Report of the Results Obtained From Questionnaires to Individual Members
of the NAIC Subcommittee To Study NAIC-FTC Resolution, 2 PROCEED-

INGS
1966). See also The National Underwriter, Nov. 21, 1964, p. 13;
Baltimore Sun, July 24, 1966.
93 The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1.
94 NAIC Survey, supra note 92.
95 KLINE 25-26.
96 McCarter 82. See The National Underwriter, June 6, 1964, p. 22 (editorial).
Similarly, a Senate subcommittee found "Economic pressures on older
Americans are causing many to turn to mail-order health insurance offered
by marginal companies which distort or omit facts in order to suggest that
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One highly critical authority said
The buyer (of an accident and health insurance policy) believes
that he or she is protected in the event of personal catastrophe
and relies on this belief-then a loss occurs and the buyer learns
that he should have been three miles at sea on a cattleship headed
profor Barcelona when it was rammed by an English freighter,
97
vided it occurred on an alternate Tuesday in May.
This example, although extreme for illustrative purposes, does, unfortunately, typify the practices of some insurers. These may be categorized under the general headings (1) deceptive and misleading advertising, (2) deceptive and misleading policy provisions, and (3)
sharp claim practices.
B. DECEPTIVE AND MISLEADING ADVERTISING
It is generally recognized that misleading or deceptive advertisements circulated by mail order accident and health insurance companies
present a significant problem in the regulation of the insurance industry
for the protection of the public. The typical mail order insurer will
secure its prospects through advertisements in published material or
by direct mailings to individuals, requesting the reader or recipient
to return a coupon or other inquiry for further information from the
insurer. The quality of the advertising used by a mail order insurer
is of prime importance since it constitutes the sole information which
the prospect receives as to the content of the policies. There is no agent
to help the insured.98
Criticism of mail order insurance advertisements is not new. Sixty
years ago, one critic wrote:
The basic principle [of mail order insurance sold through advertisements] is the use of the mail for every conceivable purpose, and the avoidance, so far as possible, of the employment
of commissioned solicitors. The results are somewhat unexThe unwary applicant
pected and, certainly, most dishonest ....
. . . believes that he will have insurance that insures . . . but he

has built his house upon the sand. 99

More recently, in response to increased advertising of cut-rate mail
order insurance policies in Florida, the insurance commissioner termed
mail order insurers and their advertisements a "growing menace. ' 1°0
the policy gives more protection than it really does." A REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON FRAUDS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS AFFECTING THE ELDERLY
TO THE SPECIAL COAMITTEE ON AGING, U.S. SENATE, 89TH CONG., 1ST SESS.

(1965), p. 47.
9 Appleman, Jokers Cost Money, 23 Miss. L. J. 1, 2-3 (1951).
98 McCarter 84. "Wide opportunities for deception or confusion exist in sales
of health insurance policies, and buyers are usually dependent upon the good
faith of the seller for accurate interpretations of provisions." REPORT, supra
note 96, at 53.
99 Park, The Evasion of State Laws by Mail Order Insurance Companies, 4 MICH.
L. REv 257-58 (1906).
100 1964 INS. L. J. 354.
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The basic problem with such advertising is the typically unqualified 01 and/or sensational explanations of the policy terms. When the
policy arrives through the mail, few applicants bother to read it, and
even fewer are able to understand its limitations. Therefore, when the
deceptive advertisement suggests to the purchaser that he has more
coverage than is actually provided, thereby causing him to buy less
insurance than he needs, the result is frequently financial hardship to
him and potentially infectious distrust of the insurance industry in
general when a loss occurs. Items which are often the subject of misrepresentation or, at least, misleading commentary in advertisements
include the following.
Type of coverage. Advertisements placed by mail order insurers
often imply that additional or a different type of insurance is provided
than is actually purchased. This may be accomplished through the deceptive use of general words, such as "life," "accident" or "hospitalization" in describing a policy which in fact does not provide broad coverage such as is connoted, but instead covers only unusual accidents, sickness, or causes of death. For example, one policy described as life
10 2
insurance covered death by drowning only.
Implied Government Affiliation or Sponsorship. Substantial abuse
has stemmed from the recent Medicare legislation. Several mail order
companies are advertising "Medicare Supplements." Although many
such insurers may offer good coverage, there are others who are selling
inadequate insurance by "palming it off" as if their plan was a part of
the Government's program of Medicare protection. The acting Michigan commissioner said,
I resent the obvious attempt of these companies to trade on the
acceptance of Medicare. They have chosen names for their
policies which would tend to leave the impression they represent
an official federal agency. Many of them print their material in
red, white and blue and imply they are supported by the American Hospital Association and the United States Surgeon General.
Some even give the impression1 their
program is endorsed by the
3
President of the United States.
A former California insurance commissioner acted to curb a similar
misrepresentation being perpetrated by a British company based in
Nassau, Bahamas, which used the term Medicare in the company's
name. This company had pushed its "Medicare 65" plan in California
in such a way that it "capitalized on extensive advertising and goodwill" created by the reputable "Western 65" plan, and allegedly attempted to deceive California residents into thinking that "Medicare
For example, advertisements may say coverage is provided for "all" sicknesses when in fact preexisting conditions are excluded. See McCarter 85.
102 McCarter 86.
103 The Weekly Underwriter, Mar. 12, 1966, p. 5. See also Washington News
Letter, Apr. 18, 1966, p. 1.
101
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65" was linked to the Government's Medicare program. 04 The Minnesota commissioner spoke out against an unlicensed mail order insurer for ".

.

. employing a mailing envelope that is in some respects

the same color and print style as the United States Government's
envelope and many citizens may believe they are receiving correspondence from a Federal agency."' 05
This type of abuse is not limited to mail order accident and health
insurers alone. As can be seen in the investigations of the Federal Trade
Commission, Defense Department and Post Office Department, mail
order insurance companies are soliciting the parents of servicemen for
the purchase of life insuranceo6 that is represented as being the same
as, or equal to, National Service Life Insurance. 7 This problem appears
to have been particularly acute in Maryland, 08 Texas' 0 9 and Florida." 0
The Federal Trade Commission has concluded"' that mail order insurance companies often are guilty of this type of misrepresentation in
material that they send to veterans. Often such mailed advertisements
are said to come from the "Veterans Insurance Division," and no
attempt is made to explain that there is no connection with the Veterans Administration.
Age of Insured. A third type of misrepresentation commonly found
in mail order accident and health insurance advertising is the assertion
that any person between the ages, for example, of 15 and 80 is eligible
to apply for the insurance. This implies that the same coverage is
available to all persons within this age group. The policy of one company that sponsored an "age 15 to 80" advertisement provided reduced payments to insureds between the age of 60 and 70, and even
greater reductions in payments to insureds between age 70 and 80. The
latter group of insureds received only one-quarter of the stated indemnity. In addition, payments to women between age 15 and 70, who
did not have daily full time employment outside of the home, were
reduced by one-half.12
Risks Covered. Another type of advertisement is that which misleads as to which events are covered and which are not. It may state
that the insured will be protected against "common accidents" or "all
kinds of sickness," but the policy itself is so qualified or so replete
104

The National Underwriter, July 11, 1964, p. 2.

105 Insurance Advocate, Mar. 21, 1964, p. 35.
106 Cleveland Press, May 5, 1966, p. A6.
107 The National Underwriter, June 4, 1966, p. 9. See also REPoRT, supra note

96, at 60.

10 8 The Journal of Commerce, June 8, 1966, p. 9.
109 The National Underwriter, June 4, 1966, p. 9.
10 The National Underwriter, Sept. 11, 1965, p. 2.
11 Washington Insurance Newslatter, No. 850, Apr. 18, 1966, p. 1; The National
Underwriter, June 4, 1966, p. 9. Sometimes actual policies are sent to parents
of servicemen with implication that he knows of offer and that offer is
approved by the Armed Services.
112 KLINE 19.
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with exceptions that only a few unusual accidents are actually included," 3 and the only diseases covered are for age groups that are
4
unlikely to contract the disease at all."

Reduction of Indemnity. Still another common deceptive practice is
to advertise, for example, that a sum of $10,000 will be paid for a certain loss or that $100 per month will be sent to the insured when he suffers a continuous loss, without indicating that there are certain factors
or conditions which can drastically reduce or totally preclude any indemnity. One technique, generally not mentioned in the advertisement,
is to pay benefits for loss that occurs under certain circumstances only,
and to reduce those benefits when the loss occurs under a different set
of circumstances." 5
C. DECEPTIVE AND MISLEADING POLICY PROVISIONS
The second general type of abuse involves misleading or deceptive
policy provisions. Whether the deception caused by such clauses is intended or not, it may have the effect of depriving the policyholder of
the protection he thought he had.
Ambiguous Terms. The policy provisions used by some accident
and health insurers are sufficiently ambiguous to warrant the assumption by the insured that coverage is provided, yet permit the insurer
to construe the provision in a manner that precludes benefit payment.
For example," 6 in one situation the policyholder paid $24.00 per year
for insurance which had been in force for over a year when the
insured was found to have diabetes and high blood pressure. After an
operation and extended hospitalization, the insured was confined to his
home and claimed benefits under his hospitalization and sickness policy.
In response to the claim, the insurance company offered the insured
$8.00, claiming that he had diabetes for one and one-half years, and
therefore he had it before the effective date of the policy. The dispute
centered on an ambiguous policy term which stated that diseases covered were "those originating after the effective date of the policy."
The ambiguity rests on an interpretation as to when a disease originates.
One commentator observed with respect to this case,
When a company makes no attempt to clarify such an ambiguity
the resulting misunderstanding, whether intentional or unintentional, may prove damaging to the policyholder. He is not
really insured. He suffers a real loss. Often the people harmed
113"Without going into details of the policy provisions the net result of the

policy is to cover all inquiries not likely to happen rather than those that
'frequently happen' because it excludes the normal injuries through qualifications." McCarter 85.
114 For example, an advertisement may offer insurance covering whooping cough
on policies issued to persons age 17 and over. McCarter 85.
"'

11

See McCarter 85-86.
KLINF 12.
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are those of low income and low educational standards, and the
loss of insurance coverage is very telling indeed 17Ambiguity may be unintentional or it may be intentionally incorporated
in the policy. In either case, the results can be harmful to the policyholder.
Equally damaging to the policyholder are those provisions which
are knowingly inserted by the insurer in a deceptive attempt to limit
the scope of the coverage. While the provisions are expressly stated
in the policy, they are stated in such a manner as to be overlooked or
misunderstood by the insured, and therefore deceive him .into believing
that he has acquired more coverage than he actually has.
Another common area of ambiguity involves the cancellation clause
which permits the insurer to cancel or not renew the policy if, in the
opinion of the insurer, the insured has become uninsurable. If a serious
and continuous disease develops, the company may cancel the policy
after the term expires. The policyholder may not have the right to
renew. This provision is often misunderstood by the purchaser, particularly if no medical examination had been required. The lack of
examination suggests that his health condition is of no consequence.""
Even though the policy states that the company retained this power, the
average policyholder most likely will not understand its true import.
He may, in fact, be misled into believing the opposite. Furthermore,
the policy may include an additional provision in effect stating that
the insurance is not valid unless the policyholder is in good physical
and mental condition when the policy is issued."19
Exceptions. A health insurance policy typically has exceptions
which, when deceptively worded, could cause the unsuspecting insured
to be without protection. For example, some policies require that the
insured be confined to his home or a hospital before he is entitled to
receive benefits. Companies have used this exception as a basis to
refuse claims if the insured manages to sit on his front porch, this
being considered not being confined. 20 The Federal Trade Commission has recognized the deceptive tendencies of such exceptions by requiring all exceptions, reductions and limitations on policy benefits
12
to be included in advertisements which mention those benefits.
D.

SHARP CLAIM PRACTICES

To the policyholder, perhaps the most aggravating and frustrating
aspect of some mail order insurers' operations is the handling of claims
117 McCarter 83.

I's Ibid.

119 KLINE 19.

McCarter 83. See also Appleman, supra note 97 at 5-6 for a discussion of
additional exceptions which that author found in various accident and health
nolicies.
121 FTC Guides for the Mail Order Insurance Industry, effective July 14, 1964,
Guide 2. See also The National Underwriter. Apr. 25, 1964, p. 33.
120
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thought to be covered by the policy. Here, the disparity between the
individual policyholder and the company becomes most apparent. Sixty
years ago, it was said of mail order insurers that "Contract beneficiaries
after loss must settle their claims on the insurer's terms or go into
distant jurisdictions and conduct a stubborn and expensive litigation. 1

22

This statement has continuing validity.

Outright Refusal to Pay and Offers of Compromise. One example
of an insured who sought to collect a claim from a mail order insurer
is illustrative. 123 The insured purchased two separate policies with different companies in 1945. Shortly thereafter the insured became ill.
Six months later he underwent surgery and was hospitalized for one
month. Thereafter he was confined to his home and was unable to
work. While so confined, the insured filed claims with both of his insurance companies. One sent a check for 380 claiming to have canceled the policy. The other sent a check for $25 as settlement in full.
Another company was reported to have collected premiums of
$7,658 from Wisconsin in 1959 while paying a grand total of $33 in
benefits. Similarly, another insurer returned to the policyholders less
124
than three cents out of each premium dollar collected.
Such companies are known as "pay at the courthouse door" companies. They delay, argue and attempt in all fashions to avoid payment until a suit is filed. 125 As a consequence, many claimants, because
(a) their claims are small, or (b) they do not realize their rights, or
(c) they do not like lawyers, relinquish their claims and lose insurance
benefits due them. 26 Regulatory officials have described some mail order
insurers as not being "responsible to anyone to pay off claims when
they are submitted,"' 27 as paying off by mail "when they pay off at
all,"' 2 as well as saying "all too often the buyer learns to his dismay
that he has spent money for coverage he cannot collect."'

5

The Fed-

eral Trade Commission has issued orders requiring companies to stop
advertising that certain benefits would be paid when in fact the company could refuse to pay such claims because of contrary policy provisions. 30
Inadequate Financial Resources. Mail order insurers often do not
possess adequate funds to pay claims as they arise. This compels the
insurer to refuse payment or to attempt compromising claims. As the
typical mail order accident and health insurance company sells insurance in states in which it is not licensed to do business, it is not re1_2 Park, supra note 99, at 258.
123 Taken from KLINE 11.
124 Memorandum on Bill 245, S. by Ins. Commissioner Manson (Wis.).
125 McCarter 84.
126 Ibid.
127 1964 INs. L. J. 354.
12s Ibid.
129 The National Underwriter, Sept. 11, 1965, p. 2.
130 The National Underwriter, Apr. 25, 1964, p. 33.
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quired to meet that state's standards for capital, surplus and reserves.
A Nassau company presents a vivid example of how disreputable claim
practices can arise from a company's financial position. This insurer had
less than $3,000 of capital. 13 Clearly, such a company cannot be expected to meet the claim obligations which arise from its policies. 32 In a
similar situation, the Maryland insurance commissioner complained of a
mail order insurer that was soliciting business in Maryland by mail
which had $37,500 in capital and surplus, whereas a company applying
for a license in Maryland must have at least $1,000,000 before it could
33
sell.
Closely connected with the problem of inadequate financial resources is the adequacy of the premium charged. Insurers not uncommonly have boasted about extensive coverage for "just pennies a day,"
or "only $1.00 monthly."' 34 These companies may not be able to pay
their claims when they arise. The problem of inadequate premiums is
not easy to solve since accident and health insurance companies generally do not participate in insurance rating organizations. 35 For example, the problems of mail order insurers were attributed, in part, to
premium rates which "in the opinion of experienced actuarial authorities [are] 'unsound, unrealistic and inadequate.' ,,13r The Ohio Commissioner, in sharply criticizing the activities of an unlicensed mail order
insurer, said:
Further, our Actuarial Department questions whether the
premium being charged is sufficient to cover reasonable claims
by policyholders under the provisions of the policies. Several
claims that have come to our attention indicate that this apparent
insufficiency of premium is perhaps counter balanced by claim
practices which are not generally followed by other companies
in the industry. 3 '
E. ABUSES: MAIL ORDER AND NON MAIL ORDER INSURERS
From the preceding section on the evolution of health insurance
regulation, it can be seen that the abuses just reviewed have not been
confined solely to the mail order insurers. Moreover, during the last
half century, statutes and regulations have been promulgated to curb
such activities. For example, the 1912 Standard Provisions Law, and
1- The National Underwriter, June 6, 1964, p. 2.
332With respect to some alien insurers transacting business in the United States,
e.g., insurers (allegedly) based in Nassau, it has been said "the one vital
area they appear least concerned with is the payment of claims . . . (F)ull
effort of management is concentrated on avoiding any claim of substantial
nature." Supplemental Report by Joseph A. Humphreys, Nonadmitted Insurers Office to Unautrorized Insurers Subcommittee, 2 PROCEEDNGS.(1966).
133 The Journal of Commerce, June 8, 1966, p. 9.
L34 KUNE 13.
See ACTUARIES 47-48.

1

136 The National Underwriter, June 6, 1964, p. 2.
137 Letter to Mr. Alexander Picone from Ins. Commissioner Morris, as quoted
in Journal of Commerce, Nov. 10, 1965.
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its successor, the Uniform Accident and Sickness Policy Provisions
Law, arose because of complex, ambiguous and technical policy provisionS.'

38

Similarly, the model Fair Trade Practices Act, among other

things, was aimed at misleading advertising. 3 9 These and other regulatory tools are readily available for application to insurers licensed to
do business in the state.
While the abuses in the unlicensed mail order insurer situation
have been similar, the same regulatory tools have, in general, not been
applied because of the limiting constitutional doctrines on the state's
ability to regulate unauthorized insurers.140 However, in recent years
some attempts have been made to overcome this gap in state regulation
both at the state and at the federal level. This is the subject of the
next section.
REGULATION OF MAIL ORDER INSURERS:
THE FTC AND THE NAIC
A. POST SEUA LEGISLATION
In response to the United States Supreme Court's holding in the
South-Eastern Underwriters' Association (SEUA) case that the insurance business involved transactions in commerce,' 4' Congress passed
the McCarran Act" to permit continued state taxation and control of
the insurance industry. After declaring that continued regulation and
taxation by the states was in the public interest, 4 ' Congress stated in
section 2(a) of the Act that:
IV.

The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein,
shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate
to the regulation or taxation of such business.
Section 2(b) of the Act provided a moratorium period from March 9,
1945 to January 1, 1948, later extended to June 30, 1948, during which
the states could evaluate their existing insurance laws and enact new
regulations. At the end of this period, this section provided that the
Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and the Federal Trade Commission
to the extent that
Act "shall be applicable to the business of insurance
144
such business is not regulated by State law."'
The Federal Trade Commission Act confers broad and undefined
powers upon the Commission, ". . . to prevent persons, partnerships
or corporations ... from using unfair methods of competition in com138 See pp. 184-86 supra.
139 See p. 188 supra.
140 If some constitutional means could be devised whereby the regulation discussed above could be applied to unauthorized mail order insurers, it would
seem that most abuses could be overcome.
1a1United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association, 322 U.S. 533
(1944).
14259 Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.A. §§1011-15 (1965).
14359

Stat. 33 (1945), 15 U.S.C.A. §1011 (1965).

144 59 Stat. 34 (1945), 15 U.S.C.A. §1012(b) (1965).
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merce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce."' 145 This
provision of the Act has been used by the Commission to control the
advertising practices of mail order accident and health insurance companies.
Our inquiry must therefore examine the meaning of the phrase
"regulated by state law" and examine the FTC's authority to determine when, and to what extent, the business of insurance is within its

jurisdiction.
1. The Meaning of "Regulated By State Law"
The provision of the McCarran Act which exempts the insurance
industry from the Federal Trade Commission Act, and other similar
acts, to the extent that the business is regulated by state law has been
the subject of varied interpretations. 146 One interpretation is that state
regulation is synonymous with state legislation. Under this view, the
Federal Trade Commission would not have jurisdiction over mail order
accident and health insurers if a state had merely enacted legislation
concerning this matter. It has been suggested 47 that the decisions of
48
the Courts of Appeals of the Fifth Circuit in the American Hospital
149
case, and the Sixth Circuit, in the National Casualty case, support
this interpretation. Under such a view, if state law covered the practice
50
It has
involved in the dispute, state jurisdiction would be exclusive.
been recognized, however, that equating legislation with regulation in
this manner could "foster inadequate supervision of the insurance inresulting in areas of the insurance business being regudustry,"''
lated by neither the states nor the federal government.
In the National Casualty case, the insurer prepared advertising material at its home office and sent it in bulk to its agents in states where
it was licensed to do business. The agents then mailed the advertising
to local residents. The United States Supreme Court noted that the
activities which the FTC sought to proscribe were carried on within
the boundaries of the state, and were not interstate activities. The
Court stated:
Whatever may have been the intent of Congress with regard to
interstate insurance practices which the states cannot for con15 U.S.C.A. §45(a) (6) (1965).
146 See McCarter 95.
1478 Note, 67 YALE L. J.452, 458 (1958).
14 American Hospital and Life Insurance Company v. FTC, 243 F.2d 719 (5th
Cir. 1957). aff'd. 357 U.S. 560 (1958).
149 National Casualty Company v. FTC, 245 F.2d 883 (6th Cir. 1957). aff'd. 357
U.S. 560 (1958). See also Gilmore, Government and the Insurance Business,
1950 Ixs. L. J.408, 410.
150 A variation of this view holds that state legislation must be similar to federal
legislation. See McCarter 95.
151 Note, 67 YALE L. J. 452, 461 (1958). See also Palmer, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction over Insurance Advertising, 1964 INs. L. J. 69;
Dean, The Foreign Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory Gap, 29 (Mar.
29, 1965) (Thesis, Harv. L. School Lib.)
'a5
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stitutional reasons regulate effectively, that intent is irrelevant
in the cases before us. Respondents' advertising programs require distribution by their local agents, and there is no question
but that the States possess ample means to regulate this advertising within their respective boundaries.' 52
Therefore, this case does not necessarily stand for the proposition that
legislation alone is equivalent to regulation. The case merely affirms the
proposition that an intrastate activity which is the subject of state
legislation (which the FTC conceded was effective legislation) is an
153
activity beyond the power of the FTC.
A second interpretation of the phrase "regulated by state law" indicates that the McCarran Act was concerned only with effective state
law and that legislation alone was not equated with regulation. Under
this view effective implementation of the regulatory laws is an important factor to consider,' and the National Casualty and the American Hospital cases are construed as being decided on the basis of the
facts involved in each case.' 5 5 The idea that Congress intended that
only effective state regulation should preclude federal intervention is
clearly seen in remarks made by President Roosevelt when he approved the McCarran Act:
... [A] fter the moratorium period, the anti-trust laws and certain related statutes will be applicable in full force and effect to
the business of insurance except to the extent that the States have
assumed the responsibility, and are effectively performing that
responsibility, for the regulation of whatever aspect of the insurance business may be involved." 6
Some feel that this requires not only that the states enact legislation
similar to that of Congress, but also staff a regulatory body with adequate funds and personnel to implement such legislation."'
A third possible interpretation of the McCarran Act is that the
states must not only possess the power and the capacity to act, they
must also actually be acting. Nonadministered regulatory power is
pseudo regulation. Potential regulation is not regulation. 5 The jurisdiction of the FTC is determined by the quality of administration and
152 FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958).
153 See Palmer, supra note 151 at 72; Dineen, The Economics and Principles of
InsuranceSupervision, II Insurance and Government 1,43 (1960).
154 See generally Note, 67 YALE L. J. 452, 464 n. 49, which cites, in part, the
following material concerning Congressional intent in respect to theMcCaran Act: "(T)he Congress proposes by this bill to secure adequate regulation
and control of the insurance business." H.R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess. 2 (1945); S. Rep. No. 20, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1945). See also
Donovan, Regulation of Insurance Under the McCarran Act, 15 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROB. 473 (1950).
155 Palmer, supra note 151, at 71.

As reported in Thomerson, Federal Trade Commission Commission Surveys
State Insurance Laws, 1950 INs. L. J. 333, 335.
157 McCarter 95.
15" Ibid.
156
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the enforcement of state laws as well as by the scope of such laws. 1 9
A more recent decision on what constitutes regulation by state law
is to be found in FTC v. Travelers Health Association,'60 and in the
Court of Appeal's decision on remand from the United States Supreme
Court.1 61 In this case, Nebraska attempted to regulate its domestic insurer to the extent that it could control the company's extraterritorial
activities. The case was unlike the National Casualty case wherein
the state regulation, relied on to replace the federal law, was the
law of the state whose residents had been the subject of the insurer's advertising activities. The United States Supreme Court concluded:
...that when Congress provided that the Federal Trade Commission Act would be displaced to the extent that the insurance
business was 'regulated' by state law, it referred only to regulation by the State where the business activities have their operative force.' 62
This conclusion, which reflected the view that only effective state regulation within a given state will satisfy the requirements of the McCarran
Act, was fortified by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in
Travelers Health on remand from the United States Supreme Court.
The Court stated:
To the extent, therefore, that a state . . .must depend on any

provisions, instrumentalities or processes of another state, we
believe that its situation cannot, within the McCarran-Ferguson
Act, be held to be 'regulated by state law.' The state must itself
be legally able to do, through its own provisions, instrumentalities and processes, everything16 that is necessary to the effecting
of control as to its situAtion.
2. Who Determines the "Effectiveness" of State Laws?
As stated above, the moratorium period after the passage of the
McCarran Act was intended to be a period during which the states
themselves could examine and evaluate the effectiveness of their insurance regulatory laws. Thereafter, who should determine the effectiveness of state regulation became another question. One commentator
looked at the broad powers of regulation and investigation possessed
by the FTC and stated:
No matter how neatly we button up state supervision, both by
regulatory law and enforcement, most lawyers doubt that anything can be done by the states to prevent FTC investigations;
FTC's power to prod and needle state regulation
therein lies 6the
4
constantly.1
159 KLINE: 143.
160 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
161 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).

162 FTC v. Travelers Health Association, 362 U.S. 293, 301-02
163 Travelers Health Association v. FTC, 298 F.2d 820, 823
164 Gilmore, Note 149 supra, at 408-409.

(1960).
(8th Cir. 1962).
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Several years later, the issue was presented to the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals in Crafts v. FTC.'65 The FTC charged a California
accident and health insurer with injuring the public by use of unfair
and deceptive acts and practices. The company advertised and solicited
business by mailings into a number of states. Crafts was subpoenaed
as a witness by the FTC, and was ordered to produce sample policies,
letters, pamphlets and circulars that were used by the company in its
interstate mail order business.
A federal district court issued an order enforcing the subpoena, and
Crafts appealed, claiming that the investigation was not shown to be
within the power of the FTC, and therefore the material demanded
was not relevant to an investigation that the Commission had power
to conduct. The claim, therefore, was that the court must decide whether
or not the McCarran Act removed this power from the FTC.
In support of the order enforcing its subpoena, the Commission
argued that the District Court had no authority to determine whether
the Commission had the power to initiate the investigation, and that
this matter was up to the discretion of the Commission. In response
to this, Crafts claimed that the insurer was a California corporation,
and therefore subject to California's complete and effective control of
the insurance business, thereby limiting the power of the Commission.
The court refused to determine the extent to which California laws
limited the power of the Commission, except insofar as the facts of
the case demanded.
The Court of Appeals reversed the order of the District Court because the subpoena was so broad, and the complaint so far reaching
that the court could see no limitation on the Commission's power of
investigation. More importantly, with respect to the question of who
should examine the effectiveness of state insurance regulation, the Court
of Appeals stated:
We hold that not only did the District Court have jurisdiction
to decide, but also that it is required to decide whether the [California] statutes have withdrawn the power from the Commission
to regulate the particular area of interstate commerce in insurance solely when the court is moved to enforce a subpoena so
definite in demand for specific books or papers that the scope
of authority may be defined. 166 (Emphasis supplied.)
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeak
in a short per curiam decision, 167 citing only Endicott Johnson Corp. v.
Perkins,68 and Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling.'69 Each of
these cases held that when Congress had demonstrated its intent to
165 244 F.2d 882 (1957).
166 Id. at 895.
167 355 U.S. 9 (1957), rehearing denied 355 U.S. 995 (1957).
168 317 U.S. 501 (1943).
169 327 U.S. 186 (1946)
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vest an administrative body with broad investigatory powers, that body's
subpoenas should be enforced by a District Court, and the court is
not a proper body to determine the extent of the administrative body's
jurisdiction. Therefore, it appears that the Federal Trade Commission
has the power to investigate in order to establish its jurisdiction to
regulate the insurance business. Of course, the Supreme Court is the
ultimate arbiter. Nevertheless, the FTC itself is the body that, at least
initially, evaluates the effectiveness of state regulation to determine
when the Commission is precluded from regulating insurance, and
when it is not.
B. FTC REGULATORY ACTION AFTER THE McCAluRN ACT
Even though section 2(b) 70 of the McCarran Act provided a
moratorium period until June 30, 1948, during which time the Federal
Trade Commission Act was not to apply to the insurance industry, the
FTC began its investigation of state insurance regulation before the
period had ended. On May 7, 1948, the FTC directed its General
Counsel to investigate state regulation so that the Commission could
determine the extent of limitation on its proceedings. Accordingly, the
laws of each state, the District of Columbia and the territories were
surveyed ".... with the view of determining the nature and extent of
any laws which it is thought may effect the application of the Federal
Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Act to practices in the insurance
business which might be violative of such acts."''l The report of the
General Counsel discussed the development of case law before and after
the enactment of the McCarran Act, and discussed the laws that had
been passed by the states to regulate the insurance business. No attempt
was made to evaluate the quality of the state laws, nor to pass upon the
sufficiency of the enforcement of those laws.
While this study of state regulation was being conducted, a special
committee of the NAIC' 2 met with the Commission to discuss proposed trade practice rules for the mail order insurance industry. As a
result of this meeting, the FTC promulgated 24 mail order insurance
trade practice rules of conduct, to be effective February 3, 1950. These
rules were designed to apply to advertising and sales activities of mail
order insurers who sold insurance without agents licensed in the state
of sale, and to communications through newspapers, radio broadcasts,
magazines, letters, testimonials and endorsements." 3 They prohibited
the following practices as unfair methods of competition:" 74 general
deception; misleading descriptions of policies, benefits, coverages; de170

15 U.S.C.A. §1012(b).

171 Thomerson, supra note 156, at 333.
13721949 PROCEEDINGS 395. See also Robison, Regulation of Unlicensed Insurers,

1950 INs. L. J. 726, 730.

173 1950 INs. L. J. 123.

".4 15 F. R. 599 (Doc. 50-960). See also 1950 INs. L. J. 123-25.
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ceptive concealment of exceptions, medical requirements, different benefits for the same losses, or reduction of payments; and many other
deceptive or misleading practices which involved the coverage, service
and payment of claims under the policy.
Since these rules were in effect for several years, and others have
been subsequently promulgated, a brief discussion of the nature and
effect of a commission trade practice rule is in order. Trade practice
conference rules are promulgated by the Commission with the cooperation of the industry to which they apply. The rules do not have the force
or effect of law. But rather, they interpret the laws which the Commission administers so that the particular industry may act without violating
those laws. The rules, when promulgated, are voluntarily accepted by
the industry, and all who do such business are bound. They may be
classed either as Group I rules, 175 which are concerned with practices
considered to be violations of the laws which the Commission administers, or as Group II rules, 7 6 which are the industry's recommendation as to what constitutes sound business methods. Nonobservance of
Group II rules does not constitute a per se violation of any law the
Commission administers.177 The trade practice rules that have been enacted for the mail order accident and health industry are Group I
rules.178
The industry for which the rules are given may form a representative
trade practice committee to cooperate with the FTC in disseminating,
discussing, or revising the rules. The industry committee may not, however, interpret the rules, correct violations, or hear complaints, this being
the function of the FTC. The Commission is empowered to correct violations of Group I rules, and may also take appropriate action if Group
II violations threaten to harm the public.' 9
The mail order accident and health industry operated under these
Trade Practice Rules without further FTC action until 1954,180 at which
time Congressional hearings were held to investigate accident and health
insurance. Following closely after this action, the FTC announced that
it, too, would investigate the advertising and promotional material of
the accident and health industry. Mail order accident and health insurers
sent samples of their advertising material and policies to the Commission. Subsequently, the FTC filed complaints against forty-one companies seeking cease and desist orders to stop alleged misleading advertising practices.
Following the lead of the NAIC, the FTC, in 1956, promulgated
CCH TRADE REG. REP. 40200 §17.3.
Id. §17.4.
See generally 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1140020-40.

175 4
176
177

178 McCarter 96.

179 See generally 4 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11140050-70. See also KLINE 147-49.
180 See Fraizer, Federal Trade Commission Jurisdiction?, 22 INS. COUNSEL J.
467, 468-69 (1955).
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sixteen trade practice rules "directed to the elimination and prevention
of harmful acts and practices in connection with the sale and offering
for sale of accident and health insurance.""" s Several states challenged
the authority of the FTC to issue these rules, stating that their own
advertising laws, and the NAIC's advertising rules sufficiently regulated this aspect of mail order accident and health insurance. The dispute was finally presented to a court as a result of the 1954 FTC complaints issued against the American Hospital and National Casualty
Companies, discussed above. Based on its 1950 Rules, which closely
resembled the 1956 Rules, the FTC maintained that American Hospital and National Casualty had used false, misleading and deceptive
advertising practices in the course of their mail order accident and
health business. In each case 8 2 the United States Supreme Court found
that the states into which the advertising was sent had enacted legislation proscribing such unfair insurance advertising and provided a
system to enforce this legislation. The Court went on to say that
"there is no question but that the States possess ample means to regulate this advertising within their respective boundaries."'1 3 Since the
satisfaction of the McCarran Act proviso precluded FTC jurisdiction,
the Commission, in response to this decision, dismissed all pending cases
which arose out of its 1954 investigation, except those against direct
mail advertisers,'8 4 and withdrew its general accident and health advertising rules.
After the National Casualty decision, the principle seemed settled
that any advertising activity performed by an insurer within one state
was beyond the regulation of the FTC if that state regulated the
activity. The FTC still maintained, however, that it had jurisdiction
over direct mail order insurers, who sent their advertising from one
state into another. This issue was presented in Travelers Health Association v. FTC,'s5 in which the Nebraska insurer transacted health and
accident business by mail with residents of every state. Nebraska had
an Unfair Competition and Trade Practices Act which applied to
domestic insurers' activities in other states.8s The Eighth Circuit Court
of Appeals S7 found that this statute subjected the insurer to control
by the Nebraska Insurance Department, and that the solicitation of the
accident and health insurance by mail in Nebraska or anywhere was
therefore regulated by state law. Hence, the court decided that the
FTC was without authority to regulate the practices of Travelers in
181 1956 INs. L. J. 605.
182 See pp. 201-202 supra.

FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560, 564 (1958).
Mertz, The First Twenty Years-A Case-Law Commentary on Insurance
Regulation Under The Commerce Clause, p. 45 (1965).
185 362 U.S. 293 (1960).
186 NE. INs. LAWs §§44-1501, 44-1521 (1963).
187 Travelers Health Association v. FTC, 262 F.2d 241 (8th Cir. 1959).
183
84

'
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soliciting insurance, and this applied to both intrastate and interstate
insurance.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, relying on Judge
Vogel's lower court dissent which branded the Nebraska statute as
impractical and ineffective. It was Judge Vogel's view that the Nebraska statute, in regulating deceptive statutes in other states, was not
"... the kind of state law that Congress had in mind""' when it passed
the McCarran Act. The Supreme Court agreed, stating:
But we cannot believe that this kind of law of a single State
takes from the residents of every other state the protection of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. In our opinion the State
regulation which Congress provided should operate to displace
this federal law means regulation by the
State in which the
8 9
deception is practiced and has its impactY.

Therefore, the FTC still has jurisdiction in this situation. Unlike the
National Casualty'9" case, in which advertising was regulated by the
state in which it was mailed and received, the FTC regulation was not
displaced by state regulation.
Shortly after this case was decided, the FTC began working directly
with the NAIC to prevent unfair advertising practices in the mail order
accident and health industry. In 1963, the FTC and the NAIC's federal liaison committee agreed upon a procedure for handling complaints
in this area of advertising.' 9' The procedure adopted by the FTC to
process complaints is simple. If the FTC believes that it has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, it will initiate the necessary action, notify the insurance commissioner of the state in which
the insurer is domiciled, and notify the NAIC. If the FTC finds that
it does not have jurisdiction, it will transmit the complaint to the commissioner in the insurer's state of domicile and will send copies of the
complaint to the state in which the complainant resides and to the NAIC.
Similarly, the NAIC adopted a procedure for each commissioner to
follow when he received a complaint concerning an unauthorized mail
order insurer's advertising. 92 The commissioner was to refer the complaint to the domiciliary state's insurance department. If that department took no action, the commissioner who received the complaint
was to send the complaint to the FTC and the NAIC for further action.
Apparently, this procedure has not proven to be effective, as is
shown by the results of a study and survey conducted by a subcommittee of the NAIC in 1966.193 The survey, which included all fifty
18s Id. at 245.
189 FTC v. Travelers Health Association, 362 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1960).
190 FTC v. National Casualty Co., 357 U.S. 560 (1958). See Palmer, supra
note 151, at 69.
191 See The National Underwriter, Nov. 16, 1963, p. 25.
'92 See 2 PROCEEDINGS 539 (1963).
193 See 2 PROCEEDINGS
- (1966).
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states and the territories, disclosed that forty-six states had received
complaints about deceptive advertising by unlicensed mail order companies. Even though these complaints should have been forwarded to
the domiciliary state under the 1963 joint FTC-NAIC resolution, only
thirty-six states stated that they had forwarded the complaints and, of
these states, only nineteen answered that they had received very good
or good cooperation. The survey also revealed that, of the fifty-three
states and territories which responded, only one had forwarded any
complaints to the FTC. More significantly, in response to a question
concerning the effectiveness of the 1963 NAIC-FTC resolution, only
four states found the procedure to be effective, while eighteen states
said the procedure was not effective. In addition, fifteen states said
the resolution only partly solves the problem, and fourteen states gave
no opinion.9 4 An interesting response came from one state insurance
department which said it was completely unaware of the existence of
the 1963 NAIC-FTC resolution.
In 1964, the FTC, perhaps sensing that its agreement with the
NAIC would not prove to be effective,' 95 issued "Guides for the Mail
Order Insurance Industry" to be effective July 14, 1964.196 The Guides
were issued to prevent the deception of purchasers of such insurance,
and each of the fourteen Guides proscribed certain practices. In brief,
the Guides cover general deception; advertisements of benefits, losses
covered or premiums, health requirements; disclosure of certain provisions; use of statistics; identification of policies and type of policy
involved; and statements about the insurer 19 r A principal requirement
is that all advertisements referring to benefits, losses or premium be
accompanied by clear disclosure of any exceptions, reductions or limitations.198
In summary, it can be concluded that the FTC has a lively and
active interest in exercising control over direct mail order insurers. It
has acted both in conflict with and in cooperation with individual state
insurance commissioners and the NAIC. However, armed with (1)
relatively broad statutory authority over unfair trade practices, (2)
jurisdiction to initiate cease and desist or investigatory proceedings,
and (3) the Travelers Health decision, the FTC is in an excellent
position to exercise substantial control over the activities of direct mail
94 Twenty-seven states thought the procedure would be more effective if, upon

failure to secure cooperation from the domiciliary state, the complaint be.
forwarded to the NAIC Executive Secretary who in turn would forward
complaints to the FTC in the NAIC's name rather than in the name of the
individual state. Ibid. See The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1.
95 See The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1.
19 96 F. R. 6381.
apt See generally The National Underwriter, June 6, 1964, p. 22 (editorial).
19s See1 Guides, supra note 196, and The National Underwriter, Aay 16, 1964,
p. .
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order insurers. This, in turn, could make the FTC a prime challenger
to the system of state regulation. 1 9
C.

NAIC

AND STATE ACTION TO REGULATE TIE MAIL ORDER
ACCIDENT AND HEALTH INDUSTRY

1. The NAIC
The foregoing discussion of the activities of the FTC would not be
complete without considering the action taken by the NAIC and the
individual states which, after the passage of the McCarran Act, sought
to keep the FTC out of insurance regulation by formulating and
adopting model laws. In December, 1948, the NAIC approved the
Unauthorized Insurers Process Act.2 0 The purpose of this act is to
subject insurers to the jurisdiction of courts in actions brought by
or on behalf of the insured parties or beneficiaries. The law provides
for substituted service of process. If the insurer performs in the state,
an act specified in the statute, this is deemed to constitute appointment
of the commissioner as the insurer's attorney for service of process purposes. The specified acts include (1) issuance or delivery of insurance
policies to state residents or corporations licensed to do business in
the state, (2) solicitation of applications for such insurance, (3) collection of premiums, fees or assessments for such contracts, or (4) any
other transaction of business. The company must either deposit a bond
or become licensed before it defends the action. In addition, if a refusal to pay a claim is found to be vexatious, the insurer is also liable
for the insured's attorney's fees.
The NAIC also adopted the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act20 1 as a means to regulate the mail order insurance
industry. The purpose of the Act is to subject unauthorized mail order
insurers to the jurisdiction of the state insurance commissioner and
to the jurisdiction of the state courts. The commissioner may initiate
remedial action on his own without having to wait for a complaint
from some local resident. The law focuses on an unauthorized insurer's advertising which misrepresents the insurer's financial condition, contract terms, benefits provided, or dividends paid in violation
of the Unfair Trade Practices Act. If an insurer does participate in
such activities, the commissioner must notify the insurer and the commissioner of the insurer's state of domicile. If such false advertising
activities are not stopped within 30 days after the notice, the commissioner is authorized to proceed against the insurer according to the
terms of the Unfair Trade Practice Act discussed above.2 0 2 The law
199 See generally Gilmore, Governinent and the Insurance Business, 1950 INs.
L. J. 408.
200 1949 PROCEEDINGS 315-16. The Act may be found in id. at 127-30.
201
PRECEEDINGS 309, 316 (1961). The Act may be found in 2 PROCEEDINGS
507-09 (1960). See generally KLINE 101-03.
202 See p. 188 supra.
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provides for substituted service of process on the commissioner. The
acts which constitute appointment of the commissioner as agent for
service of process under this law are the same four acts described for
that purpose in the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act. In addition,
service may be made on any person who is soliciting insurance; making, issuing or delivering contracts of insurance; or collecting premiums
on behalf of the insurer. Although this act does not cover all aspects
of the unauthorized insurer problem, it does provide comprehensive
control in a limited area if the state has jurisdiction and if the com20 3
missioners' orders can be enforced.
The Unauthorized Insurers Process Act has been adopted in all
states, 204 and the Unauthorized Insurers False Advertising Process Act
has been adopted in at least eight states. 20 5 These acts were designed
to cover the operating procedures of mail order accident and health
insurers, and are based upon a clear state interest to provide protection
for citizens from such misleading practices. 206 The widespread adoption of both (if they are deemed to be constitutional) would afford
both private individuals and the state a means to seek corrective measures against unauthorized mail order insurers.
The most recent NAIC action pertaining to direct mail order insurance was a resolution adopted during the June, 1966 annual meeting. Discussion of this resolution is deferred until the section on com20 7
pulsory licensing.
2. Action Taken by the States
In addition to, or in lieu of, adoption of the Uniform Insurers
Process Act and the Uniform Insurers False Advertising Process Act,
several states have sought different approaches to control mail order
unauthorized insurers. These approaches can be grouped into two basic
categories: (a) advertising regulation and (b) non-advertising regulation. No attempt has been made to present an exhaustive review of the
statutes and regulations of every state. Nevertheless, the following discussion should be representative.
a. Attempts to Regulate Advertising
At the present time several states are considering legislation that
would regulate advertising by prohibiting companies domiciled in that
203See generally Report to the NAIC Subcommittee to Study and Review

State Insurance Laws: Direct-Mail Insurance Advertisors by Industry Advisory Committee, 2 PROCEDINGs 489-501 (1960) and Second Report, 1 PRo-

CEEDINGS 310-13 (1961).
204_As of 1960, forty-eight

states had enacted the UIPA, Laws and Legislation
Comm. Rep., 2 PRoCEMINGS 511 (1961). Wisconsin adopted its Unauthorized Insurance Statute which includes the UIPA, Wis. STAT. §201.42 (1961),
and Minnesota adopted the act in 1961, MINN. STAT. §§60.921-60.926.

205As of 1961, eight states have adopted the UIFAPA, Laws and Legislation
Comm. 2 PRocEDIFGS 512 (1961).
206 See 2 PROCEDINGs 493 (1960)
207 See p. 321 infra.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

state from sending mail order advertisements into states in which the
company is not licensed.208
Another approach is found in the Pennsylvania Penal Code, 0 9 which
provides that any person who publishes or broadcasts an advertisement
or form of solicitation for an insurance company or person which has
not been authorized to do business in Pennsylvania is guilty of a misdemeanor. Upon conviction, such person shall be sentenced to imprisonment for not more than one year and fined not more than $500, or both.
Before the publisher or broadcaster accepts any advertisement or solicitation for dissemination to the public, the publishing company or
broadcasting station must have in its possession a true and attested
copy of a certificate of authority from the Pennsylvania Insurance
Department stating that the insurer is authorized to do business in the
state. Although the law does not apply to advertising originating from
another state, it would seem to provide ample deterrence to advertising
and solicitation originating within the state. Maryland, Massachusetts
and Georgia, for example, have similar provisions in their insurance laws.21 0 Of course, statutes of this type have limited effectiveness
since they do not reach newspaper, periodical, radio or television advertisements originating outside of the state.211
In 1963 the New York Insurance Department sponsored the so-called
Condon-Russo bill, which would have prohibited all persons, corporations
or associations from publishing, broadcasting or televising in the state
advertisements of unauthorized insurers through any newspaper, periodical, radio or television station. Furthermore, the bill prohibited the distribution in the state of newspapers, periodicals or other written media
printed outside the state containing advertisements of unauthorized insurers, unless such advertisements contained conspicuous language, stating that the insurer was not licensed to do business in the state of New
York.2"
The controversial bill was vetoed by Governor Rockefeller on the
basis that it would have unintended

consequences.2 13 The memo-

randum accompanying the veto noted that an advertisement for an unlicensed insurer printed in another state could be distributed in New
York if it carried the required statement. However, if the material
was printed in New York, it could not contain the prohibited advertise208 See The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1. This is one version of the
so-called compulsory licensing approach which is discussed in some detail.
See pp. 311-312 infra.
209 18 PA. STAT. ANN. §4689. See The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1.
210 MD.

INS. CODE §201(b)

(1963) ; MASS. INS. LAW §160A (1954) ; 56 GA. CODE

ANN. 602(2) (1960).
211 See generally KLINE 97-99.
212 N.Y. Sen. Bill Intro. 2551, Assem. Bill Intro. 4164, 105th Prelim. Rep. of
Sup. of Ins. to N.Y. Legis Covering Calendar Year 1963, p. 124. See The Naational Underwriter, Apr. 4, 1964, p. 1.
213 The National Underwriter, May 2, 1964, p. 1.
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ment, even with such statement. The governor feared that a standard
based on the place of printing afforded a readily available means for
evasion. Also, while the sponsors of the bill maintained that the law
would not be applied to trade papers not distributed to the consuming
public, such an exception was not incorporated into the bill. Accordingly, there was no certainty that this exception would be available.214
Furthermore, publishers of material having a national circulation would
either have to print a special edition for New York or include the required warning in all advertisements printed, including those in copies
distributed in states where the company is licensed. A special edition
would involve substantial additional expense. The inclusion of a warning in all material could unduly prejudice the company in those states
in which it was licensed. Both alternatives appear to be unsatisfactory.
Instead of attempting to regulate the advertising of unauthorized
mail order insurers through legislative action, several states have enlisted the voluntary cooperation of the advertising media to refrain
from accepting such advertising. For example, some insurance departments have asked local newspapers to cooperate by refusing to publish
advertising of those insurers not properly licensed to do business in
that state.2 15 To keep the newspapers informed as to the identity of
the licensed companies, several states regularly publish the list of authorized insurers. Not only does this guide the newspapers in their
selection of advertising, but also informs the public as to which
companies are licensed.2 6 Another approach employed by insurance
departments, when an unauthorized insurer is conducting an advertising campaign, is to release articles through local newspapers. These
releases are intended to warn the public that the department has no
authority over unlicensed out-of-state insurers and to caution that the
state cannot adequately protect those citizens who purchase such insurance.2 1: 7 The Massachusetts commissioner, by statute, is authorized
to publish a notice setting forth the name of the unauthorized insurer,
the fact that it is not licensed, and other pertinent facts including instability, business policies, operaformation as to the insurer's financial
218
tions, management and reliability.
b. Non Advertising Regulation
Even before the SE UA case, there had been some attempts to exert
control over unauthorized insurers. In 1938, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Unauthorized Insurers Act.219 The Act prohibits a person, association or
214
215

Ibid.
See The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1, and see generally

99-100.

The National Underwriter, June 20, 1964, p. 19, and June 27, 1964, p. 2.
The National Underwriter, Apr. 23, 1966, p. 1.
218 MASS. INS. LAW §160B (1963).
216
217

219

9C U.L.A. 303.

KLINE

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

corporation from acting as an agent in the state for an unauthorized
insurer or from acting for an insured by placing business with such
an insurer. It also prohibits one from aiding an unauthorized insurer
in transacting business in the state (e.g. by investigating risks or losses).
In addition, it prohibits representing or aiding an insurer effecting insurance in another state where the insurer is not authorized. However,
the provisions of the law do not apply to reinsurance, authorized surplus lines business, certain types of risks, nor to activities of the insurer in adjusting losses if the policy was formed in a state in which
the insurer was authorized.2 0 Furthermore, the Act provided for substituted service of process on the insurance commissioner in an action
on an insurance policy issued by an unauthorized insurer. The process
may also be served upon any person in the state who solicits insurance,
makes or delivers contracts, or collects premiums for the unauthorized
insurer.22 The Act also denies the unauthorized insurer the right to
institute any action in the enacting state on its transactions until the
insurer becomes licensed. Finally, before the unauthorized insurer may
defend an action brought against it, it must either deposit a bond with
the court or become licensed in the state. 2 2 It might be noted that the
sections dealing with substituted service of process and defense of actions served as the basis of the NAIC's Unauthorized Insurers Process
Act discussed above. 21 Unlike the UIPA, only a few states have enacted the Unauthorized Insurers Act.? 4
The NAIC did not entirely concur with the uniform act promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws. In 1941 the Committee on Laws and Legislation proposed a bill
commonly referred to as the Uniform Reciprocal Licensing Law or
the Uniform Unauthorized Insurance Statute.22 5 The proposed law imposed on the commissioner the duty of revoking the certificate of authority of a domestic insurer who transacts or solicits business in a
jurisdiction where it is not licensed. At least sixteen states have enacted this law in some form.2 2 6 California adopted a similar approach
except that it included the principle of reciprocity, i.e., the statute applies only to those insurers transacting business in states which have
a comparable statute applying to their insurers which transact business
7
in California.2
The purpose of this review of NAIC and individual state action is
to indicate, not to evaluate, some of the approaches employed to exer220 Id. §§1-4 at 306-07.
221 Id.
222 Id. §§6-7 at 310-11.
223 See generally KLINE
224 See

§5 at 308.

9C U.L.A. 303.

25

226
227

51-53.

1941 PROCEEDINrGS 147-48. See KLINE 53-54.
2 PROCEEDINGS 511 (1961).
CALIF. INS. CODE §706-7. Certain exceptions are specified.
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cise control over unauthorized insurers. In our subsequent discussion
we hope to show that, once a state selects the method it desires to
employ, there may be a good possibility that jurisdiction can be acquired
and regulations can be enforced against out of state unauthorized mail
order insurers.
V.
A.

JURISDICTION OVER UNAUTHORIZED MAIL
ORDER INSURERS
THE WISCONSIN UNAUTHORIZED INSURANCE STATUTE
AND THE MINISTERS LIFE CASE

Into the unsettled area of who should regulate unauthorized mail
order insurers and how it should be done, the Wisconsin legislature injected a new element. In 1961, it enacted an Unauthorized Insurance
Law which, in essence, prohibits the doing of an insurance business,
as liberally defined by statute, by an unauthorized insurer.2 Provision
is made for substituted service of process in suits brought against the
unauthorized insurer by insureds, beneficiaries or by the state.2 9 A 3
per cent premium tax, as well as fines, is imposed on unauthorized
insurers. 23 0 Since other states and the NAIC are considering following
Wisconsin's lead, 231 a more detailed evaluation of this statute's provisions and purposes will be made later in this article.23 2 For now, we
shall concentrate on its constitutional validity.
In 1962, Ministers Life and Casualty Union, an unlicensed foreign
mail order insurance company, brought a suit against the Wisconsin
Insurance Commissioner for a declaratory judgment that, aside from
the provisions for substituted service of process, the statute is invalid
23 3
and unconstitutional as applied to it and other mail order insurers.
The constitutionality of the statute was upheld at the circuit court
leve 2 3 4 and affirmed by the Wisconsin Supreme Court.2 35 Being a test
case financed by three trade associations, 236 the decision is now on appeal
to the United States Supreme Court. Since this case promises to be a
landmark decision as to the constitutional ability of.the states to regulate mail order insurance companies, and since Ministers Life's mode
of operation seems typical of such insurers, frequent reference will be
made to it in the ensuing discussion.
WIS. INs. CODE 201.42(2), (3) (1965).
WIs. INS. CODE §201.42(1), (4) and (5) (1965).
230 See Wis. INs. CODE §201.42 (11) and (13) (1965).
231 See note 5 supra.
23 See pp. 261-270 infra.
233 Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis2d 339, 141 N.W.2d
228

229

23

287, 288 (1966).

4 Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Manson, Memorandum Opinion #111-

235

513 Dane County Circuit Court, Oct. 8, 1964.
Ministers Life and Casualty Union. v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d
287 (1966).

230 30

Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, 288 (1966).
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To render a valid judgment in an in personam proceeding 37 a court
must possess jurisdiction 2 38 Jurisdiction can be said to consist of three
basic elements: (1) the competency of the court to hear the case, (2)
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and (3) jurisdiction of
2

the state.

39

The first element has reference to whether or not the court is authorized to hear the case under state law (either statutory or decisional).
This is a question peculiar to the laws of each individual state. For the
purpose of this article, the court's competency to hear a case involving
a mail order insurer will be assumed.
The other two elements of jurisdiction stem from the requirements
of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.140 The state
must provide a reasonable means of giving notice to the person being
subjected to jurisdiction and the notice must afford him reasonable time
to appear and be heard.2 41 Ever since Hess v. Pawloski2 42 and Wuchter
v. Pizzuti,243 a statute making a state official the person to receive

process coupled with a provision making it reasonably probable that
notice will be communicated to the defendant (e.g., registered mail to
last known address) has been considered sufficient to meet the adequate
notice requirements of the due process clause.2 44 Therefore, for the
purpose of this article, the ability of the state to serve adequate notice
on foreign mail order insurers will be assumed.
In the mail order insurer situation, the third element of jurisidction
involves the extent of the state's power to regulate and tax such insurers. At what point does the due process clause impose limits on this
power?
Another question can be raised. Did Congress, in passing the McCarran Act, intend that a state's power be limited by the older
more restricted concepts of due process rather than by the more liberal
current concepts? This point is forcibly urged by Ministers Life with
substantial reliance on State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards
Corp.245 However, we question the validity of this contention and sub-

mit that the prevailing concepts of due process govern the extent of
-3An action seeking a decree or judgment ordering a person to pay money,
do an act or refrain from doing an act is an in personam proceeding. Foster,
Personal Jurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L. REv.
522, 523.
238 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
239 See RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTS §§5-8 (1942). For a different breakdown see
Foster, sitpra note 237 at 523-27.
240 "nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law," U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
241 Foster, supra note 237, at 525. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank and
Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927);
compare Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
242 274 U.S. 352 (1927).
243 276 U.S. 13 (1928).
244 See e.g., McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
245 State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
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the state's ability to regulate and tax mail order insurers. The Todd
case represents only one of many decisions interpreting the due process
clause. After reviewing the status of the law prior to Todd, the impact
of Todd can better be understood.
B. STATE POLICE POWER AND LIMITATIONS THEREON
The evolution of the doctrine of due process with respect to a
state's jurisdiction over foreign corporations has a long and entangled
history. To place these cases in perspective, it may be helpful to recall
some fundamental propositions. There are two basic considerations
which determine the validity of a state's regulatory statute: (1) Does
the regulation fall within the legitimate exercise of the state's police
power, and (2) if so, is this power limited by some provision in the
United States Constitution?
In our political system, both the state and federal governments acquire their power from the people. Whereas the national government
possesses only those specific powers delegated to it by the federal Constitution, the state governments possess all powers not expressly denied
to them. The police power of a state consists of the authority to regulate its internal affairs for the protection and promotion of public
health, welfare and morals.2 46 There is little doubt but that the exercise
of state control over insurance constitutes a valid use of the state police
power. Insurance protection contributes vitally to the health and welfare of state citizens. "Government has always had a special relation
to insurance.

' 247

Furthermore, such regulation falls within the well

settled rule that a state may exclude, restrict, or regulate a foreign
corporation or a business that desires to do, or is doing, business within
the state.

248

The jurisdictional power of the state, being limited by federal constitutional provisions, is not absolute. However, a foreign mail order
insurer would not be sheltered from state regulation by the privileges
and immunities clause, 249 since such a company is not a citizen within
the meaning of this provision.2 50 The provision that no state shall pass
any law "impairing the obligation of contracts" 251 could interfere with a
state's ability to regulate a foreign mail order insurance company, but
only to the extent that such state law attempted to act retroactively so
as to impair pre-existing obligations. Being primarily concerned with
See 16 Am. JuR.2d Const. Law. §283 (1964).
Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 65 (1940).
248E.g., Bothwell v. Buckbee, Mears Co., 275 U.S. 274, 276-77 (1927); Hooper
246

247

v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 652 (1895) ; Paul v. Virginia 75 U. S. (8 Wall.)
168, 181 (1868).

"The citizens of each state shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
citizens in the several states." U.S. CONST. art. IV, §2.
250 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
251 U.S. CONST. art. I, §10.
249
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state regulatory measures having prospective application, this study
will bypass consideration of the contract clause.
A foreign mail order insurer is a "person" within the meaning of
the constitutional provisions relating to equal protection of the law
and due process of law guarantees. 52 However, the United States
Supreme Court held in Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamine 5 3 that
a regulatory tax which discriminated against foreign insurers in favor
of local insurance companies does not violate either due process or the
equal protection provisions because of the regulatory power vested in
the states by the McCarran Act. This case, in effect, discarded the equal
protection limitation with respect to the exercise of state police power
over foreign insurers.
The commerce clause of the United States Constitution 5 4 has vested
the exclusive control of interstate commerce in Congress. During the
period from Paul v. Virginia25 5 (in which the Supreme Court held
that insurance was not interstate commerce) to the United States v.
South-Eastern UnderwritersAssociation256 (in which the Court reached
the opposite conclusion), the commerce clause had no limiting effect
on insurance regulation. Congress, following the SEUA decision, enacted the McCarran Act to remove commerce clause impediments to
state regulation of insurance. Even though the SEUA case stated that
the business of insurance was interstate commerce, and therefore subject to the exclusive control of Congress, the McCarran Act was passed
by Congress "to give support to the existing and future state systems
for regulating and taxing the business of insurance. 2 5 7 As demonstrated by the Prudential case, the Supreme Court considered the support of Congress as sustaining the state regulations from attack under
the commerce clause, and held that this did not constitute an unlawful
delegation of its powers. In short, the Court laid to rest any notions
that the commerce clause had any vitality in limiting state regulation
2 58
and taxation of insurance so long as the McCarran Act endures.
Accordingly, in examining the constitutional validity of an exercise
of the state's police or taxing power over foreign mail order insurers,
discussion need center on the only constitutional restriction which may
possess vitality in this area, i.e., the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment. The term "due process of law" has not been defined by
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936).
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 437-38 (1946); See
Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Read, 325 U.S. 673, 678 (1945).
254 U.S. CONsT. art. I, §8.
255 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
256 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
257 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).
258 "Congress promptly passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act.... which provided
that the regulation and taxation of insurance should be left to the States,
without restriction by reason of the Commerce Clause." State Board of
Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 452 (1962).
252
253
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the federal or state constitutions. The best method to examine this concept is to review various judicial responses to the assertion of the due
process argument in the past.
The question, to what extent does the due process clause limit the
exercise of a state's jurisdiction over a foreign insurer, raises two
related but distinct areas for inquiry. First, to what extent may a
state's regulation have extraterritorial impact (whether or not the
insurer is licensed in the state) without violating due process? And
second, how many and what type of contacts must a foreign unlicensed insurer have with the state in order to justify that state's control?
C.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF REGULATION WITH
EXTRATERRITORIAL IMPACT

The traditional rule with respect to extraterritorial impact of state

regulation has been stated as follows:
It is true that the State may regulate the activities of foreign
corporations within the State
but it cannot regulate or interfere
2 59
with what they do outside.

However, this doctrine has been eroded on several occasions. As early
as 1928, in Firemen's Insurance Company v. Beha,-60 judge Learned
Hand considered the constitutionality of a New York statute requiring
general conformity between domestic and foreign investments. New
York prohibited an insurer from investing funds exceeding 50 per cent
of its surplus in stocks of other insurance companies. Compliance with
this requirement by the foreign insurance company would have required a reshuffling of investments outside of New York. The insurer
contended that this extraterritorial statute was unconstitutional. In rejecting this argument, judge Hand said,
scarcely any condition can be imposed touching the financial
stability of a foreign corporation, which will not involve some
results elsewhere; it is enough that these be ancillary to the
accomplishment of genuinely local purposes connected with the
company's prospective business. Otherwise each state could set
the standard of security for the rest of the Union, an intolerable
limitation upon the autonomy of each community. 16 '
In more recent years, the Supreme Court, in Osborn v. Ozlin, said
The mere fact that state action may have repercussions beyond
state lines is of no judicial significance so long as the 26action
is
2
not within that domain which the Constitution forbids.
In this case, the Court upheld a statute requiring the participation of
resident agents on insurance placed with authorized companies. As
St. Louis Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. 346, 349 (1922).
26030 F.2d 539 (S.D.N.Y. 1928), aff'd. per curiam 278 U.S. 580 (1929).
261 Id. at 542.
262 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 62 (1940).
259
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Judge Hand did in the Firemen's case, Justice Frankfurter pointed out
that the state had a "definable interest" in what it was regulating. 263
The importance of the sufficiency of state interest in the object regulated is highlighted by contrasting Osborn v. Ozlin with Fidelity and
Deposit Company v. Tafoya.264 The statute in question in the latter
case made it unlawful for an insurer authorized to do business in New
Mexico to pay commissions for the placement of insurance on
New Mexico risks to any non-resident persons. The violation of this
provision was the basis for the suspension of the insurer's license. The
Court said that even though the state has the right to exclude a company from doing business, this right cannot be "used as a part of a
scheme to accomplish a forbidden result."2 65 The Court went on to
say "the words [of the statute] go beyond any legitimate interest of
*"266 (Emphasis supplied) It was the finding of sufficient
the State ..
state interest in Osborn and the lack of the same in Tafoya which
accounts for the different results. 26 7 Similarly, in other cases the Supreme Court has rejected the traditional extraterritorial doctrine when
it found the existence of sufficient state interest. 68
D.

SUFFICIENCY OF STATE CONTACTS AND STATE INTEREST
To MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF DUE PROCESS

The demonstration of state interest so as to justify the extraterritorial impact of state regulation, and thereby avoid violating the due
process clause, does not in and of itself fulfill all the requirements of
due process. The traditional test of a state's power to subject foreign
companies to its jurisdiction and regulation is whether or not the company is "doing business" within the state. A whole body of law has
evolved as to what facts and transactions constitute "doing business."
1. Three Levels of Analysis?
Some have felt that a distinction exists between due process cases
concerning state jurisdiction for purposes of service of process, regulation, and taxation.
The inquiry as to whether a corporation is "doing business" has
three significant aspects. It may determine (1) the power of the
state to impose local taxation, (2) whether the corporation falls
within the state's regulatory power, or (3) whether jurisdiction
exists for service of process.... The degree of activity or contact which is required varies according to the purpose for which
the foreign corporation is sought to be subjected to local laws....
Thus, a state may have jurisdiction over a foreign corporation
263

Id. at 65.

270 U.S. 426 (1926).
Id. at 434.
266 Id. at 435.
267 See Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 65 (1940).
268 See Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd., 348 U.S. 66, 72
(1954) ; State Farm Insurance Co. v. Duel, 324 U.S. 155, 159 (1945) ; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 320 (1943).
264
2
65
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by virtue of its local activities for the purposes of service of
process, whilst lacking the power to tax or regulate the same
corporation.2 69 (Citation omitted.)
Regulation appears to require more activities to justify the state's jurisdiction than does service of process, 27 0 but perhaps less than are required to sustain the state's taxing power.
[T]he Court has made it clear in late years that attempts at...
taxation have always been more carefully scrutinized and more
than police power regulations of aspects of
consistently resisted
2 71
such commerce.
This three level theory suggests that a case involving due process requirements as to service of process on a foreign corporation would not
be determinative of another case which involved the due process requirements as to taxing or regulatory statute. The standards of jurisdiction are said to differ.
However, this does not mean that the standards for each of these
three situations are wholly dissimilar. Although on occasion the United
States Supreme Court has distinguished standards for each of the different levels, 72 in other decisions the Court has applied the same standards of due process to service process, regulatory and tax cases alike.
This appears to be the trend in more recent cases. For example, in
International Shoe Co. v. Washington,2 73 the Court found that due
process was not violated by service of process on the defendant, a
foreign company, because it had established those minimum contacts
with the state to make it reasonable and just for the company to be
amenable to service of process, "according to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial justice. 2 74 In this case, the State of
Washington sought to recover from the defendant company unpaid
contributions to the state unemployment compensation fund. While
much of the Court's language went to the question of the validity of
the service of process, the decision carried with it a judgment against
the defendant company for the unpaid contributions. The Court said,
For Washington has made one of those activities, which taken
together establish appellant's "presence" there for purposes of
suit, the taxable event by which the state brings appellant within
the reach of its taxing power. The state thus has constitutional
269 Jeter v. Austin Trailer Equipment Co., 122 C.A.2d 376, 265 P.2d 130, 133-34
(1954).
270 See Liquid Veneer Corp. v. Smuckler, 90 F.2d 196, 202 (9th Cir., 1937). See
Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 COLum. L. REv. 1018, 1024-25, 1045
(1925).
271 Hartman, State Taxation of Interstate Commerce: A Survey and an Appraisal, 46 VA. L. Rav. 1051, 1065 (1960). Although the case referred to related
directly to the Commerce Clause, this article pointed out the overlapping
between due process and commerce clause concepts. Id. at 1058-65.
272 Cf. Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
273 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
274 Id. at 320.
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power to lay the tax and to subject appellant to suit to recover
it alike
it. The activities which establish its "presence" subject
to taxation by the state and to suit to recover the tax.275 (Emphasis supplied.)
It can be argued that this case, in effect, merges the standards of due
process as to service of process, regulatory and tax cases into one
standard.

276

2 77
the foreign
Likewise, in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,
mail order insurer protested Virginia's prohibition of the sale of insurance in that state without obtaining a permit to do so. The insurer
claimed that the state violated due process requirements because it
lacked legislative jurisdiction to regulate such insurance contracts and
because it lacked judicial jurisdiction to enforce the regulations. In
commenting upon the Court's decision, which upheld at least judicial
jurisdiction, Professor Foster stated that the United States Supreme
Court appeared
. . to treat the two objections as one: that as a due process
matter, the power of a state to create substantive regulations
which are binding against nonresidents is co-equal with the
power of the state to subject nonresidents to personal jurisdiction of its courts to enforce the regulations created.2 7 S (Emphasis
supplied.)
And,
The inference seems clear that on the facts of the Travelers
case, at least, the same standard of due process is employed to
test the exercise of judicial power as 2is7 9 employed to test the
exercise of substantive legislative power.

For our purposes, it is unnecessary to conclude that the merged,
rather than three level, theory is now the law. Even if it is not, the above
discussion suggests that service of process, regulatory and tax cases
need not be totally isolated from one another. At least it can be said
that the due process standards applicable to each significantly overlap
and are sufficiently comparable to render service of process cases relevant to the regulation and/or taxation of unauthorized mail order
insurers.
The Development of JurisdictionalTheory: Service of
Process Cases
a. The Early Concept of Doing Business
A review of the service of process cases is helpful for several
reasons. (1) Most of the early cases involved the attempt of state
2.

275 Id. at
276

321.

See KLINE 92-93. "It would appear that ... those 'contacts' which subject an
insurer to suit, also subject it to tax." Id. at 93.

U.S. 643 (1950).
237, at 567.
Ibid.

277339
278 Foster, supra note
279
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courts to assert jurisdiction for the purpose of litigation. Therefore a
review of these will provide the basic background from which the due
process jurisdictional concepts have evolved. (2) Under the three level
theory, the due process standard for sustaining jurisdiction in service
of process cases is the least rigorous. If the contacts existing in a
particular situation fail to meet the standard established by these cases,
such contacts will be insufficient to sustain a state's power to regulate
or tax. (3) The service of process cases lay down several principles
which have been transposed to, or at least significantly influenced, the
regulation and tax cases. (4) Furthermore, it might be argued that if
a state possesses sufficient interest to provide its citizens a means of
redress through the courts, it also possesses sufficient interest to prevent the abuses which make the means of redress necessary.
The starting point is the famous case, Pennoyer v. Neff,2 0 in which
the Supreme Court laid down the doctrine that a state court may not
render a valid personal judgment under the due proces clause of the
28
Fourteenth Amendment unless the defendant is within its jurisdiction. '
2
The foundation of jurisdiction is physical power. A foreign corporation is not within a state's jurisdiction unless it is "doing business"
in the state. 8 3 In general, two theories were used to establish doing
business. The first theory was founded on the state's ability to impose
conditions on a foreign company which desired to enter the state. If the
company conducted business activities in the state, such activities were
construed as implied consent to jurisdiction.28 4 A second theory viewed
such activities as manifesting the corporation's "presence' in the state
and therefore within the state's jurisdiction.28 5 Whichever theory was
used, the finding of implied consent or corporate presence was little
more than a conclusion of law. The important question became whether
the local corporate activities were sufficient to warrant the finding of
corporate presence or implied consent.
b. The Minimum Contact Rule
In 1945, the Supreme Court handed down its landmark decision in
International Shoe Company v. Washington.5 8 The principles announced in this case had a devastating impact on former rigidly held
U.S. 714 (1877).

280 95
281 For
82

a brief discussion of this case see Foster, supra note 237, at 527-29.
McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1917).
283 International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 583 (1914); Connecticut
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratly, 172 U.S. 602, 610 (1899) ; see St. Clair
v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 355-56 (1882). See Foster, supra note 237, at 531-32.
284 Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratly, 172 U.S. 602, 613-14, 618
2

285

286

(1899).
International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579, 589 (1914). See generally
Foster, supra note 237, at 529-35; and, Kurland, The Supreme Court, The Due

Process Clause and the In PersonamJurisdiction of State Courts from Pennoyer to Denckla; A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. REv. 569, 577-86 (1958).
326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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notions of what constituted "doing business." The traditional test of
due process was abandoned.
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant
to a judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it
such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice."'

7

(Emphasis sup-

plied.)
The Court reasoned that to say a corporation is "present" so as to
satisfy due process merely begs the question. The term "presence"
does no more than symbolize those activities deemed sufficient to meet
the due process clause. The question is whether the contacts make it
reasonable "to require the corporation to defend the particular suit
which is brought there."2 8 Due process does not contemplate a judgment against a
defendant with which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations. .

.

. (Citation omitted.)

But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of
conducting activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and
protection of the laws of that state. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations, and, so far as those obligations
arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state,
a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce
them can, in most instances, hardly be said
28 9
to be undue.

Five years later, this liberalized concept of due process was applied to
an unauthorized mail order insurer when the Court upheld the substituted service of process used in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia.29o
McGee v. International Life Insurance Company291 represents the
farthest point to which the Supreme Court has gone to sustain a state
court's jurisdiction over a foreign insurer. In that case, a California
policyholder of a Texas insurer obtained a default judgment in a
California Court based upon substituted service of process under California's Unauthorized Insurers Service of Process Act. When suit was
brought on the California judgment in the Texas courts, full faith and
credit was denied on the basis of want of jurisdiction. The insured
sent premiums from California to Texas and, upon death of the insured,
the beneficiary sent proof of death. The insurer had no office or agent
in California. The insurer had never solicited in California nor done
any business in California except with respect to the sole policy involved
287 Id.
288 Id.

at 316.
at 316-17.
289 Id. at 319.
29o See 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
291

355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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in this case. In upholding California's assertion of jurisdiction, the
Court said,
Looking back over this long history of litigation a trend is
clearly discernible toward expanding the permissible scope of
state jurisdiction over foreign corporations and other nonresidents. In part this is attributable to the fundamental transformation of our national economy over the years. Today many commercial transactions touch two or more States and may involve
parties separated by the full continent. With this increasing nationalization of commerce has come a great increase in the amount
of business conducted by mail across state lines. At the same time
modern transportation and communication have made it much
less burdensome for a party sued to defend himself in a State
where he engages in economic activity.
Turning to this case we think it apparent that the Due Process
Clause did not preclude the California court from entering a
judgment binding on respondent. It is sufficient for purposes of
due process that the suit was based 29on
a contract which had sub2
stantial connection with that State.

The Court went on to say
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims.2

93

(Emphasis supplied.)

In short, the InternationalShoe case established a "minimum contacts"
testy 94 Whether or not this test is met depends upon, among other
things, the degree of state interest in providing a forum. 95 A state
court's jurisdiction may be constitutionally asserted even if there is
only a single contact, if the state has sufficient interest.
c. The Benn Case Is No More
Mail order insurers have placed substantial reliance on the Minnesota Commercial Men's Association v. Benn.2 96 In that case, a Minnesota accident and health mail order insurance company declined to pay
a claim sought by a Montana policyholder. The claimant resorted to
substituted service of process in Montana, obtained a default judgment and then sued on this judgment in Minnesota. On appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the determinative issue was whether or
2 92

1d. at 222-23.
293Id. at 223.

294 Accord, McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957)
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950); Parmalee v.
Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 206 F.2d 518 (5th Cir., 1953), cert.
denied 346 U.S. 877 (1953).
295 Cf. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927); Doherty and Co. v. Goodman,
294 U.S. 623 (1935). "Both the Hess and Doherty cases emphasized the interest which the state had in trying locally created causes of action in its own
courts to produce binding in personam judgments." Foster, supra note 237,

at 539. See Id. at 537-39.

296261 U.S. 140 (1923).
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not Montana had obtained jurisdiction through its substituted service
of process procedure.
The insurer's only office and property were in Minnesota. It solicited
new members through the mail and through uncompensated solicitation by existing members. Applications and premiums were received
and accepted in Minnesota and losses were paid from there. The only
evidence of activity contemplated within the state of Montana was the
procurement of information from local physicians in connection with
proof of loss and the reserved right to investigate claims. However, in
this case, there was no indication in the Court's opinion of any investigation. The Court concluded that this was a Minnesota contract, and said,
.. . an insurance corporation is not doing business within a
State merely because it insures lives of persons living therein,
mails notices addressed to beneficiaries
at their homes and pays
297
losses by checks from its home office.

The Court went on to conclude
. ..that the record fails to disclose any evidence sufficient to
show that petitioner was doing business in Montana within the
proper meaning of those words, and that the court
there lacked
298
jurisdiction to award the challenged judgment.
If still good law, the Benn case would seem to preclude state control over normal operations of a foreign unauthorized mail order insurer. However, this case preceded the Osborn and Hoopeston cases,299
which foretold the demise of Benn by shifting the emphasis from conceptualism to state interest. Subsequently, in the Travelers Health
Association decision, the Supreme Court distinguished Benn and depicted it as a narrow decision.
And in considering what constitutes "doing business" sufficiently
to justify regulation in the state where the effects of the "business" are felt, the narrow grounds relied on by the Court in the
Benn case cannot be deemed controlling.30
The Court also said:
we rejected the contention, based on the Benn case among
others, that a state's power to regulate must be determined by a
"conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting
or of performance."3 °1
In McGee the Court finally disposed of Benn by letting it go to its
death unnoticed in the opinion even though it was relied on by the
respondent. 302
297 Id. at
29S Ibid.

145.

299 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) ; Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318
U.S. 313 (1943). For a discussion of these cases see pp. 232-34 infra.
300 Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950).
301 Id. at 648.
302 See Kurland, supra note 285, at 608.
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d. Limitation on Minimum Contact Rule
The trend of expanding state jurisdiction over nonresidents, as
highlighted in the McGee case, has not gone unchecked. In Hanson v.
Denckla,30 3 the decedent executed a revocable trust deed while she was
a Pennsylvania resident. A Delaware trust company was made trustee.
Subsequently, the decedent moved to Florida and executed (1) an
inter vivos trust instrument appointing certain beneficiaries to receive
$400,000, and (2) a will containing a residuary clause. Subsequent to
death the Florida court held that the power of appointment was ineffective and the $400,000 passed under the residuary clause. The Delaware trust company did not appear in this proceeding. Meanwhile a
Delaware proceeding, to which the trust company was a party, held
the appointment in the inter vivos trust to be valid. The Delaware court
refused to give full faith and credit to the Florida decree.
The Florida appellees urged that there were sufficient affiiliations
with Florida to empower its courts to assert personal jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants. They cited the McGee case to support their
position.304 Although recognizing the trend away from the rigid concepts of due process, the Court said,
But it is a mistake to assume that this trend heralds the
eventual demise of all restrictions on the personal jurisdiction
of state courts .... Those restrictions are more than a guarantee
of immunity from inconvenient or distant litigation. They are a
consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States. However minimal the burden of defending in a
foreign tribunal, a defendant may not be called upon to do so
unless he has had the "minimal contacts" with that State that are
a prerequisite to its exercise of power over him.30 5 (Citations
omitted.)
The Court failed to find any such contacts in this case since the trust
company had no office, business or assets in Florida and there was no
solicitation of business in that state.
It is possible to read Hanson v. Denckla as a return to the old
standards founded on the concepts of physical power and territorial
limitations. But this is an unlikely result. The Court made no effort to
undermine even the most liberal of the due process cases. Instead it
took pains to distinguish Hanson from McGee. In the Hanson case the
agreement arose out of a transaction having no connection with the
forum. But perhaps even more important is that Chief justice Warren
called attention to the fact that in the McGee case
the State had enacted special legislation [Unauthorized Insurers
Process Act] to exercise what McGee called its "manifest interest" in providing effective redress for citizens who had been
303
304
305

357 U.S. 235 (1958).
Id. at 250.
Id. at 251.
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injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State
treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation. 306
Here again the factor of state interest appears to play an important
role. Profes~ur Kurland suggests that the Hanson case, rather than
being a reversal of attitude, merely represents a stopping place, whether
30 7
temporary or permanent, on the road to nationwide jurisdiction.
e. Summary as to Service of Process Cases
The concept of due process, at least in service of process cases,
has been the subject of numerous Supreme Court decisions. Moving
away from the concepts of physical power, "implied consent," and
corporate "presence," the prevailing standard was established in
the InternationalShoe case. If the defendant insurer has those "minimum contacts" within the state to make it reasonable to subject the
insurer to service of process, due process is not violated. What constitutes such "minimum contacts" depends upon the circumstances in
each given case.
[T]he boundary line between those activities which justify the
which do not, cansubjection of a corporation to suit, and those
30 8
not be simply mechanical or quantitative.

Some of the factors to be considered are the burden imposed on the
foreign insurer to litigate in the forum, 30 9 the extent to which the
insurer has benefited from the privilege of dealing with the state's
residents and property, 310 and the extent of actual or potential harm
arising from such activities. 3 n An important factor, which would embrace the last two factors just mentioned, is the degree of state interest
in the subject involved.
The Development of JurisdictionalTheory: Regulation
and Taxation Cases
a. Taxation Cases and the Quid Pro Quo
The general principle as to whether a state tax conforms to due
process standards was expounded in Wisconsin v. J. C. Penney Co. in
which the United States Supreme Court said:
3.

"Taxable event," "jurisdiction to tax," "business situs," "extraterritoriality," are all compendious ways of implying the impotence of state power because state power has nothing on which
to operate. These tags are not instruments of adjudication but
statements of result in applying the sole constitutional test for a
case like the present one. That test is whether property was taken
without due process of law, or, if paraphrase we must, whether
306 Id. at 252.
307 Kurland, supra note 285, at 622.
308 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).

Id. at 317.
Id. at 319.
311 See 104 PA. L. Rirv. 381, 390 (1955).
309
310
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the taxing power exerted by the state bears fiscal relation to
protection, opportunities and benefits given by the state. The
simple but controlling question is whether the state has given
anything for which it can ask return.312 (Emphasis supplied.)
This test has been subsequently reaffirmed. 313 Furthermore, it is suggested that attempts to tax are more carefully scrutinized and more
frequently resisted than police power regulation.3 14
Do unauthorized foreign insurers receive the requisite benefit? It
would seem that anything which tends to lessen the danger of accidents, threats to life, and unhealthy conditions redcunds to the benefit of companies engaging in either the life or the accident and health
insurance business. Using Wisconsin as an example, there are numerous
laws for the protection of its citizens. These include extensive pro31 6
for previsions for public health,31 5 for competent medical service,
317
for motor vehicle safety,318 for
vention of communicable diseases,
crime and fire prevention, 319 for industrial safety, 20 etc. These examples merely highlight the numerous ways in which the state promotes
the health, safety and welfare of its citizens. In turn, these efforts
mean additional continued premiums to the insurer and fewer loss
U.S. 435, 444 (1940).
313 Northwestern Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 464-65 (1959).
314 Cf. Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 253 (1946).
315See e.g., Wis. STAT. §140.05 (1963) (powers and duties of state board of
health including sanitary investigations, inquiries into the causes of disease
and mortality, investigations as to the effect on health of various conditions,
etc.) ; Wis. STAT. §140.07 (1963) (district health officers investigate industrial
diseases, inspect places of employment and study causes of mortality).
316 See e.g., Wis. STAT. §§147.01-147.26 (1963) (treating the sick including licensing of physicians thereby certifying their competency, standard of professional
312311

conduct, etc.) ; WIs. STAT. §§149.01-149.12 (1963)

(training and licensing re-

quirements for nurses) ; WIs. STAT. §§151.01-151.17 (1963) (licensing of pharmacists and the regulation of dispensing drugs); Wis. STAT. §140.27 (1963)
(state board of health prescribes minimum standards for the operation and
maintenance of hospitals) ; Wis. STAT. §142.01 (1963) (provision for a general
public hospital).
(communicable diseases) ; WIS. STAT.
317 E.g., Wis. STAT. §§143.01-143.17 (1963)
§§144.01-144.57 (1963) (water, ice, sewage and refuse) ; Wis. STAT. §§145.01145.14 (1963) (plumbing).
318 See, e.g., Wis. STAT. §§341.01-341.17 (1963) (registration of vehicles) ; Wis.
STAT. §§343.01-343.73 (1963) (licensing of drivers; cancellation, revocation and
suspension of licenses, unlawful practices relative to licenses, licensing of
driver schools and instructors) ; Wis. STAT. §§346.01-346.95 (1963) (rules of
the road) ; Wis. STAT. §§347.01-347.50 (1963) (equipment of vehicles); Wis.
(licensing of drivers, cancellation, revocation and
STAT. §§343.01-343.73 (1963)
vehicles); Wis. STAT. §349.02 (1963) (police duty of traffic enforcement).
319 The law enforcement agencies protect the public from violence through their
crime prevention activities. The Wisconsin fire departments promote public
safety by both fire fighting and by preventive measures. For example, a fire
chief or building inspector is required to inspect every six months all buildings, premises and public thoroughfares, except the interior of private
dwellings, and to ascertain and to cause to be corrected any condition liable to
result in a fire. Wis. STAT. §101.29 (1963).
320 Employers are required to furnish a safe place of employment, Wis. STAT.
§101.06 (1963). The Wisconsin Industrial Commission or member thereof may
inspect a place of employment or public building concerning its health, safety
and welfare conditions, Wis. STAT. §101.08 (1963). The Commission has the
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claims which the insurer must pay. From this, it would appear that
"the state has given [something] . . . for which it can seek return,"
thereby meeting the Penny standard for upholding the constitutionality
of the tax.
Hereafter, the due process standard for regulation and taxation will
be deemed to be essentially the same. If the Penny case imposed an
additional standard on efforts to tax, as distinguished from efforts to
,egulate, presumably this standard can be met.
b. Conceptualism and Due Process Requirements
The three cases most commonly resorted to in attempts to overturn
state insurance statutes have been Allgeyer v. Louisiana,3 21 St. Louis
Cotton Compress Co. v. Arkansas,32 and Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson.32 3 Allgeyer involved a Louisiana statute which

prohibited any person from placing marine insurance covering property
located within the state with any insurer which had not complied with
Louisiana's regulatory requirements. Violation was punishable by a
fine. This represented an effort by the state to force foreign companies
to become licensed by applying pressure on prospective insureds who
were located in the state. In this particular case the contract had been
consummated in New York. The only contact with Louisiana was the
location of the property and its owner within the state and the mailing
of notices of shipments from Louisiana. The United States Supreme
Court held that the statute violated due process since it attempted to
14
regulate a contract made outside the state.

The second major case in the Allgeyer line of decisions was St.
Louis Cotton Compress Company v. Arkansas.- 5 Arkansas levied on
a foreign corporation, authorized to do business in the state, a tax
measured by 5 per cent of the amount of gross premiums paid to an
unauthorized insurer under a policy covering property in Arkansas.
The policies were contracted for, delivered, and paid for at the taxpayer's domicile rather than in Arkansas. The only connection between
the insurer and the taxing state was the location of the insured property
in the state. Since this premium tax was higher than that imposed on
authorized companies, the Court concluded that, similar to the Louisiana fine in the Allgeyer case, the Arkansas tax manifested a purpose
to discourage those insurers who refused to pay tribute. In striking
power and duty to prescribe safety devices, to fix reasonable standards to
protect lives, health and safety, etc., Wis. STAT. §101.10 (1963). No boiler
may be installed without complying with safety requirements, Wis. STAT.
§101.30 (1963).
321 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
322 260 U.S. 346 (1922).
323
324
325

303 U.S. 77 (1938).
Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 588-89 (1897).

260 U.S. 346 (1922). Accord, Compania De Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S. 87
(1927).
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down the tax as unconstitutional, the Court commented that this case
was even stronger than Allgeyer since no act was done within the
36
state.
The early decisions indicate a conceptualistic approach in determining whether there were sufficient contacts with a state concerning
the particular transaction at hand to meet due process. Allgeyer and
St. Louis Cotton Compress illustrate the emphasis placed on ascertaining
the place of making the contract. Furthermore, in New York Life In,urance Company v. Dodge,327 the Supreme Court held that a policy loan
agreement concluded by a Missouri citizen with a New York insurer
could not be subjected to the Missouri non-forfeiture laws under the due
process clause. Although the company was licensed to do business in
Missouri, the decision hinged on construing the subsequent loan agreement as a New York contract even though it was conceded that the
policy was a Missouri contract. In Mutual Life Insurance Company v.
Liebing, w58 rendered shortly thereafter, a similar fact situation was
presented to the Court except for a slight variation in the policy's
wording. The Court seized upon this wording to hold that the subsequent loan agreement was a Missouri rather than a New York contract.
Consequently, the application of the Missouri statute was upheld as
constitutional.3 9 Here again is the concern over the place of the
contract.
330
The Connecticut General Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson case
represented the third and final major decision in the Allgeyer line of
cases. It also followed the conceptualistic theory of jurisdiction when
a California regulatory tax imposed on a Connecticut insurer was held
to violate the due process clause. Even though the insured risk was
located in California, and the Connecticut corporation was licensed to
do business in California, the necessary activities and contacts involved
in these reinsurance contracts took place in Connecticut. The Court
stated:
• . . the due process clause denies to the state power to tax or
regulate the corporation's property and activities elsewhere. 331
The Court found that no acts in the formation or performance of the
contracts took place in California, and that no privilege or protection
from California laws was necessary to the performance of the California contracts. Accordingly, there was no basis upon which the tax
could be sustained.
326260 U.S. at 349.
327 246 U.S. 357 (1918).
328 259 U.S. 209 (1922).
329 Id. at 213-14. It has been suggested that this case overrules New York Life
Insurance Co. v. Dodge. CARNAHAN, CoNF'ucr oF LAwS
CONTRAcrs

71 (1942).
(1938).

330 303 U.S. 77
331 Id. at 80-81.
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c. State Interest-The Retreat from Conceptualism
Commencing in 1940 with Osborn v. Ozlin,332 the Supreme Court
made significant departures from previously held attitudes on constitutional issues. Whereas before, the Court had used due process to
overturn state regulation, it now came around to a broad presumption
of the constitutional validity of state regulation and taxation of business.33 3 The Osborn decision marked the point at which the Supreme
Court began to consider more than the quantity of state contacts in
determining whether a state can, within due process guarantees, assume
jurisdiction over foreign insurers. In this case the Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring the participation of resident agents in effecting
policies of licensed insurers. This case does not give direct support to
sustaining the state's power to regulate on the basis of "minimum
contacts" since the statute pertained to licensed companies. However,
Osborn indicates a substantial difference in the Court's philosophy.
Now the Court appears primarily interested in the state's interest in
regulation rather than in counting physical contacts with the state. The
statute was aimed at preventing the channeling of insurance through
nonresident brokers which, in the Court's opinion, would cause difficulties in enforcing state statutes concerning rates, rebates and solvency.
The Court said:
This legislation is not to be judged by abstracting an isolated
contract written in New York from the organic whole of the
insurance business, the effect of that business on Virginia, and
Virginia's regulation of it.334
The Court no longer talked in terms of contacts or asked where the
contract was made. Instead it approached the problem from the viewpoint of ascertaining the impact on the state's regulatory system if the
statute were struck down.
This case represents a significant departure from the conceptualistic
approach to due process. In upholding Virginia's jurisdiction, the Court
said "that Virginia has a definable interest in the contracts she seeks to
regulate," 335 and that such action was not the same as outlawing foreign
contracts that were unrelated to the state's local interests. Thus recognizing Virginia's right to regulate the insurance business within its
boundaries because of the "special relation" that government has always had to insurance, 336 the Court refused to pass upon the wisdom
310 U.S. 53 (1940).
See also O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U.S. 251
(1931), in which the Court said, "As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of
record for overthrowing the statute." Id at 257-58.
334 310 U.S. 53, 63 (1940).
335 Id. at 65. (Emphasis supplied.)
336 Ibid.
332

333
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of the Virginia statute, stating that, "The limit of our inquiry is
reached when we conclude that Virginia has exerted its powers as to
matters within the bounds of her control.13 37
Three years after the Osborn decision, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the importance of state interest as a basis for regulatory
jurisdiction. In Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen,338 it took pains to
elaborate on its new philosophy. This case involved a suit for declaratory judgment to determine whether reciprocal insurance associations,
which primarily insured against fire, could be constitutionally subject
to New York Insurance Law. The attorneys, in fact, resided in Illinois.
The associations contended that the contracts were made in, and checks
mailed from, Illinois, and consequently, they were not doing busines
in New York. Although the Court assumed that the formalities of
making the contract occurred in Illinois, this was not deemed to be
determinative of the case.
[T]he issue remains whether the insurance enterprise as a whole
so affects
New York interests as to give New York the power it
33 9
claims.

The Court explicitly set out its new philosophy.
In determining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory
laws to insurance business activities, the question in earlier cases
became involved by conceptualistic discussion of theories of the
place of contracting or of performance. More recently it has
been recognized that a state may have substantial interests in the
business of insurance of its people or property regardless of
these isolated factors. This interest may be measured by highly
realistic considerations such as the protection of the citizen in340
sured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss.

However, in upholding the statute, the Court did not find it necessary to rely solely on the criterion of state interest. In this particular
case, several contacts with New York were found. An application was
signed in New York. Engineers could have been sent to investigate the
risk. The insured property was located in New York. Engineers could
visit from time to time to encourage the reduction of fire hazards or
investigate the cause or extent of losses. The contracts also reserved
the right of the association to replace or repair lost or damaged property. Thus, the Court was able to distinguish Hoopeston from Allgeyer
on the basis of the several contacts with the regulating state in the
former case. But, it is clear that the Court did not adopt the Allgeyer
conceptualistic approach when it appraised the significance of these
contacts.
33 Id. at

66.

338318 U.S. 313 (1943).
33 Id. at 316.
34oIbid.
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Surely the object of all this activity is not the signing of a contract or a check, but the protection of property and payment of
indemnity in case of loss by fire. These business transactions
neither begin nor end with the contract.
The intimacy of the relation of these insurance contracts to the
state of New York becomes even more apparent when it is
remembered
that the property insured is in the state of New
34 1
York.

The Court relied upon the Osborn decision rather than the Allgeyer
line of cases, stating that the "Allgeyer line of decisions cannot be permitted to control cases such as this, where the public policy of the
state is clear, the insured interest is located in the state, and there are
many points of contact between the insurer and the property in the
state."

3

4

In concluding, the Court established three considerations for testing "whether insurance business is done within the state" for the purpose of determining a state's power to regulate: (1) "the location of
activity prior and subsequent to the making of the contract," (2) "the
degree of interest of the regulating state in the object insured," and
(3) "the location of the property insured." 343 These factors are "separately and collectively of great weight.

344

In light of the shift from the conceptualistic place of contract
test to the sufficiency of state interest concept of due process, the question left open by this case is to what extent are contacts essential in
sustaining the state's power to regulate and tax? The Court's conclusion refers to contacts as a factor but failed to indicate how much of
a factor.
The Osborn and Hoopeston cases were expressly followed in State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel.34 In this case, the
Court upheld a Wisconsin statute pertaining to unearned premium
reserves against an attack founded on the due process clause. The
Court emphasized the interest which the state had in protecting its
own citizens. 346 Similarly, in Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance

Corp., Ltd.347 the Court upheld a Louisiana direct action statute against
an alleged violation of due process on the basis that a state has an
interest in protecting those persons injured within its borders. While
neither the State Farm nor the Watson case involved a state trying
to bring an unauthorized insurer into its jurisdiction, both cases emphasized the degree of state interest as a factor in due process considerations.
341 Id. at 318.
342

Id. at 319.

343 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

34

324 U.S. 154, 157 (1945).
Id. at 158-59.
348 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1954)

3461

34
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The broadening concept of due process was forcefully stated in
Travelers Health Association v. Virginia.3 48 Proceeding under the
State's Blue Sky Law, the Virginia Corporation Commission sought a
cease and desist order against a Nebraska mail order health insurer,
to prevent it from further solicitation or sales of insurance certificates
through the mails or otherwise unless it obtained a permit. Applicants
for permits were required to meet comprehensive conditions including
furnishing detailed financial information and agreeing to suits in Virginia by service of process on the Secretary of State. The defendants
appeared specially to contest the Commission's jurisdiction.
The insurer was a Nebraska corporation whose only offices were
in Nebraska from which its mail order business was conducted. New
members were solicited through the mail and through the unpaid recommendations of older members. At the time of the proceedings the insurer had approximately 800 Virginia members.
The insurer contended that all of its activities were conducted in
Nebraska. But the Court overrode the due process objection when it
said:
the state has power to issue a "cease and desist order" enforcing
at least that regulatory provision requiring the Association
[insurer] to accept service of process. . .. 349 (Emphasis supplied.)
In saying "at least," the Court impliedly indicated that if it had been
necessary to determine the constitutionality of Virginia's substantive
regulatory statutes, the answer would have been in the affirmative.
This implication finds support in the language of the opinion. The
Court made little effort to delineate these activities as supporting only
judicial jurisdiction and not regulatory jurisdiction.
But where business activities reach out beyond one state and
create continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
another state, courts need not resort to a fictional "consent" in
order to sustain the jurisdiction of regulatory agencies in the
latter state. And in considering what constitutes "doing business" sufficiently to justify regulation in the state where the
effects of the "business" are felt, the narrow grounds relied on
by the Court in the Benn case cannot be deemed controlling.
In Osborn v. Ozlin ... we recognized that a state has a legitimate interest in all insurance policies protecting its residents
against risks, an interest which the state can protect even
though the "state action may have repercussions beyond state
lines. . . ." And in Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen . . . we
rejected the contention, based on the Benn case among others,
that a state's power to regulate must be determined by a "conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting or
of performance." Instead we accorded "great weight" to the
U.S. 643 (1950).
349 Id. at 647.
348 339
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"consequences" of the contractual obligations in the state where
the insured resided and the "degree of interest" that state had
in seeing that those obligations were faithfully carried out. And
in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, . . .this Court, after
reviewing past cases, concluded: "due process requires only that
in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he
be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the
suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'

"350

(Citations omitted.)

This language further emphasizes how important the degree of state
interest has become in the regulatory due process cases.
The Court delivered an informative opinion in Lincoln Federal
Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron and Metal Co. 35 1 While this is a
labor case, the language reveals the Court's new attitude.
The Allgeyer-Lochher-Adair-Coppage constitutional doctrine
was for some years followed by this Court. It was used to strike
down laws fixing minimum wages and maximum hours in employment, laws fixing prices, and laws regulating business activities. 352 (Emphasis supplied.)
The opinion went on to say that:
This Court ...has steadily rejected the due process philosophy
enunciated in the Adair-Coppage line of cases. In doing so, it
has consciously returned closer and closer to the earlier constitutional principle that states have power to legislate against
what are found to be injurious practices in their internal commercial and business affairs, so long as their laws do not run
afoul of some specific federal constitutional prohibition, or of
some valid federal law. .

.

. Under this constitutional doctrine,

the due process clause is no longer to be so broadly construed
that the Congress and state legislatures are put in a strait jacket
when they attempt to suppress business and industrial conditions
which they regard as offensive to the public welfare.353 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted.)
d. Minimum Contacts
Despite the increasing emphasis on state interest, state interest
alone is not enough to establish jurisdiction under the due process
clause. For example, in the InternationalShoe case, the Court said that
the due process clause
does not contemplate that a state may make binding a judgment
in personain against an individual or corporate defendant with
354
(Emphasis
which the state has no contacts, ties, or relations.
supplied.)
350 Id. at 647-48.
351335 U.S. 525 (1949).
35 Id. at 535.
353 Id. at 536.
3.54326

U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
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Similarly, in denying jurisdiction, the Hanson v. Denckla35 5 decision
noted that there must be at least "minimum contacts" before a state
can subject a person to in personam jurisdiction.
The impact of International Shoe has yet to exhaust itself. It is
quite conceivable that the Supreme Court will extend its "minimum
contacts" test to the regulatory and taxing jurisdiction question, if it
has not already done so. The Supreme Court of Vermont has already
predicted that the United States Supreme Court will do so and, relying
on this belief, it restated the International Shoe case rule into the following language:
The foreign corporation is required to have certain minimum
contacts with the taxing [regulating] state such that payment
of the tax [compliance with the regulation] does not offend
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.356
This is not to say that wherever one or more contacts suffice to sustain judicial jurisdiction that the same contact(s) will always support
regulatory jurisdiction. But it does suggest a lessening of existing requirements. The "minimum contacts" necessary for the purpose of
sustaining service of process may not be identical to the "minimum
contacts" needed to uphold a tax or regulatory statute. Nevertheless,
such an extension, if it has not already occurred,3 57 would result in a
further lessening of the impact of artificial conceptualistic considerations in applying the due process clause to a state's attempt to regulate.
4. Summary of the Due Process Analysis
We have observed that the application of due process to the unauthorized foreign insurer has two aspects. First, the Supreme Court has
clearly done away with the extraterritorial impact objection to state
regulation or taxation if the state possesses sufficient interest in what
it seeks to control. Second, the Court has changed its basic philosophy
of due process. For several years, through the device of considering
the place of the contract to be determinative, the due process clause
had been used to strike down state regulation of business and trade.
However, significant changes in attitude became evident in the 1940's.
Following the doctrinal breakthrough in the Osborn and Hoopeston
cases, the late 1940's and 195 0's witnessed an increasingly realistic and
sophisticated approach to jurisdictional questions. Nevertheless, state
interest alone will not suffice to meet due process. There must' be at
least "minimum contacts" with the state. However, it is apparent that
the greater the state interest, the less the number of contacts necessary
to meet due process. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court recently said:
U.S. 235, 251 (1958).
356 Ruppert v. Morrison, 117 Vt. 83, 85 A.2d 584, 589 (1952).
357 See pp. 220-22 supra.
355357
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It is true, public interest alone is not sufficient to give a state
jurisdiction, but great concern and public interest do add significance to contacts which compose the organic whole and are
directly related to the regulation and which might not otherwise
be sufficient to meet the standard of the due process clause. 358
Furthermore, the necessary quantity and quality of these contacts may
vary in accordance with the type of jurisdiction sought, i.e., less are
needed for judicial jurisdiction than for regulatory and taxation jurisdiction.
E.

APPLICATION

OF DUE PROCESS CONCEPTS TO

MAIL ORDER INSURERS

The preceding section developed the theme that compliance with or
violation of the due process clause depends upon the degree of state
interest in the subject matter involved and the nature of the contacts
with the state. In the more recent cases greater weight seems to have
been accorded to the former. Thus the first, if not most important,
question which we need to ask is whether the states have sufficient
interest in the regulation and taxation of unauthori7ed mail order
insurers. This inquiry requires a review of several different aspects of
insurance regulation.
1. State Interest
a. Redress
Corporate activities are no longer confined to the territorial limits
of the incorporating state. Rapid transportation, communication, and
a highly developed mail system obliterate state boundaries as a barrier
to business expansion. The development of the insurance industry has
paralleled this expansionistic trend. However, such expansion has not
proven to be an unmixed blessing. One problem has been the difficulty
of a small individual to obtain legal redress for a wrong suffered at
the hands of some company located outside of his state.
This inequity has been particularly noticeable in the field of insurance. Residents are severely handicapped if they must follow an
insurance company to a distant state in order to hold it legally accountable for any wrong incurred. Frequently the claims are small.
Individual claimants could not afford the cost of litigating in a foreign
forum. In practical effect the company may be judgment proof. This
has been recognized by the United States Supreme Court, which explicitly stated:
It cannot be denied that California has a manifest interest in
providing effective means of redress for its residents when their
insurers refuse to pay claims. 359
358 Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287,

295 (1966).
359

McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
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Consequently, it is within the province of the states to provide means
of redress in a local forum. This has typically been achieved by some
form of the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act, the constitutionality
of which has been upheld on more than one occasion. 360 There appears
to be little reason or legal doctrine which would exempt such insurers
from local litigation based upon an appropriate substituted service of
process.
b. Regulation: Deceptive Practices
The unauthorized mail order business has given rise to some definite
social problems resulting from misleading and deceptive practices. 36 '
After procuring a policy without recognizing its limitations and the
handicaps in collecting a claim, the policyholder rests secure in the
belief that he has made provision for disaster. Meanwhile, he continues to allocate a portion of his savings to other items until an accident, sickness or death puts his policy to the test. Believing that he
has purchased protection, the policyholder neither seeks nor welcomes
solicitation from reliable companies, thereby depriving those insurers
of a customer. The purchase of such inadequate policies may leave the
policyholder in severe financial straits should disaster strike. Furthermore, he is likely to lose faith in the institution of insurance and
therefore abandon good insurance as well as bad. Such an attitude
places the insured and his family in a poor finan6ial position to face
the future.
Stemming from the fundamental proposition that the state's police
power is based upon the concept of protecting the health and welfare
of its citizens, it is obvious that the states have substantial interest in
the regulation of the mail order business. The Supreme Court, in
Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp. Ltd., has explicitly
362
recognized this interest of the states "in taking care of those injured."
Persons, covered by these mail order policies, may be injured or killed
in the state. They may require the services of local hospitals, doctors
and others. The injured insured may be destitute and require public
help. Insurance coverage can alleviate much of this financial burden.
The substantiality of the state's interest in precluding deceptive practices in the advertising and sale of insurance policies cannot be seriously doubted.
The validity of legislation controlling the solicitation practices of
mail order insurers is supported by the Watson case. Over a due
process objection, the Supreme Court acknowledged the right of a
state to assure adequate compensation and medical care to parties injured within the state. This case involved the Louisiana direct action
360
361
362

See e.g., id. and Parmalee v. Iowa State Traveling Men's Association, 206 F.2d
518 (5th Cir., 1953). For a discussion of the UIPA see p. 210 supra.
See pp. 191-200 supra.
348 U.S. 66, 73 (1954).
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statute providing that a person injured within the state may sue the
insurer directly without first obtaining a judgment or agreement establishing the insured's liability. The insurance policy contained a "no
action" clause which barred suit against the insurer until the insurer
suffers judgment. The policy was negotiated, issued and delivered in
states sustaining the validity of the "no action" clause. The insurer
contended that the state was without extraterritorial jurisdiction to
regulate the terms of contracts made outside its boundaries. The
Court overrode this due process objection by pointing out the state's
"legitimate interest in safeguarding the rights of persons injured
there."

3 63

c. Regulation: Insurer's Financial Condition
In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Duel, the Supreme Court recognized that a state
of comhas a legitimate concern with the financial soundness
6
panies writing insurance contracts with its citizensA ,
Mail order insurers may claim no exemption from this concern. For
any policyholder to be protected, the insurer must be in such financial
position that it can meet all legitimate loss claims. As Professor Kimball
pointed out,
all systems of insurance regulation regard the financial solvency
of the insurance enterprise as the central aim, for if nothing
else, insurance must insure.3 65
The state's interest in protecting its citizens compels concern as to
the financial condition of its citizens' insurers.
d. Regulation: The Regulatory Structure
Unauthorized insurers pose a potential threat to the effectiveness
of the state regulatory system. Not having to comply with the strict
regulatory standards imposed on licensed companies, which were enacted for the public's protection, these insurers may possess an arti363

Id. at 73. It may be argued that the Watson case does not apply to the mail

order situation since the insurer was licensed to do business in Louisiana. But
in the Connecticut General case the Court held that a California tax on a
premium paid by one insurer to a reinsurer in Connecticut violated due
process even though both insurers were licensed in California. The Court
reasoned that licensing was immaterial since the transaction did not exercise
a privilege needed to be granted by California. Since the materiality of licensing depends upon whether or not a privilege was exercised, the assertion that
licensing was a material fact in the Watson case would imply that the insurer
exercised a privilege in Louisiana by insuring an Illinois resident under a
contract not negotiated or made in Louisiana. This is a nonsensical interpretation. Therefore, the fact that the insurer was licensed in Louisiana, presumably, was immaterial in this case. Instead, the degree of state interest seems
to be the determinative factor.
364324 U.S. 154, 158 (1945); cf. Robertson v. California 328 U.S. 440, 459-60
(1946).
365 Kimball, The Purpose of Insurance Regulations: A PreliminaryInquiry in the
Theory of Insurance Law, 45 MINN. L. Rav. 471, 480 (1961).
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ficial competitive advantage. Substantial diversion of business from
regulated to unregulated companies would further weaken state control and lessen policyholder protection. The Wisconsin Commissioner
envisioned this possibility when he said,
If we do not battle with the forces promoting the existence of
unauthorized insurance then we will experience a breakdown
in insurance regulation and supervision and there will be little
reason for a company to become licensed and our statutes would
3 6
be without meaning.

6

In Osborn v. Ozlin, the Supreme Court highlighted the legitimacy of
state interest in the effects on the totality of its regulatory system.38 7
e. Taxation
It appears inequitable that unauthorized mail order insurers should
be unregulated, untaxed, and yet derive the benefits of a regulated
market, whereas its competitors are not only regulated, but also have
to pay for it. Furthermore, a state provides numerous publicly sponsored services which redound to an insurer's benefit by reducing the
number of claims.368 Such public services are financed by taxes. A
business can hardly be justified in complaining about paying taxes to
support those public activities which directly benefit it.
2. State Contacts
Because of the substantial degree of state interest in exercising
control over unauthorized mail order insurers, the requirement as to
state contacts needed to overcome due process objections would seem
to be minimal. Nevertheless, the International Shoe and McGee cases
require at least some minimum contacts to support judicial jurisdiction. Since regulatory and taxing jurisdiction may require even more
contacts, it follows that state interest in regulating is not, in and of
itself, enough to meet due process. However, the normal conduct of
a mail order insurance business necessitates local contacts which should
be more than enough to meet the concepts of due process.
a. Location of the Insured Risk
The mail order insurers typically maintain that they have no contacts and carry on no activities in the state rendering them susceptible
to state control. This is somewhat difficult to fathom. In the first place,
the most important element of the entire insurance transaction is the
protection afforded the policyholders. Although the Supreme Court has
apparently rejected the location of the insured subject as a sole cri366 Memorandum on Bill No. 245 S. by Wis. Ins. Comm'r. Manson, found in
Amicus Curiae-Brief and Supplemental Appendix at 119, Ministers Life and
Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W2d 287 (1966).
36 310 U.S. 53 (1940). See State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp.,
370 U.S. 451, 458-59 (1962) (dissent).
368 See p. 229 supra and notes 315-320.
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terion for determining the validity of state taxation, 36 9 this does not
mean that residence of the insured risk is inconsequential. The importance of this factor was highlighted in the Hoopeston case."'
b. Solicitation
In the early due process cases the Supreme Court laid down the
doctrine that there must be more local contacts than mere solicitation
before a state court may exercise jurisdiction over a foreign corporation.3 1. Mere solicitation manifests neither implied consent nor presence
so as to establish the corporalion as doing business in the state. The
case most frequently cited to sustain a mail order insurer's freedoi
37 2
from service of process is the now discredited Benn case.
However, there arose early indications of dissatisfaction with the
so-called "mere solicitation" rule. While the Supreme Court found
something more than mere solicitation in International Harvester Company of America v. Kentucky,3 7 3 it did not emphasize such activities.
Instead, the Court said:
Here was a continuous course of business in the solicitation of
orders which were sent to another State and in response to
which the machines . . . were delivered within the State of

Kentucky.
This was a course of business, not a single trans37 4
action.

Some leading state authorities declined to follow the "mere solicitation" rule and have interpreted the Harvester case as turning upon
the quantity and continuity of solicitation, not upon the incidental
collection of money by the salesmen.3 7 5 Nor have the lower federal
courts failed to recognize this trend towards reason.3 7 6 Thus, as early
as 1914, the International Harvester case sowed the seeds of countervailing thought. By 1945 it had become increasingly apparent that the
Supreme Court would achieve a "break through" in judicial doctrine.
In 1945, the Court handed down the "minimum contact" doctrine
in the International Shoe case.3 7 7 While it is unsettled whether this
See State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 45455 (1962).
370 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 319 (1943). For discussion of
37 Hoopeston case see pp. 233-34 supra.
1 E.g., People's Tobacco Co., Ltd. v. American Tobacco Co., 246 U.S. 79, 87
(1918); Philadelphia & Reading Railway Co. v. McKibbin, 243 U.S. 264, 268
(1917); Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Railway Co., 205 U.S. 530,
533-34 (1907).
372 Minnesota Commercial Men's Ass'n. v. Benn, 261 U.S. 140 (1923). For discussion of Benn case see pp. 225-26 supra.
3 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
34 Id. at 585.
375 American Asphalt Roof Corp. v. Shankland. 205 Ia. 862, 219 N.W. 28, 31-32
(1928) ; Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N.Y. 259, 115 N.E. 915, 917 (1917).
376 See Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1943).
37 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
369
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standard applies to regulation, as well as to service of process cases,
the liberal attitude expressed at least warrants the inference that the
Court would be less stringent in applying the "doing business" test.
For example, in Nippert v. City of Richmond, the Court said:
In view of the ruling in International Shoe Company v. Washington, supra, we put aside any suggestion that "solicitation,"
when conducted regularly and continuously within the State, so
as to constitute a course of business, may not be "doing business . . . . 37 8
And in Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, the Court said,
And in considering what constitutes "doing business" sufficiently
to justify regulation in the state where the effects of the "business" are felt, the narrow grounds relied3 on by the Court in the
Benn case cannot be deemed controlling. 1
The courts are coming to recognize that:
Solicitation is the foundation of sales. Completing the contract
often is a mere formality when the stage of "selling" the customer
has been passed. No business man would regard "selling," the
"taking of orders," "solicitation" as not "doing business." The
merchant38 0or manufacturer considers these things the heart of
business.

Even though this case involved judicial rather than regulatory jurisdiction, its realistic thrust possesses compelling logic. Taking away the
solicitation of business would leave no business. The heart of "doing
business" is solicitation.
It would seem, therefore, that the "mere solicitation" rule should
be abandoned when the soliciting activity is a regular, continuous and sustained course of business . . . It constitutes, in the
practical sense, both "doing business" and "transacting business,"
and should do so in the legal sense. 38'
For example, from Wisconsin residents alone, Ministers Life was
able to generate over $208,000 of premium in 1961. 38 Where did this
solicitation occur? It occurred in Wisconsin. Ministers Life each
year sends approximately 25,000 mailing pieces into Wisconsin to approximately 3600 residents.38

3

The prospective Wisconsin policyholder

sits in his living room reading pamphlets, brochures and national publications which he received in the mail. He does not cross the state
line to negotiate and execute an insurance contract with the insurer.
Whereas, in the Allgeyer line of cases it was the policyhoder who went
U.S. 416, 426 (1946) (annual license tax held to violate the commerce
clause).
379339 U.S. 643, 647 (1950).
3SO Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F.2d 511, 516 (1943).
381 Id. at 516-17.
382 Appellant's Appendix, at 159, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30
Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
383 Id. at 151.
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out to seek the insurer, in the mail order situation it is the insurer who
seeks the resident in his own home.38 4
The fact that solicitation was by mail rather than in person should
be immaterial. As one California Court said:
There is no essential difference in the activity or in the results
between solicitation by agents in the state and solicitation by
advertising in magazines circulated in the state. Solicitation by
advertising may be more productive of business than by
38 5
agents.

Solicitation being the most important ingredient in the mail order insurer's operation, it is only natural to conclude that such efforts constitute a significant contact with the state of the insured's residence.
Nevertheless, while the lower court logic that mail order solictiation
alone should be enough to support state jurisdiction to regulate and
tax, the Supreme Court has yet to take that step.
However, in Scripto, Inc. v. Carson,386 the Supreme Court upheld
a Florida statute levying a tax on the use of certain products in Florida
and imposing responsibility for its collection on a Georgia company.
The Georgia company maintained no office, warehouse or other place
of business in Florida, had no regular employee or agent there and
maintained no bank account or merchandise in the state. Orders for its
products were solicited by brokers who took the order and forwarded
it to the home office for acceptance or refusal. The purchaser forwarded his money directly to the company. In short, the company's
activities in the state were primarily, if not totally, related to soliciting
business. In upholding the statute, the Court seems to be saying, in
effect, that continuous and systematic soliciting of business by brokers
in the state is enough to overcome due process objections.38 7 Therefore,
it appears that continuous and systematic solicitation is sufficient to
sustain substituted service of process (International Shoe) and regulatory or tax statutes (Scripto), at least if the solicitation is done by
agents in the state. But, as suggested above, the same should be true
if the solicitation is achieved through the mails rather than through
agents or brokers. If the "minimum contact" test were to apply to
regulation, such solicitation would surely be enough even if it would
not meet the more stringent version of the "doing business" test. If
the Supreme Court does extend the minimum contact rule to regulatory and tax cases, the validity of the state regulation and taxation
of mail order insurance becomes almost axiomatic. As it is, we believe
that mail order solicitation, at least in the insurance field, meets the
Cf. Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207, 212 (1960). Compare Miller Brothers Co.
v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954).
385 Florence Nightingale School of Nursing v. Superior Court, 335 P.2d 240,
243 (2nd Dist. Ct. of A., Div. 3, 1959).
386 Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
387 See id. at 212-13.
384

MAIL ORDER INSURERS

"doing business" test under the older cases. Mail order companies, of
necessity, have numerous contacts with the state. These include (1)
advertising within the state by mail, radio, television, and newspapers;
(2) applications signed and sent from within the state; (3) premiums
paid from within the state; (4) policy delivery in the state; (5) losses
occurring within the state; (6) claim investigation in the state; (7)
claim payments sent into the state; and (8) insuring residents of the
state. 3ss If the standard becomes the more liberal "minimum contacts"

test, through the extension of InternationalShoe, the validity of such
statutes would seem assured.
c. The Fiction of the Place of Contracting
Ministers Life noted that the policyholder application is received
in Minneapolis and that the policy is mailed from there.3 s9 From this
it may be argued that a Minnesota contract is involved and that Minnesota rather than Wisconsin law should govern. Regardless of whether
this is an appropriate conclusion under conflict of law principles, the
Supreme Court has not equated such principles, in general, nor enshrined the place of contracting, in particular, in constitutional doctrine.3 90 This is not to say that there is no overlap between conflict of
laws rules and constitutional issues. But the constitutional questions
are not determined by resort to the fictional concept of place of contracting which local courts use for choice of law purposes. In the
Hoopeston case the Supreme Court rejected the criterion as being the
formal place of contracting.
[T]he issue remains whether the insurance enterprise as a whole
so affects New York interests as to give New York the power
it claims.3 91
Instead, the Court said:
In determining the power of a state to apply its own regulatory
laws to insurance business activities, the question in earlier cases
became involved by conceptualistic discussion of theories of the
88

81. In the ordinary course of conducting an accident and health insurance business, underwriting and claim procedures, for example, raise
numerous contacts with the insured's state. See AcrUARIEs 49-79. If mail order
insurers employ such procedures, they too possess many such contacts. On
the other hand, if they do not employ sound underwriting and claim procedures, one may question their financial integrity and/or the reasonableness
of premiums. In either case, the degree of state interest becomes even greater.
389 Appellant's Brief, pp. 53-54, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30
Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
390 "We must beware of transposing conflicts doctrines into the law of the
Constitution." Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyers' Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COLUM L. REv., 1, 30 (1945). The Supreme Court "has at
one time or another followed every 'rule' for choice of laws governing contracts." CARNAJAN, CONFLICT OF LAWS AND LIFE INsURANcE CoNTRAcTs 24
(1942) ; "although the forum had possibly failed to apply the most desirable
3

KLINE

conflict of laws rule, the Supreme Court thought that the matters presented
were primarily of local concern." Id. at 64. These statements suggest that
conflicts rules do not provide immutable constitutional standards.

391 Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

place of contracting or of performance. More recently it has
been recognized that a state may have substantial interests in the
business of insurance of its people or property regardless of
these isolated factors. This interest may be measured by highly
realistic considerations such as the protection of the citizen in3 92
sured or the protection of the state from the incidents of loss.

And more recently in the Travelers Case.
...we rejected the contention, based on the Benn case among
others, that a state's power to regulate must be determined by a
"conceptualistic discussion of theories of the place of contracting
or of performance." 39 3
As Professor Foster summarized:
In the mail order insurer cases the point has been repeatedly
and unsuccessfully made that practically all of the contractual
incidents take place at the home office 39of
4 the insurer rather than
in the state whose resident is insured.
He further concluded:
In short, the insurance cases come down to this: a state need
be neither the state of "contracting" nor the state of "performance" in order to have a sufficient basis for exercising personal
jurisdiction over a foreign insurer in actions brought by the state
or its residents where the suit grows
395 out of activities the insurer
conducts by mail within the state.

The mail order insurers primarily write accident and health, or life
insurance policies. In both situations not only is the insured risk located within the state, but also the application is signed and premiums
are paid from there. These contacts were sufficient to sustain California's judicial jurisdiction in the McGee case.396 In that case there
was only one policyholder. In a situation involving numerous policyholders, the contacts would be multiplied. Every indication points towards the extension of the International Shoe and McGee cases so as
to justify regulatory and taxation jurisdiction based on contacts such
as these. There would appear to be little doubt as to the validity of
state control when, added to these contacts, there is a systematic and
continuous program of mail order solicitation coupled with a high degree of state interest in the protection of its residents.
d.

Local Credit Investigation, Claim Investigation,
and Doctor Examinations
Another aspect of the Ministers Life case highlights a typical mail
order situation involving numerous state contacts:
392 Ibid.
393 Travelers Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648 (1950).
394 Foster, PersonalJurisdiction Based on Local Causes of Action, 1956 Wis. L.
Rxv. 522, 569-70.
395 Id. at 570.
39OMcGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

MAIL ORDER INSURERS

Plaintiff [Ministers Life] has arrangements with three independent nation-wide investigatory agencies to make local investigations and reports thereof to the plaintiff when it requests such
services. . . The extent of such local investigations made in
each instance is determined by the plaintiff. Plaintiff utilizes
such organizations to make local investigations and reports
thereof to obtain information for the issuance and renewal of
policies and also to obtain information for settlement of claims.
Local investigations and reports by such organizations are utilized by plaintiff for virtually every application for individual
life insurance and for many applications for individual accident
and health insurance. Obtaining of information by such local
investigations is an integralpart of the operation of the insurance
business by the plaintiff.39 7 (Emphasis supplied.)
And,
Additional medical information is obtained by medical reports from the applicant's own local doctor or a local doctor
selected by the plaintiff from a medical directory. Such reports
are upon forms mailed from the home office and returned thereto by the doctor by mail. Fees therefor, and for physical examinations when involved, are paid by the plaintiff by mail. Such
medical reports and the making of physical examinations by
local doctors in such instances are an integralpart of the plaintiff's insurance business.398 (Emphasis supplied.)
Whenever applications raised underwriting questions, there would be
local investigations as to questionable finances, morals, habits, occupation, etc. Answers to medical questions are sought from reports of
local physicians. If more medical information is needed, a special examination may be required. The extent of these examinations is controlled by the home office. The doctors are compensated. Such investigations involve local contacts with local doctors.
Ministers also employs local professional investigating organizations to ascertain credit and claim information. For example, when a
policyholder dies, the beneficiary fills out a claim statement. A physician's certificate and perhaps a hospital report is needed. Submission
of the autopsy report, if any, is presumably required and close scrutiny,
at the local level, is had when the question of death by accident or by
natural causes arises.
However, Ministers employed two approaches to mitigate the impact
of these facts. First, it was asserted that the present day concepts of due
process are inapplicable by virtue of the Todd case.399 This contention
shall be discussed when we discuss the Todd case.400 Second, it was as397Appellant's Appendix, at 153, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase,
30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
39
8 Id. at 152.
399Appellant's Brief, p. 32, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30
Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
40 See p. 250 et seq. infra.
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serted that the credit agency and the doctors are independent contractors.4 0
The Retail Credit Company, for example, is said to be an independent contractor engaged in a nationwide business of investigating
for other insurance companies and businesses. It is not an employee
of Ministers Life. It neither settles nor negotiates the settlement of
claims. 40 2 However, the independent contractor argument may have

been rejected by the United States Supreme Court.
In Scripto v. Carson,40 3 the Supreme Court sustained a Florida
statute requiring a Georgia corporation to collect a use tax, despite
the assertion that there were insufficient contacts to meet the requirement of the due process clause. In essence the only contacts the corporation had with Florida were brokers who solicited orders for several companies. The contracts termed brokers as independent contractors. Nevertheless, the Court, while recognizing that the brokers
were "not regular employees of appellant devoting full time to its
service," it concluded "that such a fine distinction is without constitutional significance." 40 4 The Court emphasized that whether the broker
is deemed "independent" or not does not change his local function of
solicitation nor does it bear on his "effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida." 405
The facts in Scripto are closely akin to the facts in the mail order
situation. Both involve alleged "independent contractors" who work for
different principals and who conduct detailed operations within the
state. Although the nature of their activities differ, in each case these
activities constitute an integral part of their respective businesses and
result in placing a substantial amount of business in the state seeking
to regulate or tax. Without the solicitation in Scripto there would be
little or no business in Florida. Similarly, without local credit, medical
and claim investigations, Ministers Life would be unable to write business on Wisconsin residents. Therefore, by virtue of Scripto it can be
argued that the independent contractor argument "is without constitutional siguificance." 40 6 Professor Foster lent support to this conclusion
when he said,
401 Appellant's Brief, pp. 18-19, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30

Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
402 Id.at 19.
403362 U.S. 207 (1960).
404 Id. at 211.
402 Id. at 19.
406 On the other hand, it is possible to read the Court's opinion in the Scripto
case as saying that despite the fact the broker works for other employers
and operates on a commission basis, he is closer to being a regular employee
than an independent contractor. If this interpretation is correct, the assertion
that the contact in the state is an independent contractor has no constitutional significance would be weakened.
With respect to Todd Shipyards Corporation, it appears that when a loss
occurs, the London Salvage Association makes a local survey of the loss
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If the test is one of responsibility for the contracts, the question of jurisdiction should not depend upon whether the contacts were established individually by the person in question, or
by his agent, or by an "independent contractor"on his behalf, or
by the mails, or by a wholly-owned and controlled subsidiary
corporation. 40 7 (Emphasis supplied.)

e. Litigation and Incidents Thereto
Mail order insurers frequently advance the claim that virtually
everything is done in the domiciliary state. This is at war with elementary aspects of the day to day conduct of an insurance business.
If a policy is procured through fraud or misrepresentation, and if the
company discovers the facts within the contestable period and before
the death of the policyholder, the company may bring an action to
rescind the policy. If death occurs within the contestable period so as
to bring the fraud or misrepresentation to light, the company can interpose the appropriate defense to resist payment in an action brought
by the beneficiary. If suicide takes place within the contestable period
the company is likewise at liberty to plead suicide as a defense and
resist payment.
The case books are full of litigations brought against life insurance
companies involving these issues. To be successfully prosecuted or defended, as the case may be, they require detailed local investigation
made by inspectors of the Retail Credit Company, private investigators,
lawyers or home office representatives. No arm chair strategist sitting
in the home office can direct one of these controversies without the
benefit of exhaustive local inquiry. If a company wants to write life
insurance, it must expect a certain percentage of these cases and be
prepared to conduct and finance such investigations as a regular part
of its business operations.
Similarly, the case books are full of suits brought against accident
and health insurers involving the issue of whether or not the disability
was a result of accident or disease. (If the company writes double
indemnity the same situation prevails there.) Here, as well, exhaustive
local investigation is required not only to determine the cause of the
disability, but also its duration. Both elements are fertile causes of
law suits tried locally.
and that the London insurers use this survey as their basis for adjusting the
loss. See State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 340
S.W.2d 339, 341-42 (Tex. 1960). If the London Salvage Association is deemed
to be an independent contractor and if the United States Supreme Court took
this into account when it said that neither losses were investigated or claims
adjusted in Texas, 370 U.S. 451, 454-55 (1962), the Todd case supports the
argument that the status of a true independent contractor is constitutionally
significant. However, in addition to the fact that the Court did not specifically
address itself to this question, there are some other reasons which suggest
that the Todd decision did not consider this point. See pp. 256-60 infra.
40r Foster, supra note 394, at 582.
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f. Investments
An essential part of an insurance company's operation is its investment activities such as mortgage loans and the buying and selling
of securities.
The investment of the funds of an insurance company is as
much its business as the writing of insurance.

....

408

Investments in a state add to the contacts that the insurer has with the
state. An example would be the local activity incident to servicing a
mortgage. As was said in John Hancock Miutual Life Insurance Company v. Girard,such activities as
looking after and protecting the security, the payment of taxes,
which involves the necessity of making and furnishing annual
statements of taxable property to the taxing officers of the state,
the collection of principal and interest, procuring insurance on
improvements, examining and appraising the real estate mortgaged, etc. . . . [constitute] "doing business."40 9

Where default occurs, it is necessary to foreclose through the use of
local processes.
Several states have enacted statutes exempting foreign companies
from the requirement of obtaining a license if their sole business in
the state was acquiring loans secured by m6rtgages on real property
located in the state. 410 Presumably these exemptions constitute recog7
nition both by business and by state legislatures that such activities
may constitute "doing business" in the state, 11 but even if they alone
do not constitute "doing business" they certainly strengthen the case
when added to other activities.
F.
IMPACT OF THE TODD CASE
Consideration of the cases prior to State Board of Insurance v.
Todd Shipyards Corp.41 2' demonstrate that the trend of judicial decision

leads to the conclusion that the state interest and state contacts involved in the mail order insurer situation meet the requirements of
the modern concepts of due process. Nevertheless, in the Todd case,
the Court held a premium tax to be unconstitutional. To some observers, the Todd case might indicate that the United States Supreme
Court had retreated from applying its former realistic due process
standards, and had returned to the conceptualism of the Allgeyer, St.
Louis Cotton Compress, and Connecticut General decisions. The ques-

tion is, what impact does Todd have on our analysis?
Horsfall, 48 S.D. 629, 205 N.W.714, 716 (1925).
(1937).
E.g., Wis. STAT. §180.801(2) (1963).
411 See John Hancock Insurance Co. v. Girard, 57 Idaho 198, 64 P.2d 254 (1937);
Annot. 137 A.L.R. 1147 (1942) ; contra id. Ministers Life in addition to soliciting insurance also invested in mortgages in Wisconsin. See Ainicus Curiae
Brief, p. 20, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
412370 U.S. 451 (1962).
408 Bankers Life of Des Moines v.
40957 Idaho 198, 64 P.2d 254, 258
41 0
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1. The Stipulated Facts in Todd
sued the State Board of Insurance to recover taxes
Shipyards
Todd
paid under protest. The case was tried on a stipulated set of facts. The
issue presented was whether a Texas tax imposed on a premium paid
for an insurance policy on a risk within the state purchased from an
unlicensed insurer in a manner other than through a licensed agent is'
unconstitutional.

413

The United States Supreme Court noted that:

The insurance transactions involved in the present litigation
take place entirely outside Texas. The insurance, which is principally insurance against loss or liability arising from damage
to property, is negotiated and paid for outside Texas. The
policies are issued outside Texas. All losses arising under the
policies are adjusted and paid outside Texas. The insurers are
not licensed to do business in Texas, have no office or place of
business in Texas, do not solicit business in Texas, have no
Texas, and do not investigate risks or claims in
agents 41in
4
Texas.

And,
The only connection between Texas and the insurance transcovered by the insurance
actions is the fact that the property
41 5
is physically located in Texas.

The facts, as presented here, are dissimilar to those found in the
typical mail order situation. For example, in Wisconsin, Ministers Life
solicits business, investigates credit, investigates claims, procures local
doctor reports, holds mortgages on Wisconsin property, etc. Whereas
in Todd the Supreme Court asserted an absence of activities within
the state seeking to exercise control, in the mail order case the insurer
would seem to carry on a multitude of activities in those states where
it solicits business. The Todd case would seem to be inapplicable to
such a situation.
2. The Frozen Concept of Due Process
Ministers Life, in its brief to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, set
down its interpretation of the Todd case, an interpretation which presumably must be upheld if jurisdiction of the state to regulate and tax
mail order insurers is to be thwarted.
It is our position: (1) that, as held in Todd, the McCarran
Act froze for the future the constitutional standard of due
process as established in pre-SEUA decisions of the Supreme
Court, thus substituting for the flexible and developing constitutional standard a more fixed and rigid statutory standard,
and limiting and conditioning the grant of power contained in
413 See State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 340 S.W.2d 339-40
(C.C.A. Tex., 1960), aff'd. 343 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. 1961) (Per curiam)

aff'd. 370 U.S. 451 (1962).

414 370 U.S. at
415 Id. at 455.

454-55.
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the Act to compliance with that standard; (2) that the Wisconsin
Statute, because it purports to tax and regulate and in effect
prohibit the carrying on of business with Wisconsin residents
outside Wisconsin's borders by insurers not licensed in Wisconsin, exceeds this limited grant of power and is therefore invalid
not because it violates the due process clause, but because it
violates the commerce clause and the supremacy clause; (3)
that if the McCarran Act be not construed so as to freeze the
concept of due process as of the date of the decision in SEUA,
even under present day concepts of due process in the field of
and taxation, the Wisconsin Statute is unconstituregulation
416
tional.

Based upon the due process discussion above, (3) is assumed to be incorrect. The key contention here considered is whether Ministers Life
is correct in attributing to Congress and the Supreme Court the rejection of a "flexible and developing constitutional standard" and the
adoption of a "fixed and rigid statutory standard."
By attributing to Congress the intent to freeze the concepts of due
process, Ministers Life would have Congress ignore the protection of
the insurance buying public, which is the underlying purpose of the
McCarran Act,417 and would have the Supreme Court don a strait

jacket in carrying out its judicial function. A careful reading of the
Todd decision suggests that not only is it unnecessary (as well as unfortunate) to adopt this interpretation, but also that a contrary conclusion seems to possess greater merit.
Several factors suggest that Congress intended all relevant judicial
experience to be applicable. First, the House Report on the McCarran
Act said that
your committee is of the opinion that we should provide for
the continued regulation and taxation of insurance by the States,
subject always, however, to the limitations set out in the controlling decisions of the United States Supreme Court as, for
instance, in Allgeyer .

. .,

St. Louis Cotton Compress Co ...

and Connecticut General . .
omitted.)

.411

(Emphasis supplied, citations

The for instance indicates that Congress did not set out these three
cases in splendid isolation with intent to disregard all other judicial
experience. The Todd opinion made this same point when it said "...
these earlier decisions are a part of the arch. . ... ,419 (Emphasis supplied.) In short, it would appear that Congress referred to the Allgeyer
Brief, pp. 32-33, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase,
30 W.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
417 "Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several
59 STAT. 33
States of the business of insurance is in the public interest.
(1945), 15 U.S.C.A. §1011 (1963).
41 H. R. REP. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1945).
419 State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 458 (1962).
416Appellant's
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line of cases merely as examples. Second, Senator McCarran said during the Senate debate ".

.

. we give to the States no more powers than

those they previously had, and we take none from them." 420 (Emphasis
supplied.) Since no power was to be taken from the states, all relevant
judicial decisions are material, not just the three cases cited as examples. Furthermore, unless there is reason to believe the contrary,
an act of Congress is normally deemed to have been passed in light of
existing judicial decisions. And third, if the Court in the Todd case
had construed the intent of Congress to use only the three named cases
(Allgeyer, St. Louis, Connecticut General), it would not have needed
421
to distinguish the Osborn and Hoopeston cases.
Furthermore, it appears that Congress intended all future, as well
as existing, cases to be considered. If the SEUA case had not declared
insurance to be commerce, and thereby subject to the control of Congress, the power of the states to tax and regulate would have depended
upon the evolution of the judicial doctrine. As both Senator McCarran
and the House Report intimated,4 2 an essential purpose of the Act
was to place the states in approximately the same position that they
occupied prior to the SEUA case by removing the commerce clause
impediment to state control. A corollary proposition would be that
Congress intended that the McCarran Act be comfortably fitted into
the contemporaneous concepts of due process. The Supreme Court, in
PrudentialInsurance Co. v. Benjamin, emphatically supports the evolutionary approach underlying the McCarran Act when it said:
Obviously Congress' purpose was broadly to give support to
the existing and future state
systems for regulating and taxing
42 3
the business of insurance.

The Court went on to say that Congress
clearly put the full weight of its power behind existing and future state legislation ... subject only to the exceptions expressly
provided for.4 24 (Emphasis supplied.)
Another point might be noted. To interpret Todd as saying that only
pre-McCarran Act cases (or more specifically, the Allgeyer line of
cases) are relevant, in effect, says that Travelers Health Association
v. Virginia was a big mistake and that it is overruled by Todd or, at
least, its rationale is seriously undermined.42 5 If the Court was required
to apply the Allgeyer concepts, it probably would not have decided
Id. as quoted at 456.
"Here, unlike the Osborn and Hoopeston cases, the insurance companies carry
on no activities within the State of Texas." Id. at 453.
422 See H. R. REP. Supra note 387, at 1-4. "Congress desires to protect the continued regulation and taxation of the business of insurance by the several
States .. " Id. at 2.
420

421

423
424
425

328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).

Id. at 431.
For a discussion of the Travelers Health case see pp. 235-36 supra.
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Travelers as it did. However, this conclusion can only be reached if
the Supreme Court was unaware of the House Report until it was
brought to the Court's attention in the Todd case. But, in the Prudential case the Supreme Court considered this very same House Report.42 6
This occurred prior to the Travelers case. Consequently, prior to Todd
the Supreme Court had not felt it necessary to adopt the "frozen" concept. Furthermore, in Todd the Court indicates no intent to reverse
Travelers.
In summary, it would appear that nothing in the Congressional
Record nor in the Todd decision requires the conclusion that Congress,
in the McCarran Act, intended to preclude consideration of the entire
range of judicial experience in considering any given fact situation.
Therefore, under the modern concept of due process, the states would
seem to possess the constitutional authority to regulate and tax mail
order insurers.
3. The Allgeyer Line of Cases
The position of the mail order companies pivots on the House
Report's reference to the Allgeyer, St. Louis Cotton Compress and
Connecticut General cases. Yet these cases, in essence, stand for a very
narrow proposition. In both St. Louis and Todd, the sole contact with
the state seeking to tax was the location of the insured risk. In Allgeyer, Louisiana attempted to seize upon the act of mailing a notification as a toehold for jurisdiction. However, the Court disposed of this
act as being merely incident to a New York contract. Thus, in Allgeyer,
as well, the only contact with the state was the location of the insured
risk. Unlike the mail order situation, it was conceded in Allgeyer that
the state did not claim the insurer did business in the state. 427 In
Connecticut General, since the Court pointed out the immateriality of
the licensing and of the location of the lives insured with respect to
the reinsurance facet of the insurer's operation, no material state contact was present. Furthermore, in none of these cases was there a forcible demonstration of state interest. In short, this bloc of cases stands
for the simple and narrow proposition that in the absence of a showing
of state interest and of state contacts other than the location of the insured property, a state lacks jurisdiction to tax or regulate. Therefore,
if these cases represent the controlling standards, the Court will have to
decide the mail order situation in a vacuum. In none of them was there
a demonstration of state interest and state contacts. Such distinctions
would render the Allgeyer line of cases irrelevant to the mail order
situation. Furthermore, not even the Supreme Court in the Allgeyer
case attempted to lay down an absolute standard so as to disregard past
and future judicial experience. Instead, the Court said,
426 Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 431 (1946).

427Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 583 (1897).
Allgeyer line of cases see pp. 230-31 supra.

For a discussion of the
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... we do not intend to hold that in no such case can the State
exercise its police power. When and how far such power may be
legitimately exercised with regard to these 42
subjects
must be left
8
for determination to each case as it arises.

In the mail order situation numerous contacts and a high degree of
state interest can be shown. Thus, we must look elsewhere for precedent, for example, to Osborn and Hoopeston (both of which arose
prior to the McCarran Act, if this is of any significance).
The stipulated facts in Todd are indistinguishable from the facts in
St. Louis Cotton Compress. As the Court said in Todd "the insurance
companies carry on no activities within the State .... ',429 The Allgeyer
case, if anything, had more contacts with the state than were recited
in the Todd decision. 43 0 Since neither Allgeyer nor St. Louis Cotton
Compress had been expressly overruled in the earlier cases, and since
the Todd facts are indistinguishable, presumably the Supreme Court
in the Todd case was loathe to overrule the Allgeyer line of cases, especially since Congress made specific reference to them. However, it
can be strongly argued that in the Todd case, the Court, while following precedent, did nothing more.
4. The Multple Situs and Avoidance of State Regulation and Taxation
In both the Allgeyer line of cases and Todd, the insured was a
business organization conducting its affairs in more than one state, i.e.,
the insured had multiple situs.
Allgeyer was a cotton exporting business domiciled in Louisiana.
It conducted much of its business abroad, utilizing New York City
as a transfer point for bills of exchange and bills of lading. A New
York insurer, with whom Allgeyer had negotiated a contract of marine
insurance, attached coverage to these bills of lading in New York.
These were then either negotiated in New York or delivered to Allgeyer's New York agent for transmission elsewhere. The record of
that case shows that the contract for insurance was negotiated and
consummated in New York.
St. Louis Cotton Compress Company was a Missouri corporation
authorized to do business in Arkansas and having property in that
state. This property was insured by a company not licensed in Arkansas. The insurance contracts in question were entered into in Missouri.
Connecticut General Life Insurance Company, licensed in California, entered into a reinsurance transaction with some other insu "ance companies also licensed to do business in California. The reinsurance contracts were entered into in Connecticut where the premiums
428
429

430

165 U.S. at 590.

State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 453 (1962).
In Allgeyer, in addition to the insured risk being located within the state,
letters of notification were sent from the state.
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were Iaid and where the losses if any, were payable. Although the
transaction involved the reinsurance of lives in California, the Court
pointed out that there was no direct relationship between Connecticut
General and the lives insured; its relationship was with the companies
which it reinsured. The Court also indicated that the fact that Connecticut General was licensed in California was immaterial since this
license pertained to the company's regular business, not its reinsurance
business.
In Todd, the defendant corporation was a New York company with
extensive operations in its main office located in that state, although
its shipyard operation was located in Texas. However, its insurancethe so-called builders insurance on a shipyard-was negotiated in New
York with New York brokers, the premium was paid in New York
and losses were adjusted there.
These corporate multiple situs situations are quite distinct from
the typical mail order situation. A common thread running through the
Allgeyer, St. Louis Cotton, Connecticut General and Todd cases is that
in each case the insured, a corporation having operations in more than
one state, negotiated and executed the insurance contract in a state
other than the one seeking to regulate or tax. A "big time" buyer
represented by a "big time" broker-both sophisticated and capabledealt at arms length with brokers representing the insurers. Presumably, the insured was sufficiently skilled to protect his own interest
without the intervention of the state.
This presents a vivid contrast to the typical mail order situation
which involves direct dealings with relatively unsophisticated individuals living and functioning in a single state. Such insureds have
no double situs, nor do they leave the state physically to negotiate a
life or accident and health insurance contract elsewhere. Quite the
contrary, to make a sale, the mail order insurer must actively solicit
prospects in their homes or places of business. The acts of the prospects pertaining to the execution of the contract physically occur in
their own state. In short, the insurer had to come into the state. This
is the exact opposite of what occurred in Allgeyer, Todd, etc.
It can be urged that when small individual policyholders are involved, the intervention of the state is needed to protect against the
overreaching of some companies. The Supreme Court may have had
in mind the distinction between the multi-situs corporation and the
single situs individual when it sustained due process objections in the
Allgeyer line and in the Todd case, yet reached the opposite result in
other cases.
5. The Necessity of Local Contacts
If the Supreme Court, either consciously or unconsciously, has accepted the concept that a multi-situs corporation and its insurer can
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avoid the regulation and tax of one state by conducting their business
with each other in another state, the door is open to substantial abuse.
For example, let us assume the existence of a large industrial corporation, called Company X, having satellite factories in several states.
Like every large industrial enterprise, it utilizes many forms of insurance, workmen's compensation, accident and health, group life and
pension plans on its employees. It carries workmen's compensation
insurance to discharge its statutory responsibilities. It carries automobile insurance on its trucks. It carries public liability insurance to protect the general public as well as products liability insurance for its
many lines of products. It has fire and extended coverage insurance
on its properties and protection against loss of use of the properties
as a result of fire or windstorm. It carries inland marine insurance to
protect the goods it manufactures while they are in shipment. It has
additional coverages against such occurrences as malicious mischief
and vandalism. Business of this size frequently uses insurance managers as well as the services of outside insurance advisers or agents or
brokers. In the Allgeyer-Todd tradition, Company X negotiates its insurance contracts through its New York office utilizing so-called "big
time" brokers in New York. All of the insurance might be placed with
American companies, or some of it with American companies and
some of it with insurers abroad like Lloyds of London. The settlement of losses also are negotiated in New York.
An insurance program of this magnitude requires careful and continuous inspection, safety engineering, payroll auditors and claims
services. A steady stream of engineers, inspectors, payroll auditors
and claim adjustors go back and forth handling the numerous matters
that arise in cases of this kind. In view of this continuous activity,
to say that there are no contacts between the state where the risk
is located and where the insurer is located merely because Company X
elected to execute these contracts in New York City is subject to serious
question.
As early as 1905, the Supreme Court recognized that such events,
occurring prior and subsequent to the execution of an insurance policy,
constitute important elements of doing business. In Lumbermen's
Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyers, the United States Supreme
Court highlighted the importance of adjusting losses.
The provisions of the contract clearly contemplate the presence
of an agent of the company at the place of the loss after it has
occurred, for the purpose of determining its extent and adjusting, if possible, the amount payable by the company to the
owner. If no such adjustment can be made the policy provides
in terms for the appointment of appraisers, one by the company
and one by the owner, and that they disagreeing, an umpire
shall be appointed, and the agreement of any two shall be bind-
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ing. After that, the loss is payable to the owner by the company
within sixty days. As the policy insures against loss, it of course
contemplates that such loss may occur; and it also contemplates
that the company shall send to the place where the loss occurred,
that is, to New York, its agent, for the purpose stated. When,
under the terms of the contract, the company sends its agent
into the State where the property was insured and where the
loss occurred, for the purpose of adjustment, it would seem
plain that it was then doing the business contemplated by its
contract, within the State. A fire insurance company which issues
its policies upon real estate and personal property situated in
another state is as much engaged in its business when its agents
are there under its authority adjusting the losses covered by its
policies as it is when engaged in making contracts to take such1
risks. If not doing business, in such case, what is it doing ?43
Although the Court was considering the issue of judicial jurisdiction,
its rationale applies equally well to regulatory and taxing jurisdiction.
In light of the more liberal philosophy which has evolved since 1905,
presumably Lumbermen's rationale would be so extended. Hoopeston
lends support to such a conclusion. 432 Futhermore, both of these cases
indicated that the occurrence of actual contacts is unnecessary to sustain jurisdiction if the transaction contemplates that such contacts may
4 33

occur.

The aftermath of Hurricane Betsy further illustrates the fact that
insurance operations, such as those involved in the Todd case, necessitate numerous and intimate contacts with the state. Hurricane Betsy
smashed into the gulf states in the fall of 1965, wreaking havoc and
causing one of the worst insurance disasters in history.434 Total insurance losses were estimated to be in the neighborhood of $715 million,
and the number of claims on fixed property losses alone was approximated at 435,000. 4 3 - Vivid examples included the sinking of

numerous ships in the Mississippi River. Two nearly
sunk with one coming to rest atop the other in 117
decision which confronted the shipbuilder and its
writers was whether to salvage the ships or dynamite

completed vessels
feet of water. A
insurance underthem as menaces

to navigation. 436 Decisions of this type, as well as decisions in the

many thousands of other claims, require extensive local contacts in
197 U.S. 407, 414-15 (1905). The Court has found that an insurer was
"doing business" in a state where an agent entered the state to adjust a claim.
Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Spratly, 172 U.S. 602 (1899) (service of process
case).
432 See 318 U.S. 313 (1943).
For discussion of this case see pp. 233-34 supra.
433 See id. at 317-18 and Lumbermen's Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Meyer, 197
U.S. 407, 414-15 (1965).
434 Insurance Advocate, Sept. 25, 1965, p. 3. However, it cannot be argued that
hurricanes occur only rarely. In the last 50 years, 94 hurricanes reached the
United States. Furthermore, nearly 900 tornadoes occurred in 1965. Insurance
Information Institute, Insurance Facts 48-49 (1966).
43 Insurance Advocate, Feb. 12, 1966, p. 8.
436 Business Week, Oct. 23, 1965, p. 180.
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the state. Reference has been made to the "small army of adjusters
and claims men" who entered the states "to sort out the deluge of
claims.

' 437

The General Adjustment Bureau set up twenty-one local

storm offices in Louisiana and three in Mississippi. The adjusting
force on the scene was estimated to be 1,500 men representing the
General Adjustment Bureau, independent adjusters, company claims
men and public adjusters.4 3
The discussion of hypothetical Company X and of Hurricane Betsy
highlights the amount of local activity attendant to insurance operations. It might be contended that such activities are carried on by independent contractors, as distinguished from the insurer, and that the
final adjustments are negotiated with the insurer outside the state.
From this it can be argued that the insurer has no local contacts with
the state and therefore is not subject to the state's control.
Sustaining the independent contractor argument in this type of
situation would seem to be undesirable. Whether or not an insurer responsibly performs his obligations as to insureds and risks located in the
state is of vital interest to the state. Furthermore, local inspections, investigations, adjustment activities constitute an integral and important
facet in the conduct of an insurance operation. In view of the background
of innumerable and indispensable local contacts, can those insurers
utilizing independent contractors to perform essential functions escape
regulation while similarly situated insurers using their own employees
or agents are unable to do so? Or, to put the question another way,
can an insurer isolate the insurance transaction from local state interest, local activity both before and after the loss, and the local event
giving rise to the loss, by merely conducting the formal incidents of
settling the loss in another state. To permit such a result would be
at war with the manner in which the insurance business is conducted.
Although stated in a different context, the Supreme Court has recognized that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, it
should not be judged
by abstracting an isolated contract [negotiated settlement] written in New York from the organic whole of the insurance
business, the effect
of that business on Virginia, and Virginia's
4 9
regulation of it.

3

The local activity, whether or not entered into by an employee or
independent contractor, being an integral part of an insurance operation, would seem to be a part of the "organic whole of the insurance
business." These considerations, as well as Scripto v. Carson,440 sug4, Insurance Advocate, Sept. 18, 1965, p. 18.
438 Ibid.
439 Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53, 63 (1940).
440 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
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gest that the independent contractor argument lacks, or should lack,
44 1
constitutional significance.
Confronted with a full record developed along these lines instead
of an abbreviated stipulation of fact such as was used in the Todd
case, the result in that case might conceivably have been different. In
a future case akin to Todd, it should not be difficult to develop numerous state contacts and forcibly to demonstrate a high degree of state
interest and the numerous local contacts. The difficulty in the Todd
case may have been that the Supreme Court was confronted with an
unrealistic set of stipulated facts which were "out of tune" with the
realities of the everyday operation of an insurance business. The stipulated facts failed to indicate both the extent and the indispensable
character of local activities. Added to this lack of emphasis on such
a crucial matter, the stipulated facts conceded that:
Neither [insurer] . . . conducts any investigation of Texas
adjustments of losses . ..are
claims in Texas [and] . ..the 442
handled .. . in New York City.
Some observers feel that the state's position was even more seriously
weakened by the concession (perhaps unwarranted) that the state did
not have "any control or supervision" over the insurer's activities.44 3 It
is no wonder that on review, the United States Supreme Court concluded that there were "no activities within the State."4' 4 Futhermore,
Todd did not involve a continuous systematic solicitation of business
within the state. The development of a more comprehensive set of
facts in a corporate multiple situs case, like the Todd case, may command the opposite result, simply because of the difference in the facts.
In summary, the Todd decision, being decided on the assumption of
no local contacts, would not control a typical mail order insurer situation when the actualities of the insurance operation are pointed out.
The assumed facts in Todd are easily distinguishable. In that case it
was stipulated that the sole contact with the state was the location of
the insured risk. There was no showing of solicitation, investigation,
adjustment, etc. with the indispensable local incidents. There was no
showing of the extent of state interest in the subject matter. And, there
was no showing that that taxing state had conferred benefits upon the
insurer. Consequently, the unrealistic fact situation in Todd seriously
limits its value as a precedent for the control of mail order insurers.
In conclusion, we submit that under the current concepts of due
process, as well as under the concepts of due process prior to the
441 See pp. 247-49 and note 406 supro.
442 State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp. 340 S.W.2d 339, 340 (Tex.
C.C.A. 1960). But see Foster, supra note 394, at 582.
443 See Petitioner's Brief, p. 5, State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards
444

Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 453
(1962).
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SEUA case, the state has the power to tax and regulate in the typical
mail order situation. Furthermore, we submit that Congress did not
intend to freeze the applicable concepts of due process when it enacted
the McCarran Act. But even if it did, Osborn and Hoopeston would
control, and not the Allgeyer line of cases, since sufficient state interest
and contacts can be shown. The applicability of the Todd case would
seem to be restricted to a narrow (and unrealistic) fact situation.
Therefore, for the balance of the article, except in Section VII, we
will assume that, in general, the states possess constitutional authority
to tax and regulate such insurers.
G.

EVALUATION

OF THE WISCONSIN

UNAUTHORIZED

INSURANCE STATUTE

The 1966 survey conducted by the NAIC's subcommittee to study
the NAIC-FTC resolution 4 45 revealed that several states contemplated
adopting a statute similar to the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance
Statute. 44 6 Superintendent Stern of New York said,

It would also appear that, should the Wisconsin statute be
upheld, the adoption of such a statute by all states would serve
as a declaration of public policy. .

.

. The New York
Depart7

44
ment, for one, has been considering this possibility.

Since the Wisconsin statute may be used as a model, its validity and
effectiveness should be evaluated.
1. Surplus Lines Provision
In discussing the Wisconsin statute, it is necessary to be cognizant
of the closely interrelated provision pertaining to surplus lines insurance. 448 Wisconsin's and other states' surplus lines laws demonstrate
states' awareness that not all coverage needed by their residents is
procurable from authorized insurers. Lloyd's of London, for example,
provides a substantial amount of insurance protection to insureds in
the United States. Because of its unique structure, Lloyd's would be
unable to meet the organizational and financial requirements of most
states despite its almost unquestioned financial integrity. Rather than
preclude the acquisition of needed and otherwise unavailable coverage
by resident insureds, several states expressly sanction transactions with
49
unauthorized foreign and alien insurers under certain conditions.
445 See pp. 208-209 supra. and note 193 supra.
446 WIs. STAT. §201.42 (1963) The Illinois Department of Insurance has drafted
a bill which would prohibit an unauthorized insurer to transact insurance
business in the state through mail, publication, broadcast or otherwise. Specified acts are defined as transacting an insurance business. See The National
Underwriter, Sept. 10, 1966, p. 1.
447Address by Superintendent Stern (N.Y. Ins. Dept.), before Section of Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, Amer. Bar Ass'n. Annual Meeting,
Aug. 9, 1966, p. 14.
448 WIs. STAT. §201.63 (1963).
449E.g., N. Y. INs. LAw §122; 'Wis. STAT. §201.63 (1963).
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Wisconsin's surplus lines law permits placing business with foreign
and alien unauthorized insurers if (a) it is placed through a licensed
resident surplus lines agent, and (b) the insurance is not procurable
after a diligent effort has been made to obtain it from a licensed insurer.150 Furthermore, the surplus lines agent may not knowingly place
surplus lines insurance with a financially unsound insurer. Also, the
insurer must be of good repute, possess competent management, and
provide prompt service.' 5 A 3 per cent premium tax is imposed on
the insurer to be collected by the resident surplus lines agent.452
To the extent that unauthorized insurers are dependent on local
brokers, the states can exercise some regulatory and taxing control
through such brokers. In one sense it might be said that the states
have compromised their standards by permitting transactions with unauthorized insurers who have not met all of the state requirements.
However, to most observers, the surplus lines laws represent a reasonable and balanced response to a difficult problem by permitting the
acquisition of otherwise unavailable coverage while at the same time
imposing some regulatory safeguards.
Business placed with unauthorized insurers is one of two types:
surplus lines or nonsurplus lines business. In this article the term unauthorized insurers or insurance relates to unauthorized business which
is not placed in accordance with the surplus lines statute. This is the
subject of the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Statute which explicitly exempts surplus lines business from its provisions. 53 It is this
statute which is involved in the Ministers Life case and is pertinent
to most mail order insurance business since such business usually involves coverage procurable from a licensed insurer, i.e., nonsurplus
lines coverage.
2. Purpose of the Unauthorized Insurance Statute
The declared purpose of the statute can be broken down into four
overlapping but distinct categories. 4 4 (1) It is aimed at protecting
Wisconsin resident insureds and beneficiaries. This is to be achieved
by subjecting unauthorized insurers to the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin courts in suits by, or on behalf of, resident insureds or beneficiaries
and by maintaining honest and fair insurance markets. (2) It seeks
to protect authorized insurers, which are subject to regulation and
premium taxation, from unfair competition by unauthorized insurers. (3) It is also directed at protecting the state's regulatory interest by subjecting unauthorized insurance to the jurisdiction of the
courts in actions brought by the state to prevent evasion of and to en45°WIs. STAT. §§201.63 (3), (5) (1963).
451WIs. STAT. §201.63(8) (1963).
452 WIS. STAT. §201.63(12)
(1963).
53
4 WIS. STAT. §201.42 (2) (b) (1963).
454
WIs. STAT. §201.42(1) (1963).
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force compliance with the state's insurance laws. (4) And finally, it attempts to preserve premium tax revenue through the enforcement of
the tax laws.
3. Definition of Daing Business
To implement the stated objectives, the statute prohibits an unauthorized insurer from doing any of certain specified acts in the state
whether by mail or otherwise. 45 5 These acts, which are defined as
"doing business," include making or proposing to make an insurance
contract; taking or receiving an application for insurance; receiving
or collecting any premium; issuing or delivering contracts of insurance
to residents of this state; representing or aiding any insurer in soliciting, negotiating, procuring of insurance or inspecting risks, or investigating or adjusting claims, etc.45 6
The doing of any of the specified acts by an unauthorized insurer
is deemed to constitute the appointment of the commissioner as the
attorney of such insurer upon whom process may be served in any
action by an insured or beneficiary, or to constitute the appointment
of the secretary of state as attorney for service of process in suits
brought by the commissioner or the state against the unauthorized insurer. 457 In both situations, substituted service of process is provided
for. 458 In attempting to subject an unauthorized insurer to the state's
jurisdiction, Wisconsin apparently hopes to afford judicial relief to
and to permit enforcement of the
resident insureds and beneficiaries,
459
state regulatory and tax laws.
With respect to suits by insureds or beneficiaries, this approach
has proven to be effective. 460 It is comparable to the Uniform Insurers
Process Act,4 61 the constitutionality of which has been upheld.462 On
the other hand, jurisdiction in suits brought by the state to enforce
either its insurance or its tax laws rests on more tenuous ground.
Even if the Wisconsin Supreme Court's decision in the Min*sters
Life case, upholding the constitutionality of the unauthorized insurance
statute, is affirmed by the United States Supreme Court, a careful
reading of that decision suggests the statute's limitations. The Court
found that:
The activities essential to the conduct of this insurance business, both prior to and subsequent to the making of the contract
and which are part of the organic whole, take place in Wisconsin and, in addition, the subjects of the insurance are in this
455 Wis. STAT. §§201.42 (3) (1963).

§201.42 (2)(a)(1963).
Wis. STAT. §§201.42 (4), (5) (1963) respectively.

456 AIs. STAT.

457

45sWIS. STAT. §§201.42 (4), (5) (1963) respectively.
45
9 See Wis. STAT §201.42(1) (1963).
46o See e.g., McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).

461 For discussion of the UIPA, see p. 210 supra.
462 fcGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
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state. In common parlance and in any enlightened sense, it cannot be said that Ministers does not do business in Wisconsin.463
(Emphasis supplied.)
Ministers was "doing business" in Wisconsin because it had sufficient contacts therein to meet constitutional standards, not because
its activities fell within the definition of doing business in the Wisconsin statute. The statute goes far beyond the facts of this case when
it provides that a single, or isolated acts, are sufficient to subject an
insurer to Wisconsin regulation and taxation. The Court said,
We do not hold, however, that any one single act defined
as doing business in the state in sec. 201.42 is alone sufficient
for the application of the section to a given business. Each set
of facts must be considered on its own merits when applying
the statute.464
The Court also said that it was unnecessary to dwell on the degree of
state interest since the state "has not exceeded its reach of legitimate
interest ....-465Here again the court's approval of the statute is limited to the facts of the case. The statute's definition of doing business
is not determinative of jurisdiction. The Constitution, as interpreted
by the United States Supreme Court, rather than by state legislatures,
controls.
If the activities of the insurer and the interest of the state are such
that the exercise of control by the state would not violate due process
standards, the enactment of a special statute directed at unauthorized
insurers may be unnecessary. For example, in a recent California case,
the court upheld the authority of the state to enforce its regular insurance licensing provision against unauthorized mail order insurers. 6
Most, if not all states, require in some form that an insurer doing or
transacting business therein procure a license or certificate of authority.
Presumably failure to comply enables the state to proceed against the
46
insurer under its regular insurance statutes.

7

This is not to say that Wisconsin's statutory attempt to assist in
the enforcement of its regulatory and taxation scheme against unauthorized insurers has no significance. In Hanson v. Denckla, the point
was made that in the McGee case
the State had enacted special legislation [the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act] to exercise what McGee called its "manifest
Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141, N.W.2d
287, 295 (1966).
464 Id. at 296.
465 Ibid.
466 California v. United National Life Insurance Co. et. a!., Calif. Dist. Ct. App
(2nd Appel. Dist., Div. 4), Civ. No. 30330-30332, filed Sept. 14, 1966.
467 If a statute specifically directed at unauthorized insurers is to be enacted, it
might be well to include a provision indicating that it is merely supplementary
to the rest of the insurance laws. Otherwise, an unauthorized insurer may
successfully assert that only the provisions directly pertaining to it are applicable.
463
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interest" in providing effective redress for citizens who had been
injured by nonresidents engaged in an activity that the State
treats as exceptional and subjects to special regulation.468 (Emphasis supplied.)
Similarly, the Wisconsin statute manifests its interest, through special
legislation, in exercising control over unauthorized insurers. This should
enhance, although not assure, the likelihood that state control will be
found constitutional in an appropriate fact situation.
Furthermore, a statute defining what constitutes "doing business"
or "transacting business" in terms of specific individual acts may significantly facilitate the administrative process. Such a definition sets
down a written standard. Under the Wisconsin statute if an insurer,
whether by mail or otherwise, does any of the specified acts in the state
-for example, making or proposing to make an insurance contractit is deemed to be doing business. This is a clear cut definition. Rather
than going to court in every disputed situation to determine whether
or not the insurer is doing business under state law, both the commissioner and the insurers can look to relatively specific standards.
A definition of doing business in terms of individual acts, as contrasted to a definition in such terms as "continuous," "systematic" or
"frequent" contacts, has advantages in addition to administrative feasibility and clarity. Situations could arise where an isolated transaction
may be of substantial interest to the state. For example, an insurer
may provide a variety of coverages for one large corporate complex.
The size of the risk, the amount of premium, and the number of persons protected in this one case may exceed the risk, premium and persons involved in individual accident and health coverage written as a
result of a continuous and systematic mass solicitation. A definition of
doing business including the latter situation but not the former would
be somewhat inconsistent. If the definition is not couched in language
applicable to individual acts, this conceivably could be the result.
Of course, litigation may result when the insurer believes that the
statutory definition of doing business is unconstitutional as applied to
its operations. The state's case would be weakened if the statute obviously overreaches constitutional bounds. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has said,
As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some
469 factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute.
This suggests that a statute which appears to be overreaching in some
situations will not be held to be unconstitutional except when applied
468 357 U.S. 235, 252 (1958).

469

O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-58
(1931).
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to an inappropriate fact situation. Therefore, a definition of doing
business in terms of specified individual acts would not seem to
jeopardize the statute's constitutionality when applied to an insurer
having sufficient contact with the state.
Although theoretically such a definition would encompass those insurers who have only isolated contacts with the state, from a practical
administrative viewpoint applying the statute in this type of situation
is unlikely. The amount of harm or tax revenue involved would be so
minimal that the commissioner presumably will concentrate on other
matters. But even if he did attempt to bring an action, the insurer could
defend on constitutional grounds. Therefore, despite the seemingly
broad applicability of this type of definition, there appear to be sufficient offsetting factors to justify such an approach. 7 0 Of course,
certain situations may warrant specific exemption from the statute.4 7 1
4. Miscellaneous and Taxing Provisions
Other sections of the Wisconsin unauthorized insurance statute
provide that (a) before an unauthorized insurer may defend it must
deposit securities, cash or bond to secure payment of adverse judgment
or procure a license to do business,47 2 (b) an unauthorized insurer
cannot enforce an insurance contract,4 73 (c) the commissioner can
compel a person in the state to disclose insurance placed with an unauthorized insurer, 4 7 4 (d) investigators and adjustors must report insurance placed with unauthorized insurers,'4 7 and (e) penalties may be
assessed against unauthorized insurers who do business as defined by
6
47

the statute.

Two provisions establish the taxation scheme of unauthorized insurance. The first imposes a 3 per cent premium tax on unauthorized
insurers with respect to insurance "on subjects resident, located or
to be performed in this state." The phrase "in this state" embraces
insurance procured through negotiation or an application in whole or
in part occurring or made within or from within the state. If the insurer fails to pay the tax, the insured is liable. 7 7 This provision fastens
The California definition of transacting business includes (1) solicitation,
(2) negotiations preliminary to execution, (3) execution of an insurance contract, or (4) transaction of matters subsequent to execution. CALIF. INS.
CODE §35. Although no attempt has been made to review the various definitions
of doing or transacting business, the California definition may be an excellent
one to adopt in that it covers the insurance transaction from beginning to end.
For a compilation of definitions see 1 PROCEEDINGS 174-78 (1959).
471 For example, the Wisconsin statute exempts transactions in the state involving
a policy solicited, written and delivered outside the state covering subjects not
resident or located in the state at the time of issuance. Wis. STAT.
4 7 §201.42 (2) (b).
2 WXIs. STAT. §201.42(6) (1963).
473 WIS. STAT. §201.42(8) (1963).
474 WIS. STAT. §201.42(9) (1963). See p. 272 infra.
47 5
WIs. STAT. §201.42(10) (1963). See p. 272 infra.
476 WIS. STAT. §201.42(13)
(1963).
477 WIS. STAT. §201.42(11) (1963). This section exempts premiums on lawfully
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upon the resident insured as the fulcrum to enforce compliance with
the tax law.
An individual holder of a life, accident and health, or other type of
policy is unlikely to be aware of his ultimate liability for the payment
of the insurer's tax. Being unaware of this potential tax liability, such
policyholders are unable to protect themselves in their dealings with
the unauthorized insurer. Of course, after getting "burned" once, a
policyholder could terminate his policy (assuming that he is still insurable so that he could obtain new protection elsewhere). But, in
addition, this section provides that if the tax is not paid within the
prescribed time, it shall be increased by 25 per cent and by an additional penalty of 1 per cent per month. Since the insured may be unaware of the tax and since the insurance department has no periodic
and systematic method to ascertain the names of policyholders of unauthorized insurers, a sizable tax liability could accrue before it becomes known. When it does, the insured could be subject to a substantial tax liability. In short, we question whether shifting tax liability
from the unauthorized insurer to the insured is a sound and fair policy,
particularly when this technique results in little, if any, pressure being
exerted against the insurer to pay the tax. 7 8
If the state tax on an unauthorized insurer is constitutional, its enforcement may be achieved without resort to the resident insured.
judgment can be obtained for the tax in the local courts. This judgment
would be enforceable, by virtue of the full faith and credit clause, in
the unauthorized insurer's domiciliary state. 479 If the state lacks jurisdiction to tax the insurer, it may be able to protect a minute portion
of its revenue by shifting liability to the insured. However, even if
this is constitutional, 4 0 it does not appear to achieve the intent of the
procured surplus lines insurance and on independently procured insurance
(discussed infra).
47s Conversations with the Wisconsin Department of Insurance indicate that the
specific exemption for individual life and individual disability insurance in
companion subsection 201.42(12) is considered to apply to a subsection 201.42
(11) situation. Although a literal reading of the statute may not support this
result, it seems that the administration of this subsection does not result in
shifting tax liability to the typcial mail order policyholder.
*79 See Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). For a discussion of the applicability of the full faith and credit clause, see pp. 277-92
infra.
480 Although we have not extensively researched this question, the constitutionality of this provision would appear to be subject to some doubt. For example,
the statute in Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897) prohibited any person,
firm or corporation, under penalty of a fine, from making contracts or marine
insurance on property within the state with insurers who did not comply with
local law. Violation was punishable by fine. Here was an effort to compel
foreign insurers to become licensed by applying pressure on the insureds within
the state. The Supreme Court held the statute to be unconstitutional. In contrast, the Court sustained a statute imposing a fine on any person, or an insurance agent or broker, who made, negotiated, solicited or otherwise aided a
transaction of insurance on lives or property within the state. Nutting v.
Massachusetts, 183 U.S. 553 (1902). The Wisconsin statute relates to a situation which falls between these two cases. Unlike Allgeyer and like Nutting
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statute, namely, to reach the unauthorized insurer and protect the resident insureds. In fact, such a provision seems to do just the opposite
48 1
by imposing additional burdens on unsuspecting insureds.
The conclusion that tax.liability should not be shifted to the insured
must be somewhat qualified. We noted that under the surplus lines
statutes the resident broker serves as the mechanism for the collection
of taxes imposed on the insurer. However, this mechanism may be
circumvented (perhaps unlawfully) if the insured resorts to out-ofstate brokers or to direct placement of business with the insurer. If the
insurer is a United States company, enforcement can be had through
recourse to the full faith and credit clause. However, if business is
placed with an alien insurer, the full faith and credit clause has no
force. In this situation, the resident insured is the sole remaining local
subject upon whom tax liability can be imposed. Presumably, any
insured who places business through out-of-state brokers or directly
with the insurer would be sufficiently knowledgeable to be aware of
potential tax liability and handle its transactions with the unauthorized
insurer accordingly (e.g., withhold the amount of the premium tax
from the premium paid). Imposing the ultimate responsibility for payment of the tax on such an insured does not give rise to the same
objections as does the shifting of tax liability to the typical mail order
policyholder. Thus, the question is, how can the statute distinguish
between these two types of insureds?
One approach might be to shift the insurer's liability to the insured
only in those situations where the insured "knows or should reasonably know" of such liability. Such a qualification to the insured's tax
liability should preserve the state's ability to tax insureds placing business other than through local brokers, yet avoid fastening additional
burdens on the typically small individual policyholder who merely
responds to a mass solicitation campaign. However, this general standard could create administrative problems by affording the insured the
opportunity to deny tax liability on the basis that he neither knew nor
should he have reasonably known of the potential liability. To refute
this argument might prove to be difficult in many cases.

481

some activities in the state are required for the section to apply. On the other
hand, like Allgeyer and unlike Nutting, the person subject to the fine (or tax)
is an insured. See KLINE 96-97.
"In order to achieve its purpose, such a tax would have to be given widespread
and continuous publicity. To be effective, the presence of the tax must be
known to the citizen before he buys the policy. Notification that he owes a
tax, after he acquires the policy, would serve no useful purpose and would
merely make the insured's position more unfortunate. Furthermore, it must
be observed that the operational effect is extremely indirect.
"It was pointed out earlier that the most important evil resulting from the
illegitimate mail-order accident and health business is the fact that the insured
may feel that he has completely provided for his security, when in fact he
has not done so. The imposition of a tax upon him serves merely to increase
the cost of his already inadequate coverage." KLINE 97.
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Perhaps a more feasible approach would be to exempt insureds
from ultimate tax liability when the insurance is purchased for commercial, as distinguished from personal, purposes. This distinction
would appear to be clearer in most cases than the know or should reasonably have known standard. Presumably, a purchaser of insurance for
business or commercial purposes can reasonably be held to a higher
standard of awareness of the tax consequences of his actions. An exemption based on this distinction, in general, may be comparable to
the know or should reasonably have known standard yet be administratively more feasible.
The second taxing provision under the Wisconsin statute, covering
indepedently procured insurance, provides that an insured who procures or renews insurance with an unauthorized insurer upon a subject resident, located or to be performed within the state, must file a
report with the commissioner and must pay a 3 per cent premium
tax.4 2 This is akin to a use tax which is imposed directly on the user
rather than on the seller. Here, as well as under the preceding subsection, the insured can be held liable for the tax.183 However, in this subsection individual life and individual disability insurance is expressly
exempted. 484 Nevertheless, some of the comments above also seem
pertinent here.
5. Summary
The evaluation of the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Statute
shows that it possesses considerable merit along with some drawbacks.
On the positive side, it provides a means by which resident insureds and
beneficiaries can seek redress against unauthorized insurers in local
courts. This is Wisconsin's version of the Uniform Insurers Process
Act. It also provides a means by which the state can obtain an in
personam judgment to enforce its regulatory and tax laws. In doing
so, however, the very liberal definition of doing business may exceed
constitutional limits in some fact situations. Nevertheless, such definition would seem to afford the basis for feasible administration,
yet, practically speaking, not result in undue burdens on insurers.
The attempt to tax the unauthorized insurer who actually is doing
business in the state is appropriate. However, enforcement should be
sought directly against the insurer (e.g., through full faith and credit)
without resort to resident insureds except those who know or should
reasonably have known of the potential liability. The latter standard
482
483

WIs. STAT. §201.42(12) (1963). This section exempts insbrance procured pursuant to the surplus lines law.
"If the insured fails to withhold from the premium the amount of the tax

herein levied, the insured shall be liable for the amount thereof

. . ."

WIs.

§201.42(12) (e) (1963).
484 Wis. STAT. §201.42(12) (g) (1963) excludes individual life and individual disSTAT.

ability insurance from the independently procured insurance section. Does

this mean that such a policyholder is entirely exempt from tax or can he still
be subjected to shifted tax liability under §201.42(11)? See note 478 supra.
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could be implemented by exempting insureds from ultimate tax liability
on insurance purchased for personal as distinguished from commercial
purposes. Otherwise, resort to the insured would work contrary to
the purpose of the statute.
Some of the other provisions in the statute appear to contribute to
its effectiveness, 4

5

particularly those pertaining to the disclosure of

the names of unauthorized insurers.
In short, the widespread adoption of a statute patterned after the
Wisconsin statute, somewhat modified, may enhance the ability of the
states to exercise regulatory and taxing powers in appropriate situations, both from a constitutional and an administrative standpoint.
However, as was pointed out earlier, the enactment of a special statute
aimed at unauthorized insurers is not deemed to be essential to the
exercise of such control.
H. JURISDICTIONAL ASCERTAINMENT
In any attempt to exercise control over an unauthorized insurer,
a pivotal question is the extent of the insurer's activities in the state.
Despite the importance of ascertaining these jurisdictional facts, however, an insurance department lacks a readily available source of information. For example, in the Ministers Life case, 486 the jurisdictional

facts were developed in the course of a trial proceeding. If a simpler,
less time consuming and less expensive method of jurisdictional ascertainment cannot be devised, effective regulation will be seriously deterred. But this need not be the case.
Every insurance company licensed in the United States must file
an annual statement with the commissioners of those states in which
it is licensed.""7 The NAIC, over a period of many years, has developed
a standard annual statement form in which the required information
is disclosed. Insurers use this form to comply- with state requirements.
To develop jurisdictional information, the NAIC could amend the
annual statement, or require a supplementary statement, 48 8 so as to
compel the disclosure of information needed by a state to exert jurisdiction in the appropriate situation. Such an amendment, or supplementary statement, could require that an insurer report on its activities
in those states where it is not licensed. This information should be
broken down by individual states. If this were done, any commissioner, wanting to determine whether there are sufficient contacts between his state and a particular insurer to warrant an attempt to exerSee p. 266 supra.
486Ministers Life and Casualty Union, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
487 E.g., Wis. STAT. §201.50(1965).
488 This was done in 1964 when the NAIC adopted the Stockholders Information
Supplement in connection with preserving state regulation of insurance securities as against the SEC. See discussion of this in Hanson and Farney, New
Life Insurance Companies: Their Promotion and Regulation, 49 MARQ. L. REV.
175, 309-310 (1965).
485
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cise control or collect taxes, would merely need to procure a copy of
the annual statement from the insurer's domiciliary state. This would
avoid the necessity of resorting to a judicial proceeding in order to
obtain the relevant jurisdictional facts.
The required information should be of the type which reveals those
state contacts which have judicial significance. As developed earlier,489
such data would include the number of policyholders in the state, the
amount of insurance carried by these policyholders both in terms of
insurance in force and of new sales, and the amount of premiums paid
by these policyholders. In addition some measure of the insurer's soliciting activity in the state should be given, e.g. the frequency of mailings and the number of pieces of literature sent into the state, a listing
of advertisements in pamphlets or periodicals circulated in the state,
etc. The number of medical examinations, credit checks and claim
investigations (including those conducted by local doctors and investigators who might be labelled independent contractors) are also significant. Furthermore, data on company investments in the stateas to number, type, dollar amount and possibly the name of the debtor 490
-should be shown as well as the amount and nature of litigation either
in the state or involving policyholder residents of the state.
Presumably, such information would be reasonably accurate and
truthful since the annual statement is filed under oath.491 Furthermore,
since each insurer licensed in the United States is periodically examined
by state examiners, the NAIC's Examination Manual could be amended
to require that the report of examinations cover the extent of the insurers operations in states where it is not licensed. Hence there would
be a periodic audit to serve as a double check on the information provided in the annual statement.
Such an approach to jurisdictional ascertainment is neither novel
nor startling. As early as 1895, the National Convention of Insurance
Commissioners (the NAIC's predecessor) recommended:
that the respective departments require companies of their States
to report separately in their annual statements the amount of
business done in each State in which they are unauthorized
492

Furthermore, one of the NAIC's standing committees, the Blanks
Committee, has long had the function of reviewing and updating the
information required in the annual statement in view of current needs.
The inclusion of data on the activities of insurers in states where they
are not licensed presents no radical departure from the normal evolutionary pattern in the widening disclosure of information. This would
489 See pp. 241-50 supra.
49oSee note 496, infra.
491 E.g., Wis. STAT. §201.50 (1965).
492 1895 PROCEEDINGS 91.
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greatly facilitate the ability of insurance regulators to apply and enforce their laws in the appropriate situations. The mere enhancing of
such ability in itself may serve as a deterrent to conduct which is, or
borders on, the unlawful. Therefore, we submit that the NAIC should
amend the annual statement, or perhaps add an Unauthorized Insurers
Information Supplement to the annual statement, to require jurisdictional information of the type suggested above and to correspondingly amend the examiners manual to provide a periodic audit of
such information.
Even if the NAIC adopts the proposed change, an insurance commissioner may be unaware that a particular unauthorized insurer is
transacting business in the state. Until the name of the company is
known, the information in the annual statement would not be requested
from the domiciliary state. Typically an unauthorized insurer's activities are brought to the commissioner's attention, if at all, by a complaint. However, under Wisconsin's unauthorized insurance law reliance on complaints is not the sole source of unauthorized insurer's
names. This statute requires every person investigating or adjusting
any loss or claim in the state to report to the commissioner every insurance policy written by an unauthorized insurer.493 In addition, if
the commissioner has reason to believe that insurance has been effectuated by or for any person in the state with such an insurer, the commissioner may order the person to disclose, among other things, the
name of the insurer.494 Thus, in Wisconsin, names of unauthorized insurers may be procured from any one of several sources. This, in
combination with the proposed provision for jurisdictional ascertainment, would place the Wisconsin commissioner in an excellent position
to apply the insurance laws to those insurers who are within the state's
jurisdiction.
VI. ENFORCEMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
Assuming that the above discussion is persuasive and that the states
do possess jurisdiction to regulate and tax mail order insurers, how
can such regulations be made effective? As one commentator said,
A state may legislate, adjudicate or administrate as it pleases,
but if it cannot reach the person or pocketbook of those who
fail to 495
yield obedience such activities take on an air of unreality.

Of course, if the insurer violating the law is present in the state through
its representatives or if it possesses assets in the state which can be
fastened upon, enforcement could be solely a domestic matter. How493 WIS. STAT.
4 94

§201.42(10) (1963).

WIS. STAT. §201.42(9) (1963).
49564 HARV. L. Rxv. 482 (1951).
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ever, if the unauthorized insurer has neither representatives nor property within the state,49 despite its jurisdiction over the insurer the
state may be compelled to call upon other states to assist in the enforcement of its laws. Such assistance may or may not be forthcoming.
Consequently, the enforcement problem could be the greatest single
obstacle to achieving "effective" state regulation of unlicensed foreign
insurers. 497 It has been suggested that since unenforced regulation is
ineffective regulation, Congress, the courts or the FTC might declare
insurance regulation of unauthorized insurers to be ineffective for purposes of the McCarran Act. 498 With this in mind let us turn to the
possible means of overcoming the enforcement problem.
B.

PROCEEDING WITHIN PRESENT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK

1. ExtraditionProceedings
A crime has been defined as conduct which is prohibited by state
law and which is punishable by fine, imprisonment or both. 49 9 Commonly, violations of insurance laws give rise to the imposition of fines
and, as a consequence, fall within the definition of a crime. Although
such conduct is deemed a misdemeanor, as distinguished from a felony,500 nevertheless, those whose conduct violates the insurance law
would appear to fall within the scope of the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act which pertains to a person charged with treason, felony or
95

In attempting to find property in the state, the states may commonly overlook
the fact that a substantial part of an insurance operation involves investments.
Investments (e.g. mortgages) are also debts which may be subjects to garnishment. See KLINE 64 and n. 1; cf. Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,
339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950); Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating
Co., 312 U.S. 183, 193 (1941). Some decisions have held that a debt presently
and unconditionally owing, although not payable until a future date, is subject
to garnishment. 6 Am. JuR.2d Attachment and Garnishment §122 (1963). Garnishment denotes a proceeding by a creditor to satisfy a debt out of the
debtor's property in possession of or owning by a third party called the
garnishee. Id. at §2. Generally speaking, garnishment is available according
to local law and practice in aid of suits brought by the states. Id. at §65. A
state statute may provide for a garnishment process to collect a valid tax.
Clement National Bank v. Vermont, 231 U.S. 120, 140 (1913). An action based
on a statute seeking recovery of penalties may not fall within the terms of a
garnishment statute. Cf. 6 Am. Ju.2d Attachment and Garnishment §42
(1963). On the other hand, irrespective of express statutory provision, actions
on judgment claims are commonly deemed to be enforceable by garnishment.
Id. at §49. If the suggested amendment to the annual statement and examiners
manual is implemented, see pp. 270-72 supra, the insurance commissioner
would have a means to ascertain the existence of investments in the state. If
permitted by local state law, 6 Am. JUR.2d Attachment and Garnishment §8
(1963), he might then be able to enforce a penalty judgment or tax claim
through garnishment proceedings without having to resort to another state's
courts.
49 Dean, The Foreign Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory Gap, 32 INs.
COUNSEL. J.,July 1965, pp. 432, 440. See address by N. Y. Superintendent of
Insurance Stern to the ABA Section on Insurance, Negligence and Compensation Law, Annual Meeting, Aug. 9, 1966, p. 11.
498 Dean, supra note 497, at 440.
499 E.g., WIs. STAT. §939.12 (1963).
500 "A crime punishable by imprisonment in the state prison is a felony. Every
other crime is a misdemeanor." Wis. STAT. §939.60 (1963).
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other crimes.50 1 Section 6 of the Uniform Act provides that the gov-

ernor of the state from whom extradition is sought may surrender to
the demanding state a person charged with intentionally committing an
act in a state other than the demanding state which results in a crime
in the demanding state even though the accused was not in that state
when the crime was committed and had not fled therefrom. The typical
unauthorized mail order insurer situation could very well fall within
the scope of this provision. Consequently, through the use of this Act
the state attempting to enforce its insurance laws may be able to obtain
personal jurisdiction over individual agents of the insurer and thus
subject them to a fine as per judgment or for contempt by reason of
noncompliance with a court order. 02 One virtue in particular commends
utilizing the extradition mechanism, namely, the Uniform Act already
has been enacted in forty-four states. 50 3 The Act affords an existing
means by which a state might be able to obtain redress for offenses
against its laws. Furthermore, a state's willingness to initiate the extradition procedure may have a salutary deterrent effect upon other members of the industry, although the extent of such deterrence is question504
able.
On the other hand, the extradition technique for enforcement has its
limitations including, but not necessarily limited to, the following: some
states require that for an act to be extraditable it must be unlawful not
only in the state demanding extradition, but also unlawful in the state
in which the event occurred. 50 5 This restriction is a severe limitation
since, in effect, it requires widespread adoption of a uniform unauthorized insurer law. 506 A second limitation is the absence of compulsion
against the governor if he refuses to grant a warrant of extradition
even though he has the duty to do so upon an appropriate showing of
jurisdictional fact.50 7 A third limitation is that section 6 has not been
adopted by all states having the Act. This would effectively exclude
most unauthorized insurer situations from the Act's applicability. A
fourth limitation on the effectiveness of the extradition approach has
been stated as follows:
Although no legal barriers appear to prevent extradition of misdemeanants, the practice of not so doing appears to be based
upon the reluctance of governors to grant extradition against
misdemeanants, the limited funds available to local prosecutors,
501

UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION AcT,

§2, 9 U.L.A. 264 (1939).

Comment, 17 Mo. L. REv. 73, 81-82 (1952).
503 9 U.L.A. at 137 (Pocket Supp. 1965) for use during 1966.
504 KLINE 72.
505 E.g., N.Y. CODE OF CRim. PROCEDURE §834.
506 KLINE 71.
507 See e.g., People ex rel. Higley v. Millspaw, 12 N.Y.S.2d 435 (1939), Ex Parte
Cohen, 92 A.2d 837 (1952). "Commissioners' Prefatory Note ... The effectiveness of section 6 therefore depends upon comity between the States, rather
than upon the mandatory effect of the Constitution .... " 9 U.L.A. 169, 171.
502
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and the reluctance of local officials to expend money and time
upon what appear to be relatively inconsequential matters.508
And, finally, even if extradition were accomplished and the appropriate
penalties imposed, such action is retroactive rather than prospective in
nature. 0 9
In summary, while the extradition approach may in some situations
furnish the means by which a state's insurance laws can be enforced, as
a general proposition such action may be too cumbersome and out of
proportion to the violation involved. 510
2. State Use of the
United States Supreme Court's Original Jurisdiction
The United States Constitution provides for original jurisdiction in
the Supreme Court in actions brought by one state against citizens of
another state."" Consequently, some have suggested the possibility that
a state invoke this jurisdiction and seek an injunction against those
unauthorized insurers violating the state's insurance laws.-,2 To do so
involves two basic issues: (1) over what cases will the Court assume
jurisdiction, and (2) does the conduct of unauthorized insurers present
such cases ?513
The Supreme Court's authority to hear a case and grant relief
depends upon whether the issue constitutes a justiciable controversy."
For example, in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,515 Georgia brought
suit seeking injunctive relief against an alleged freight rate fixing conspiracy by twenty railroads which discriminated against the state. In
response to the contention that there existed no justiciable controversy,
the Court responded that the complaint involved a restraint of trade, a
problem which has long presented questions with which the courts have
dealt.5 10 The same can be said as to suits against unauthorized insurers.
There is no question that an insurer who violates a state's insurance
laws can be subjected to the judicial process.
However, an action brought by the state raising a judicial question
does not necessarily create the right to invoke the Supreme Court's
original jurisdiction. 1 7 The Court may also examine the interest of the
complaining state5 s8 to see if it possesses a "quasi-sovereign" interest in
508 KLINE
509 KL NE

71.
72.

See Comment, 17 Mo. L. REv. 73, 81-82, and 64 HARV. L. REV. 482, 487. See
generally KLINE 68-74. But see The National Underwriter, March 28, 1964, p. 1.
531 Art. III, Sec. 2.
2
5 2 KLINE 104; Note, 64 HARV. L. REv. 482, 486 (1951).
513 KLINIE 104.
514 See Georgia v. Penn. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 445 (1945); Texas v. Florida, 306
U.S. 398, 405 (1939).
515 324 U.S.439 (1945).
510

516 Id. at 446.
517

See id. at 446.

518 See id. at 446-47; Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 392-96 (1938).
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the suit,' 19 as distinguished from a suit brought in the name of the state
which is really "for the benefit of certain members of the public." 520
Would a suit against the illegitimate operation of an unauthorized insurer be a matter of quasi-sovereign interest? In 2Iissouri v. Illinois
and Chicago District51 it was held that the Supreme Court had original
jurisdiction over a Missouri suit against Illinois and the Sanitary District of Chicago for an injunction to prevent the discharge of sewage
from Chicago ultimately into the Mississippi River. In sustaining the
sufficiency of Missouri's interest, the court said,
But it must surely be conceded that, if the health and comfort of
the inhabitants of a State are threatened, the State is a proper
party to represent and defend them.- 2 (Emphasis supplied.)
The conduct of an unauthorized insurer in violation of a state's insurance laws which were enacted for the protection of the public would
appear to fall within the scope of the Missouri v. Illinois doctrine. For
example, elderly policyholders victimized by illegitimate mail order insurance companies may find it extremely difficult to obtain legal redress,
while at the same time additional unsuspecting residents may have been
induced to take out policies. 23 Although it cannot be categorically said
that the requisite quasi-sovereign interest is present in a suit against an
unauthorized insurer, the chances seem relatively good that it is.
A more difficult obstacle to overcome, however, is the principle that
to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court, the suit must be one
of a civil nature, not one to enforce a criminal or penal law. 5 24 In Oklahoma v. Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry., 525 the state brought a suit to
enjoin carriers from conveying intoxicating liquor into its territory. The
Oklahoma statute prohibited such conduct and prescribed various penalties of fine and imprisonment for its violation. The Supreme Court
noted that although an injunction was sought to prevent violation of a
penal law, it is in essence an effort to enforce a penal law. 526 Therefore,
the Court held that it did not have original jurisdiction. 527 While the raGeorgia v. Penn .R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 447 (1945). See Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 237 (1907).
520 Oklahoma v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 392 (1938)
(State bank comm'r. attempting
to enforce statutory liability of a stockholder of an insolvent bank for benefit
of creditor) ; see Oklahoma v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe R. Co., 220 U.S.
277, 289 (1911).
521 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
522 Id. at 240.
523 KLINE 107.
524 See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888) ; and Oklahoma, ex rel.
West v. Gulf Colo. & S.F. R. Co., 220 U.S. 290 (1911).
525 220 U.S. 290 (1911).
526 Id. at 299-300.
527 "Although the State does not ask for judgment against the defendant railroad company for the penalties prescribed by the Oklahoma statutes for violations of its provisions, she yet seeks the aid of this court to enforce a
statute one of whose controlling objects is to impose punishment in order to
effectuate a public policy touching a particular subject relating to the public
519
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tionale of the penal rule is suspect, the Supreme Court has not cast
doubt on its validity in original jurisdiction cases as it has done in full
faith and credit situations. 28 Thus, it is highly questionable whether
the Court is available for suits against unauthorized insurers. 529
Even if it were available, however, there is some question as to the
desirability of this approach. The Supreme Court occupies a unique
position in our judiciary system. This, coupled with its already overburdened docket, suggests that perhaps relief should be sought elsewhere. 53 0 Secondly, it is frequently impractical, if not impossible, for
an individual to procure judicial relief despite the validity of his claim.
One remedy is to permit (although not compel) the state to act on an
individual's behalf. However, original jurisdiction is not available when
the state is bringing suit primarily in behalf of private individuals. A
third disadvantage to this approach is the tacit admission by the states
of their inability to regulate unauthorized insurers. Since there may be
some question as to the comprehensiveness and overall effectiveness of
suits in the Supreme Court, such an admission may lend aid and comfort to those desiring federal control. 531
3.

Suits in State Courts: Full Faith and Credit as to Judgments
a. Recognition of Other States' Judgments
A regulating state has three basic sanctions. (1) It may refuse to
issue or renew the license to do business or revoke a license already
granted. This sanction, however, would have no impact on an unauthorized insurer unless some means is adopted to compel the procurement
of a license as a condition precedent to doing, or continuing to do, business in the state. (2) It may impose a fine for failure to comply with
the law. Or, (3) it may seek an injunction prohibiting the violative
course of conduct. In dealing with unauthorized insurers, by definition,
we need be concerned only with (2) and (3).
The regulating state may bring suit in its own courts and procure a
money judgment for a fine. Such a judgment could result in little redress since no one may be found from whom the fine can be collected.
Similarly, the procurement of a cease and desist order in the courts of
the regulatory state may have little effect in halting the proscribed conduct since there may be no representative or property of the insurer
welfare. The statute viewed as a whole is to be deemed a penal statute. The
present suit, although in form one of a civil nature, is, in its essential character, one to enforce by injunction regulations prescribed by a State for violations
of one of its penal statutes and is, therefore, one of which this court cannot

take original cognizance at the instance of the State." Oklahoma, ex rel.
West v. Gulf Colo. & S. F. R. Co., 220 U.S. 290, 300 (1911).

528 See pp. 283-87 infra.
529 But see Stem, supra note 447, at 11, 12, 14.
530 Note, 64 HARv. L. REv. 482, 488 (1951).
531

For discussion of some advantages to seeking original jurisdiction in the Supreme Court, if it were available, see KLIE 107-09.
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through which compliance can be compelled. 532 The state might resort
to some form of extradition proceeding, but this would appear to be
too cumbersome and serious a remedy for the type of offenses involved. 533 Consequently, to effectuate its sanctions, the regulatory state
must seek the recognition of its judgments and cease and desist orders
by the courts of other states, generally in the state of the insurer's
domicile.

534

The judgment of a foreign state is enforced by a method provided
under the law of the forum. This usually takes the form of an action on
the judgment to obtain a local judgment upon which execution may be
had. In the absence of a statute, a foreign judgment cannot be enforced
by direct execution. It seems clear that Congress by virtue of the powers
conferred upon it by the full faith and credit clause could direct the
states to enforce the judgments of sister states. In the absence of such
legislation, common law prevails. 535
One basis upon which recognition of a judgment by a sister state
can be urged is the principle of comity. The doctrine holds that although
the laws of one state or nation have no real force outside the territorial
limits of that state or nation, such laws will be enforced by the courts
of another state so long as its laws or public policy are not offended.
Comity has been said to be the recognition which one state or nation
allows within its territory of the laws of another state or nation having
due regard to the convenience and rights of its own citizens. 3 From
the viewpoint of effective insurance regulation, the doctrine of comity
is insufficient. The forum court as a matter of respect or courtesy may
recognize judgments procured under the regulatory laws of a sister
state, but it is not obligated to do so.
For our purposes, far more important than comity is Article IV,
Section 1 of the United States Constitution which provides:
Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public
Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.
532 The state might publicize the cease and desist order in an attempt to "educate"
its residents who in turn might refrain from doing business with the Company.
Dean, supra note 497, at 441. This Virginia has attempted. See Travelers
Health Association v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 655-56 (1950). However, wholly
indirect enforcement such as this cannot be said to provide a comprehensive
and effective regulatory system. See also n. 496 supra.
553 Dean, supra note 497, at 441. See pp. 273-275 supra.
534 The regulating state may also attempt to enter the courts of another state
and bring an original action based upon its own regulatory system. This is
less likely to be successful than is proceeding on judgments or order obtained
in its own courts. "The full faith and credit clause and the the Act of Congress
implementing it have, for most purposes, placed a judgment on a different
footing from a statute of one state, judicial recognition of which is sought
in another." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 437 (1943). See
Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201 (1941). See Currie, Full
Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sup. CT.
REv. 89-90.
535 GoomIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWs 388-89 (4th ed. Scoles, 1964).
53821 C.J.S. Courts §545 (1940).
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And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner
in which such Acts, Records and Procedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.
The full faith and credit clause, as this provision is commonly called,
provides the compulsive element lacking under the doctrine of comity.
Although the following discussion is not meant to be a comprehensive
analysis of the full faith and credit clause, hopefully it will suggest that
the clause does embrace those sanctions needed for effective state regulation of unauthorized insurers.
A literal reading of the language of the clause and of the implementing statute5 37 suggests that the command of full faith and credit to a
sister state's judgments, decrees and statutes is comprehensive to the
point of no exception. Little in the way of historical constitutional or
statutory materials exists to support or refute such an interpretation.
Consequently, the courts were left to work out the clause's meaning for
themselves.

53 8

The impact of the full faith and credit clause can vary depending
upon what is asked to be given full faith and credit, (1) a judgment,
(2) an equity decree ordering the performance or nonperformance of
an act, or (3) a claim upon a statute. For our purpose (1) and (2)
are of primary importance.5 3 9 If the Supreme Court had construed the
clause to require all judgments and decrees to be entitled to recognition
by sister states, the discussion could end here. The regulating state
could procure a judgment in its own courts and then proceed on the
judgment or decree in a sister state which would be bound to give effect
to such judgment.
In many cases a judgment is rendered full faith and credit.54 However, as was said by Chief Justice Stone, "the full faith and credit clause
is not an inexorable and unqualified command," 5 41 despite its sweeping
language. Various reasons have been developed as the basis for
5 42
exceptions to giving effect to the full faith and credit clause.
§1738 (1965).
538 Por a discussion of the early history of the full faith and credit clause from
its inception in the Articles of Confederation, see former Justice Jackson's
Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,45 COLUM. L.
REv. 1, 3-7 (1945) ; MacChesney, Full Faith and Credit-A Comparative Study,
44 ILL. L. REv. 298-99 (1949) ; Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith
and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLOM. L. Rxv. 153-55 (1949); Nadelman, Full
Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, A Historical-AnalyticalAppraisal, 56 MICH. L. REv. 33, 34-62 (1957).
539 See supra note 534 and pp. 291-292 infra.
540E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 462 (1940) which said "[T]he full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution precludes any inquiry into the
merits of the cause of action, the logic or consistency of the decision, or the
validity of the legal principles on which the judgment is based."
541 Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Express, Inc., 314 U.S. 201, 210 (1941). This case
involved primarily the question of giving full faith and credit to a foreign
state's statute rather than judgment.
542 See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra, note 535, at 395-405; Jackson, supra note 538,
at 8-10; Leflar, Extrastate Enforcement of Penal and Governmental Clahns,
537 28 U.S.C.A.
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From the viewpoint of insurance regulation, some have greater relevance than others, namely (1) lack of jurisdiction, (2) paramount local
interest or public policy, (3) the so-called penalty exception, and (4)
5

equity decrees.

43

b. Lack of Jurisdiction
Perhaps the most important and least questionable limitation on the
applicability of the full faith and credit clause as to judgments in personan is the absence of jurisdiction of the court rendering the judgment. An attempt to render a personal judgment in the absence of jurisdiction violates the due process clause. Therefore the judgment is void
5 44
in the state where rendered and not entitled to recognition elsewhere.
Jurisdiction is open to inquiry by the court of the sister state asked to
recognize the foreign judgment.5 45 However, a party who has contested
the court's jurisdiction and lost can attack the judgment for lack of jurisdiction only on appeal and not collaterally when sued upon the judgment. In other words, the determination of the jurisdictional issue is
entitled to full faith and credit.54 Thus the lack of jurisdiction is not
really an exception to the full faith and credit clause, but rather jurisdiction is a question of due process, in the absence of which there is
no valid judgment to which full faith and credit can be given. "I
On the other hand, unless one of the other exceptions applies, a
judgment rendered after proper and sufficient service of process on a
foreign corporation doing business in the state will be recognized and
given full faith and credit. 548 The previous discussion suggests that a
state does possess jurisdiction over unauthorized mail order insurers
in the typical situation. Even if the insurer does not appear to defend,
46 HARV. L. REv. 193, 201-02 (1932) ; Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign
Equity Decrees, 42 IA. L. REv. 183, 184-89 (1957); Reese and Johnson,
supra note 538, at 153.
543 Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of A Sister State, 42 IA. L. REv.
202, 204 (1957). Paulson lists, as defenses to the enforcement of a money
judgment of a sister state, lack of jurisdiction, lack of finality, the running
of the statute of limitations, payment or discharge in bankruptcy, and fraud
in obtaining the judgment. Id. at 204.
544 Full faith and credit is not required if the foreign court lacks jurisdiction
either over the parties or the subject matter. E.g., Riley v. N.Y. Trust Co.,
315 U.S. 343 (1942), May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953), Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958), Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610 (1947). See
Jackson, supra note 538, at 8; Rashid, The Full Faith and Credit Clause:
Collateral Attack of Jurisdictional Issues, 36 GEo. L. J. 154, 156-57 (1957).
See generally id. Mere irregularities or errors do not constitute a lack of
jurisdiction so as to create a defense when recognition is sought in another
state. E.g., Chandler v. Peketz, 297 U.S. 609 (1936).
545 E.g., Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940).
546 E.g., Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106, 111-116 (1963) ; Baldwin v. Traveling
Men's Association, 283 U.S. 522, 524-26 (1931). "One trial of an issue is
enough. 'The principles of res judicata apply to questions of jurisdiction as
well as to other issues,' . . . " Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66,
78 (1939). See Paulsen, supra note 543, at 208.
547 See Reese and Johnson, supra note 538, at 166.
548 See Milwaukee County v. White, 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
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the regulatory state can obtain a default judgment. Default judgments
54
are entitled to full faith and credit.

9

c. Local Policy of the Forum
Another basis referred to for nonrecognition of a sister state's judgment is that its recognition or enforcement would be contrary to the
public policy of the forum. 550 This doctrine is potentially applicable in
every suit brought on a foreign judgment. Except where a constitutional mandate is violated, it is always within the power of a state not
to recognize a foreign judgment when allowing relief would be contrary to the local policy of the forum.
When a judgment is sought to be enforced in a sister state, the question may arise whether under the full faith and credit clause a defense
can be made on the basis that the nature of the claim underlying the
judgment is repugnant to the forum's concept of public policy or morals.
This question was squarely presented to the Supreme Court in Fauntleroy v.Lum,551 which held that full faith and credit must be given. As
one judge said,
With complete jurisdiction of the subject-matter and the parties,
a judgment shall be accorded the same faith and credit in every
court within the United States as it has by the law and usage in
the state or territory where it was originally rendered; and this is
true, though the cause of action upon which the judgment was
based is against the law and public552policy of the state or territory
in which enforcement is sought.

While

there

have

been

rare

exceptions, 5 53

the

Supreme

Court

has generally adhered to this doctrine. 554 Full faith and credit should
49

See Annot. 77 A.L.R.2d 1410, 1425; Gibson v. Epps, 352 S.W.2d 45 (Mo.
App. 1961). "A judgment of a court having jurisdiction of the parties and
of the subject matter operates as res judicata, in the absence of fraud or

collusion, even if obtained upon a default." Riehle v. Margolies, 279 U.S. 218,

225 (1929). There would appear to be no reason to deny full faith and credit
which is intended to implement the principle of res judicata in the federal
system. See e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439 (1943).
550 See generally Reese and Johnson, supra note 538, at 171-77. A parallel exception views full faith and credit as one national policy which, on rare occasions,
may be required to give way to another national policy(s) assuming greater
importance in a particular case. See Reese, supra note 542, at 187-88. But see
Corwin, The Full Faith and Credit Clause, 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 371, 374
(1933) who said "as to these (the "records and judicial proceedings") the
local policy of the forum state can have no application."
551210
U.S. 230 (1908).
552
Hieston v. National City Bank, 280 F. 525, 528 (C. of A. of D.C. 1922). For
cases following these decisions, see Goonaici, op. cit. supra note 535, at 400.
553 E.g., Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562
(1906) ; rev'd. on other grounds Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287
(1942). "It has often been recognized ... that there are limitations upon the
extent to which a state may be required by the full faith and credit clause
to enforce even the judgment of another state in contravention of its own

statutes or policies." Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm.,
306 U.S. 493, 502 (1939). "So far as judgments are concerned, the decisions,
as distinguished from the dicta, show that the actual exceptions have been
few and far between. .. " Williams, supra 294-95

554 "We are aware of no such exception in the case of a money judgment
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Former Justice Jack-

son aptly summarized the situation when he said,
A money judgment in the usual civil action, if it survives inquiry
into jurisdiction of the rendering tribunal, is unimpeachable in a
sister state, either as a basis for a judgment of its courts or as a
shield against further litigation of the same issues by the same
parties. Exceptions there are, but they are few and affect only a
small number of judgments, and no tendency to enlarge them appears. 556
Although the various state policies may differ as to the degree of
regulation of insurance companies, all states are committed to fairly
comprehensive regulation in the public interest. Through the efforts of
the individual states, the NAIC and others, insurance regulation has
attained a fairly high degree of uniformity (in principle, although perhaps not in detail) throughout the many states. This uniformity of regulatory policy suggests that the occasion for nonrecognition of a foreign
judgment based on a conflict with that state's insurance law should be
infrequent. The local exception is narrow to begin with. Relatively
uniform insurance policy throughout the different states should further
limit the already narrow latitude generally accorded this exception.55
State policy considerations must be of major importance to prevent the
operation of full faith and credit on a foreign judgment.
rendered in a civil suit. Nor are we aware of any considerations of local
policy or law which could rightly be deemed to impair the force and effect
which the full faith and credit clause and the Act of Congress require to be
given to such a judgment outside the state of its rendition." Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943). "The constitutional command requires a state to enforce the judgment of a sister state . .. although the
suit in which the judgment was obtained could not have been maintained
under the laws and the policy of the forum to which the judgment is brought."
Id. at 439. See also Kenney v. Supreme Lodge 252 U.S. 411 (1947). See
Jackson, supra note 538, at 10. See GooDaIcH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 398.
555 Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581, 584 (1951).
556 Jackson, supra note 538, at 10.
557 In urging that the NAIC adopt the Uniform Insurance False Advertising
Act, the Industry Advising Committee said, "Limitations upon the obligation
of the forum to give recognition to a foreign judgment are founded upon the
view that the full faith and credit clause 'does not require the enforcement
of every right conferred by a statute of another state. There is room for
some play of conflicting policies . .' (Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper,
286 U.S. 145, 160 (1923)). Adoption by each state of the UIFAPA would
result in unification, rather than conflict, of policies concerning false advertising if, indeed, adoption of the Unfair Trade Practice Act by all states has
not already had that effect .... In the light of fact that (1) all states have
a common obligation under the McCarran-Ferguson Act to regulate the business of insurance, (2) all states in the partial discharge of that obligation
have adopted the Unfair Trade Practice Act, and (3) the proposed UIFAPA
is a procedural device for the more effective implementation of substantive
principles already adopted, it seems most unlikely that the Supreme Court
would find that any state has a policy against enforcement of a UIFAPA
judgment which would merit 'recognition of a permissible limitation upon the
full faith and credit clause.' This conclusion is reinforced when it is recalled
that the Court declined to find such a limitation in an area-taxationcharacterized by a high degree of dissimiliarity of policy among the several
states." 2 PROCEEDINGS 489, 499-500 (1960).

1966]
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d. The Penal Exception
Historically, the courts of one state have refused to enforce claims
based on the penal or revenue laws of a foreign nation or a sister
state. 5 When applied to judgments of other states, this constitutes an
exception to the general full faith and credit rule pertaining to judgments. Assuming arguendo that the so-called penal exception is valid,
does the term "penal" embrace the techniques employed to enforce a
state's system of insurance laws?
Generally speaking, two tests for penalty have evolved- One test
looks to the award of damages. If the permissible award to the injured
party includes more than pure compensation for his loss, or is measured
by a standard such as the defendant's culpability, the claims will be
deemed penal and enforceable only by the state whose law gave rise to
it." 9 That is, in some cases the term "penal" or "penalty" has been
applied to anything that the defendant is compelled to pay the plaintiff
other than the amount necessary to compensate for losses caused by
the defendant. 560 Under this test courts have denied as penal under another state's law claims for triple interest, 5G' double damages for injury
5 63
to live stock,562 and treble damages for rate discrimination.
The second test as to what is penal was formulated in the leading
case Huntington v. AttrilL 56 4 This case involved a New York statute
imposing liability on a corporate director to creditors for a false affidavit
as to the amount of paid-in stock. The plaintiff secured a judgment
against the director in a New York court for the amount of money lent
to the corporation. When the judgment was refused enforcement in
Maryland, the case was taken to the Supreme Court on writ of error
and the Maryland decision was reversed. The Court said the test as to
whether or not the statute is penal, that is, whether it is penal in the
international sense, depends upon whether the purpose of the law is
to punish an offense against the public justice of the state, or to
afford a private remedy to a person injured by the wrongful act.5 65
The Court held the New York statute not to be penal. In the absence of
an exception to full faith and credit, the judgment was entitled to recognition.
Of course, for constitutional purposes the Supreme Court's test,
rather than the broader compensatory test, is controlling. Even under
the Supreme Court's narrower definition of the term "penal," a judg558 See GooDRIcH. op. cit. supra note
559 Leflar, supra note 542, at 203.
560 GooDRIcH, op. cit. supra 535, at

535, at 18; Leflar, supra note 542, at 194.
18.

561 Blaine v. Curtis, 7 A. 708 (1887).
562
Bettys v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 37 Wis. 323 (1875).
563

Langdon v. New York L. E. & W. Ry. Co., 11 N.Y.S. 514 (1890) ; see Leflar,
supra note 542, at 197.
564 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
565 Id. at 673-74.
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ment for a fine being collected for and retained by the state would appear to be penal. 566 Thus, the Huntington case lends little support to
enhancing the efficacy of state regulation through the application of full
faith and credit. To do this the validity of the so-called penal exception
must be challenged.
The opinion in the Huntington case has been frequently cited as
support for the proposition that a "penal" judgment is not entitled to
full faith and credit. The decision in the case did not go that far. Since
the New York statute was deemed not to be "penal," the judgment was
held to fall within the scope of the constitutional command. The validity
of the penal exception to the full faith and credit clause, in fact, required no determination.
Presumably, this so-called exception was established in the earlier
case of Wisconsin v. Pelican Insurance Co. 56 7 In that case a suit was

brought by Wisconsin against a foreign insurance company which had
done business in the state but which had failed to file annual returns
as required by the Wisconsin law. The suit resulted in a judgment for
a fine imposed by statute. The Court held that the action could not be
maintained. In the course of its opinion, the Court said,
The rule that the courts of no country execute the penal laws of
another applies . . to all suits in favor of the State for the recovery of pecuniary penalties for any violation of statutes for the
protection of its revenue, or other municipal laws, and to all judgments for such penalties. 568
However, in Pelican,Wisconsin was invoking the original jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court.5 6 9 The applicability of the full faith and credit
clause to a suit in a state court on a sister state's judgment was not in
issue, a fact not unnoticed in subsequent cases. For example, in Fauntleroy v. Lurn, the Court said,
The [Pelican] case was not within the words of Art. IV, §1 (full
faith and credit clause). .

.

. It is true that language was used

which has been treated as meaning that the original claim upon
which a judgment is based may be looked into further than Chief
Justice Marshall supposed. But evidently it meant only to justify
the conclusion reached upon the specific point decided, for the
proviso was inserted that a court "cannot go behind the judgment
for the purpose of examining into the validity of the claim."
566

See Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 299 (1888) ; Huntington v.
Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 682 (1892), and Leflar, supra note 542, at 214. But see

Report to the NAIC Subcommittee to Study and Review State Insurance

Laws: Direct-Mail Insurance Advertising by Industry Advisory Committee,
2 PROCEEDINGS 489, 500-501 (1960).
5 7 127 U.S. 265 (1888). The concept was first expressed in this country by Chief
Justice Marshall in The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 337, 344 (1825), who
said "The courts of no country execute the penal laws of another..
568 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888).
569 Id. at 287. U.S. CONST., art. III, §2 extends the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to suits brought by a state against citizens of another state.
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However, the whole passage was only a dictum and it is not
worth while to spend much time upon it.570 (Emphasis supplied.)
In Fauntleroy, although the Court held that local public policy could
not be used to deny full faith and credit, its opinion indicated that the
availability of the penal exception was an unsettled question.
Subsequently in Milwaukee County v.M. E. White Co.,571 the Supreme Court compelled the recognition and enforcement of a sister
state's judgment for taxes. It expressly refrained from intimating any
opinion on the penal question 72 although the judgment included an
item for a 2 per cent delinquency penalty. The Court reserved the question whether a penal judgment is entitled to full faith and credit. 57 3 In
other words, the Court drew a distinction between a judgment for taxes
with regard to which full faith and credit was required and a penal
judgment on which no opinion was given. However, the considerations
relevant to enforcing penal and fiscal obligations would appear to be
analogous, 574 for the

very purpose of the full faith and credit clause was to alter the
status of the several states as independent foreign sovereignties,
each free to ignore the obligations created under the laws or by
the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral
parts of a single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just
obligation might be demanded as of right, irrespective of the state
of origin.575
Furthermore, foreign revenue laws have generally been classified together with foreign penal laws with respect to the question of extraterritorial enforcement. 576
In the Milwaukee County case, the taxpayer relied on a sentence
in Pelican which would permit a state to look behind a judgment of a
sister state to determine "whether the claim is really one of such a nature that the court is authorized to enforce

''57 7
it.

The Court in Milwau-

kee County disposed of this contention by saying
So far as the opinion can be taken to suggest that full faith and
credit is not required with respect to a judgment unless the original cause of action would have been entitled
to like credit, it is
5 78
inconsistent with decisions of this court ....
This language undercuts the very basis of the Pelican decision.575
570 210 U.S. 230, 236-37 (1908).
571296 U.S. 268 (1935).
572 Id. at 279.
573Ibid.
57- GooDRiC, op. cit. supra note 535, at 403.
575 Milwaukee County v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
5 See Leflar, supra note 542, at 214-15. See also Banca Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 414 (1964).
568 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 290 (1888).
57s Milwaukee County v. Al. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 278 (1935).
57 Paulsen, supra note 543, at 207.
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Certainly, the logic of the Milwaukee County decision substantially
weakens the penalty exception rule.580 None of the policy reasons against
trying penal actions in a foreign jurisdiction are present here, since liability has already been adjudicated. s1 Furthermore, as has been shown
above, the Pelican and Huntington cases, upon which the validity of the
5 2
penal exception must rest, offer at most some dicta in its support.
In view of the foregoing plus the fact that Congress, in enacting the
McCarran Act, intended the states to be able to effectively regulate insurance, it would be anomalous for the Supreme Court to require full
faith and credit to be given to a judgment for taxes against an unauthorized insurer and not require the same for an injunction or a penalty.58 3 Consequently, the Supreme Court, when called upon to ultimately decide this question, may very well find that penal as well as
tax judgments are entitled to full faith and credit by sister states.58 4 As
former Justice Jackson has said,
The faith and credit clause has been held to permit the forum to
examine the cause of action merged in the judgment and, if it
was based on a penalty, to refuse enforcement. This, too, has
been limited strictly to penalties and the Court refused to extend
the doctrine to a judgment for taxes in an opinion which casts
some shadow on the whole penalty exception. 8 5
And, as Professor Paulsen said "To rely on the Pelican Insurance case
today is a desperate gamble."5 6
One commentator suggests that the penal exception would be particularly suspect with respect to cases arising out of business regulation
as distinguished from criminal cases.5 87 However to date, the Supreme
Court has not yet been confronted with a case requiring a decision to
enforce or not enforce a judgment that could be deemed penal within
the Huntington v. Attrill definition. Until it does, the validity of the so580 It has been argued that a judgment based upon a failure to comply with

insurance licensing laws affects an individual more than failure to pay taxes.
From this it can be urged that such a judment is more strongly entitled to
full faith and credit than a judgment for taxes which has been held to be
entitled to recognition. See KLINE 85.
581 Note, 64 HARv.L. REv. 482, 486 (1951).
582 See Leflar, supra note 542, at 196, where the author questions whether the
reasons for the old penalty exception actually fit the facts to which it had
been applied in the years since Chief Justice Marshall's dicta appeared in
The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10. Wheat.) 337 (1825).
5S3 See Stern, Address given before the Section of Insurance, Negligence and
Compensation Law, A.B.A. Annual Meeting, in New York, N.Y., August 9,
1966, at 13.
584 The penalty exception has been characterized as dicta. See Williams v. North
Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 n. 6 (1942). "The (penalty) rule does not seem
to rest upon a strong logical foundation, at least when the state itself is
asking for enforcement, since the reason for the rule has been stated to be
non-interference with the other states' sovereignty." Note, 17 Mo. L. REV. 73,
83 (1952).
585 Jackson, supra note 538, at 9-10.
586 Paulsen, supra note 543, at 208.
587 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 403. See also Leflar, supra note 542, at
200-202.
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called penalty exception to full faith and credit, while seriously undermined, remains an unsettled question. As of now the potential
application of the penalty exception plagues the system of state regula8
tion of insurance with doubts and uncertainty.5
e. Equity Decrees
Another, and very important, regulatory sanction is the cease and
desist order. The full faith and credit clause reads "Full Faith and
Credit shall be given in each State to the . . .judicial Proceedings of

every other State."58 19 The term "judicial proceedings" was set down
without limitation in both the clause and the implementing statute. If
the clause is construed literally, this term must include equity decrees
of all types (including orders to perform or to refrain from performing specific acts), and it would seem that equity decrees are entitled to
the same measure of recognition as any other type of judgment.5 90
The effect which must be given a sister state's judgment has already
been discussed. Now to be considered is whether there is anything in
the nature of an equity decree to prevent it from being accorded similar
recognition.
Three primary theories have been raised to deny giving full faith
and credit to an equitable decree: (1) One group of early writers contended that equity decrees have an inferior status to judgments at law
since their only effect is to render the defendant responsible to the issuing court. They have no legal effect. According to this theory, an equity
decree for doing an act cannot create a binding obligation, but rather it
is merely a method of enforcing an obligation. 91 If this is an accurate
description of today's equity decrees, plaintiff's case would have to be
proved again on the merits in the state where enforcement is sought.
But today, it is clear that an equitable decree ordering the payment of
money will be enforced in another state as would a money judgment
rendered in a court of law.5 12 In short, as one commentator put it:
This theory, however, has been exploded in the light of experience, since it is now well established that equity decrees for the
payment of a sum certain in money have exactly the same res
also
judicata effect as do judgments and 59
3 enjoy a status co-equal
with them under full faith and credit.
58sDean, The Foreign Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory Gap, 32 INS.
COUNSEL J. 432, 433 (1965).

CONsT., art. IV §1.
59o Reese, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Equity Decrees, 42 IA. L. REV. 183
(1957).
591 See Barbour, The ExtraterritorialEffect of the Equity Decree, 17 MIcH. L.
REv. 527, 539-41 (1919), and Reese, supra note 590, at 190; Currie, Full Faith
and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. oF CH. L. REv. 620, 623 (1954);
GOODRICH, op cit. supra note 535, at 411.
592 See Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77 (1944), and Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1
(1910) in which an order for alimony by an equity court was sued on in another state and held entitled to recognition under the full faith and credit
clause. See also Annot. 18 A.L.R.2d 862 (1951).
593 Reese, supra note 590, at 190.
589 U.S.
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The reluctance to recognize foreign decrees, at least in many cases, has
been attributed to some conception of policy relating to local land-a
fear that a state may lose control over land within its borders-rather
594
than to the nature of an equitable decree.
(2) A second argument urged against recognizing a foreign equitable decree is that it interferes with state control over local land. 595 This
point has been thoroughly discussed in other articles.596 What is important to note, for the purpose of effectuating insurance regulation, is that
even if this is a valid exception to full faith and credit, a matter of
some doubt,597 the exception does not rest on the equitable nature of
the decree.
(3) A third argument against the enforcement of a sister state's
foreign equitable decree is that
... there is no action known to the common law for the enforcement of a foreign judgment except the action for598debt .

debt will be only for a certain sum of money due.

. .

and

Consequently, so the argument runs, a foreign equity decree, other than
one ordering the defendant to pay money, cannot be enforced. Despite
this contention, however, foreign decrees of this type have been enforced,5 99 thereby refuting the basic premise of what has been called an
"archaic doctrinal argument.

' 60 0

However, it has been suggested that

since equitable relief is extraordinary relief, the forum court is entitled
to discretion as to the form of relief allowed.6 1 Professor Reese responds:
See Currie, Full Faith and Credit to Foreign Land Decrees, 21 U. CHI.
L. REv. 620, 623-24, 628 (1954). It has been said that a foreign decree with
respect to land in the forum state created no binding obligation but rather
merely a duty to the court rendering the decree. Bullock v. Bullock, 52 N.J.
Eq. 561, 30 A. 676 (1894). But this argument is equally applicable to a decree
ordering the payment of money, yet it does not hold true in that instance.
See GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 411-12. "There appears to be no
sensible reason for this distinction. The decree assumes substantially the
same form whether it be for the payment of money or the conveyance of
land .... When a judge . . .to-day declares that a foreign decree ordering
the conveyance of land creates no obligation but merely a duty owed by
the defendant to the Court, he is assuming that equity has made no progress
since the time of Coke." Barbour, The ExtraterritorialEffect of the Equitable Decree, 17 MicH. L. REv. 527, 528 (1919).
595 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 412. See supra note 558 and accompanying text.
596 See e.g., Barbour, supra note 555; Currie, supra note 594; and Reese, supra

594

note 590.
597 Ibid.

CONFLICT OF LAWS, §449.1 (1935).
59 See e.g., Matson v. Matson, 173 N.W.
598 BEALE,

127 (1919) ; Sistare v. Sistare, 218
U.S. 1 (1910) ; Forrest v. Fey, 218 Ill. 165, 75 N.E. 789 (1905) ; Simmons
v. Sup. Ct., 96 Cal. App.2d 119, 214 P.2d 844 (1950). See GOODRICH, op. cit.
supra note 525, at 414.
609 GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 412.
601 RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS, §449, comment a (1934).
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This suggestion, however, finds no support in the language of the
full faith and credit clause and its implementing statute. Furthermore, equitable relief has now become so common that it60can
2
hardly be considered more extraordinary than relief at law.
The forum should be required to provide the same relief as given in
the original court.

60

3

Furthermore, it might be noted that injunctions have been held to
4
be entitled to recognition under full faith and credit by lower courts,
but the Supreme Court has not had occasion to definitively settle this
issue.605 In Travelers Health Association v. Virginia,606 the Court upheld Virginia's authority to issue a cease and desist order against an
unlicensed mail order insurer. But Virginia merely wished to publicize
the defendant's unlicensed status, 60 7 and no attempt was made to enforce
the injunction through the courts of the insurer's domicile. Consequently, the Court was not confronted with determining whether an
injunction is entitled to full faith and credit.
In one case the Supreme Court held that it did not have original
jurisdiction to entertain a suit by a state seeking an injunction against
a foreign corporation. The determinative factor was the conclusion that
an injunction prohibiting the violation of a penal statute, in essence, is
an enforcement of a penal statute.6 0 8 Although this was an original
jurisdiction-rather than a full faith and credit-case, it tends to
weaken the argument that an injunction is entitled to full faith and
credit. Therefore, until both the penal exception and the objection based
on the nature of an equitable decree are swept away, it cannot be said
with assurance that injunctions will receive full faith and credit. 60 9
In summary, three rationales have been raised as to why equity
decrees, because of their nature, do not come within the scope of full
faith and credit. Each of these has been refuted. Nothing in the nature
of an equitable decree appears to warrant a denial of such recognition.
602 Reese, supra note 590, at 191; Accord GooDRIcH, op. cit. supra note 535, at
412-13.
603 Reese, supra note 590, at 191. However, two possible exceptions were pointed
out: (1) when the relief is of a type which the forum court does not grant,

and (2) when the only way to enforce an order requiring defendant to do
or refrain from doing a specific act is to imprison him. Ibid.

604 E.g., Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N.Y. 156 (1854) (Plaintiff secured a Connecticut
injunction against enforcement of N.Y. judgment followed by New York

dismissal of suit on New York judgment because Connecticut injunction
entitled to full faith and credit.)

605 In Fall v. Estin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909), a foreign decree affecting title to land

in the forum State was not required to be recognized. But this case has been
severely criticized and deemed inconclusive. See Reese, supra note 590, at 199.

606 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
607 Id. at 655-56 (Dissent).

See Oklahoma v. Gulf, Colorado and Santa Fe R. Co., 220 U.S. 290 (1911).
For a discussion of this case see p. 276 supra.
609 See pp. 276-77 supra for a discussion of penal laws in relation to seeking
original jurisdiction in the United States Supreme Court.
608
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To date the United States Supreme Court has not provided
a definitive answer as to whether a foreign equity decree ordering the
performance or nonperformance of a specific act is entitled to full faith
and credit and, if it is, whether it might be subject to the penalty exception in full faith and credit cases. However, an important purpose
of the full faith and credit clause is to assure to our federal system
some of the benefits of a unified nation, by establishing that
throughout the federal system the salutary principle of the common law that a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as
conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other court as in
that where the judgment was rendered ....

Because there is a full

faith and credit clause a defendant may not a second time challenge the validity of plaintiff's right which has ripened into a
judgment and a plaintiff may not for his single cause of action
secure a second or a greater recovery. 610
The purpose is equally applicable to equity decrees as to legal judgments.
This position has received substantial support from the academic community. 611 Furthermore, in its commentary on the Uniform Enforce-

ment of Foreign Judgments Act (1948), the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws indicated that equity decrees
are entitled to full faith and credit when they said:
No distinction is made between judgments and decrees requiring the payment of money, ordering or restraining the doing
of acts, or declaring rights or duties of any other character,
whether entered in law or equity, in probate, guardianship, receivership, or any other type of proceedings. The fact that there
is a "judicial proceeding" entitled to full faith and credit within
the United States Conthe meaning of Article IV, Section 1, of
6 12
stitution is the only criterion employed.

f. Possible State Action
If the United States Supreme Court were (a) to sustain state jurisdiction to tax and regulate unlicensed mail order insurers 13 and (b) to
hold that the full faith and credit clause requires recognition of foreign
penal judgments and equity decrees (including injunctions), a substantial gap in state insurance regulation would be closed. The state could
procure a determination of the applicability of its laws in its own courts.
It would then obtain enforcement through fines and/or injunctions using the courts of a sister state. No longer could companies defy with
impunity the regulatory safeguards for public protection in those states
where they do business.
As noted above, this discussion of the full faith and credit clause
is not an exhaustive analysis of its applicability. However, it does sug610 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 439-40 (1943).

611 See GOODRIcH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 413-14, and Currie, supra note 594,
at 677-79.
6- 9A U.L.A. 476 (1965).
613 Of course, there may be some factual situations justifying an exception.
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gest that there is an excellent possibility that this clause does embrace
those sanctions needed for effective state regulation. As has recently
been said:
The expansion of state jurisdictional bases over the past few
decades, in recognition of the need to provide meaningful means
of redress for aggrieved parties in an increasing mobile society
and an essentially interstate economic system, will also witness a
placed
relaxation of those limitations which have heretofore been
614
upon the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution.
What is now needed (assuming a favorable disposition of the Myinisters Life case) is a test case to settle the questions pertaining to full
faith and credit. Wisconsin is in a position to continue playing a key
role. If the Supreme Court sustains the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
the Ministers Life case, Wisconsin can proceed to bring suit in a Wisconsin court for both penalties and for an injunction under the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Statute.15 Assuming that a favorable judgment is obtained, enforcement can be sought in Minnesota by virtue of
the full faith and credit clause.
This approach--i.e., a test case on full faith and credit-possesses
certain advantages over other approaches subsequently to be discussed.
It only takes the determination of a single state to carry it out. Legislators need not be persuaded to enact a new law. The cooperation of
other states or the NAIC is not indispensable. No assistance need be
sought from the federal government. In short, it is a "do it yourself"
approach which can have widespread ramifications for the protection
of the public and for the ability of the states to regulate. 616
4. Suits in State Courts: Full Faith and Credit As to Statutes
The application of full faith and credit to the laws of a sister state
61
represents an area still fraught with a high degree of uncertainty.
Insofar as the laws of a state expressly reflect its public policy, it is
understandable that, under some circumstances, foreign statutes may
merit different treatment by the forum state than is accorded foreign
judgments. 6 s That issue will not be pursued here. With respect to judg614 Stern, supra note 583, at 11.

615 Currently, the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Statute, Wis. STAT.
§201.42(6), confronts unauthorized insurers with a difficult question. To
plead a defense, it must deposit securities or the like to secure payment in
the event of an adverse final judgment (or, as an alternative, it may procure
a license). If it fails to do so, a default judgment may be entered against it.
If the judgment is entitled to full faith and credit, the insurer has lost.
On the other hand, if the insurer deposits such security, it loses the possibility
to defend on the inapplicability of the full faith and credit clause since an

adverse judgment can be satisfied out of the deposits.

616

Of course, the insurer may capitulate rather than litigate. In this case, while
the resolution of the constitutional issues would still be in doubt, the desired
result would be achieved.

617 See Nadelman, Full Faith and Credit to Judgments and Public Acts, A
Historical-Analytical Reappraisal, 56 MicH. L. Ray. 33, 85-86 (1957); Jack-
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ments, the full faith and credit clause has been implemented by Congress619 and dealt with by the courts. For this reason, and because we
believe that the enforcement of foreign judgments and decrees holds
the most promise for effective state insurance regulation, little will be
said here concerning attempts to bring foreign actions based on the
6 20
regulating state's own laws.

C.

PROCEEDING THROUGH LEGISLATIVE ACTION

As we did in our discussion of the full faith and credit clause, let
us assume that the states can obtain jurisdiction over an unauthorized
mail order insurer. Furthermore, let us assume that a judgment or decree against the insurer is obtained in the courts of the regulating state.
The state may follow one of two paths in attempting to enforce this
judgment or decree. It may seek enforcement through the courts of a
sister state or through the federal district courts. In either case, legislation may be required.
Statutes Pertaining to Judicial Jurisdiction:Enforcement Through
the State Courts
Assuming, for the moment, that a state court is willing to enforce
the foreign judgment or decree against the mail order insurer, what
procedure is to be followed? Full faith and credit does not require that
a judgment procured in one state be recognized as a basis for execution
in a second state,6 21 but rather such foreign judgment be deemed an
indefeasible cause of action upon which a new judgment shall be rendered by the courts of the second state. 22 There is no uniform system
of enforcing judgments or decrees in the United States. 622 Neither the
full faith and credit clause nor the Congressional statute implementing
it have mandated the procedure for effectuating full faith and credit.
Consequently, the judgment is enforced in accordance with the procedure provided under the law of the forum." 4

1.

son, supra note 538, at 11; Currie, -Full Faith and Credit, Chiefly to Judgments: A Role for Congress, 1964 Sue. CT. REV. 89-90; MacChesney, Full
Faith and Credit-A Comparative Study, 44 ILL. L. REV. 298, 304 (1949).
618 "Where this Court has required the state of the forum to apply the foreign
law under the full faith and credit clause or under the Fourteenth Amendment, it has recognized that a state is not required to enforce a law obnoxious to its public policy." Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 507 (1941).
619 Currie, supra note 617, at 90.
60

See note 534 supra.

-21 See Yntema, The Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Anglo-American
Law, 33 MICH. L. REV. 1129, 1149 (1935) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS,
§433 (1934).
622 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935); 17 VAND. L. REV. 652 (1964).
-3 The NAIC Subcommittee to Study and Review Laws recommended a study
leading to the legislation of a model act providing for enforcement, on a
reciprocal basis, of penalty judgments and injunctions in the insurer's domi624

ciliary state. 1 PROCEEDINGS 158 (1959).

GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 535, at 388; Yntema, supra note 621, at 1135.
The same general principle applies to the method of execution available to
an action on a foreign judgment. ".

.

. if the action on the foreign judgment
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a. Suit on the Judgment
In the absence of statutory provisions, traditional common law procedure to enforce a foreign judgment requires a new action upon the
judgment to be brought in the state where enforcement is sought. 6 5
.. . execution will not issue immediately upon a foreign judgment in its character as a judgment, but the obligation which it is
deemed to impose must be reduced to a judgment in the forum
by a new action in order to be executed."' 6
This requires obtaining service on the judgment debtor and meeting the
other standard requisites for maintenance of an in personam suit.67
The procedure for reducing a foreign judgment to a new judgment
in the forum has proven to be unsatisfactory. Enforcement of rights
should be "certain, prompt, inexpensive and effective." 628 By this standard the common law procedure possesses several defects, namely, there
is unnecessary delay stemming from over-crowded calendars, postponements and dilatory tactics; unnecessary expense; and the additional
difficulty created by the necessity of again securing personal jurisdiction over the judgment debtor.62 9 The first two defects are partially
mitigated in those jurisdictions where the summary judgment procedure is available. 30
As one commentator pointed out, bringing a new action on a foreign
judgment is the same "archaic" method employed in the colonies before
the American Revolution. However, in the early 1940's, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws commenced
study on a uniform act with respect to the enforcement of foreign
judgments. 631 Two basic approaches were explored: (a) direct registration, and (b) summary judgment.
b. Direct Registration
This method contemplates that a sister state's judgment can be regterminates favorably to the plaintiff, the judgment rendered is in all respects a judgment of the forum." Id. at 1136.
625 GooDRIcK, op. cit. supra note 535, at 388; Yntema, supra note 621, at 1136;
17 VAND. L. Rrv. 652, 653 (1964).
626 Yntema, supra note 621, at 1144. See GoomicH, op. cit. supra note 535, at
388, and Paulsen, Enforcing the Money Judgment of a Sister State, 42
IA. L. REv. 202 (1957). This conception of a foreign judgment may be the
result of an attempt to harmonize the principle of independent territorial
jurisdiction and the principle of finality of litigation. Yntema, supra note

621, at 1144.

627 Leflar, The New Uniform Judgments
628 Yntema, supra note 621, at 1164.
629

Act, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. 336, 337 (1949).

Id. at 1164-65, and Note, 50 CoLUm. L. REv. 471 (1950). The problem of
delay is illustrated in Tolley v. Wilson, 212 Ark. 163, 205 S.W.2d 177 (1947)
where a foreign judgment sued upon in Arkansas for the purpose of reaching Arkansas land was thwarted since the judgment debtor sold the land
before a new judgment was reached in the Arkansas Court. See Paulsen,
supra note 626, at 202. A situation of this type is less likely to occur when

the defendant is a domestic insurance company.
631 See Leflar, supra note 627, at 338.

630 Yntema, supra note 621, at 1165.
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istered in the state where execution is desired. Thereafter, the judgment
has the effect of a local judgment without the bringing of a new action. 632 Comparable procedure has long been used in England and Australia. 633 Finally, in 1948, the registration approach was adopted by Congress for the federal court system, thereby permitting registration of
judgment in all federal district courts. 634 Under this statute a
judgment in an action for the recovery of money or property
S..

entered in any district court which has become final by ap-

peal or expiration of the time for appeal may be registered in any
other district by filing therein a certified copy of such judgment.
A judgment so registered shall have the same effect as a judgment of the district court of the district where registered and
may be enforced in like manner.
This registration statute was intended "to provide all the benefits deriving from a local judgment on a 'foreign' judgment without subjecting
either the plaintiff or the defendant to the expense of a second lawsuit."

63 5

The registration procedure offers speed, convenience and an economical method of enforcement. Furthermore, it relieves the parties of
additional cost and harrassment of further litigation otherwise incident
to the enforcement of a foreign judgment. 36
Summary Judgment-Uniform Enforcement
of Foreign Judgments Act
When the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws initially considered enforcement of foreign judgments, it concentrated its thinking on a state system of registration modeled after existing judgment registration statutes, especially those in the British Commonwealth and separately in Canada and Australia.63 It was assumed
that in drafting a uniform statute, a registration procedure similar to
that ultimately used in the federal courts would be adopted. 38 Although
the Commissioners seemed to believe that the registration procedure
would not violate the due process clause, they recognized that questions
as to its constitutionality could jeopardize its adoption by the states.6 39
The alternative solution appeared to be a summary judgment procedure.
c.

632

17 VANO. L. REv. 652, 653 (1964)

See Administration of Justice Act of 1920, 10 & 11 Geo. v. c. 81; The British
Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act of 1933, 23 Geo. v. c. 13.
See Yntema, supra note 621, at 1129; Cook, The Powers of Congress Under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L. J. 421, 426-28, 441-49 (1919);
Leflar, supra note 627, at 343-45; MacChesney, supra note 617, at 306-13.
63462 Stat. 958 (1948), 28 U.S.C. §1963 (1958).
635 Hanes Supply Co. v. Valley Evaporating Co., 261 F.2d 29, 30 (5th Cir. 1958)
(dictum).
636 See Comm's. Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 486-87. On the other hand, the
federal statute would appear to be too brief to be ideal. See Note, 50 COLUM.
L. REv. 971, at 973-74 (1950).
637 Leflar, supra note 627, at 338.
638 Id. at 346.
639 Id. at 346-48.
633
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This approach was incorporated into the Uniform Enforcement of
Foreign Judgments Act (UEFJA) 640 in 1948 by the Commissioners, 641
6 42
and was adopted by the American Bar Association.
The UEFJA covers the enforcement of foreign judgments, decrees
or orders of a federal or state court which are entitled to full faith and
credit. No distinction is made between money judgments and decrees,
decrees ordering or restraining the doing of certain acts, etc. 643 The Act
provides for the registration of authenticated foreign judgments.6 44
This is followed by a form of summary judgment proceeding specifically designed for the enforcement of foreign judgment. Provision is
made for notice to the defendant (which lays the foundation for a new
personal judgment based upon the foreign judgment as a cause of action) ,645 and for a hearing, followed by a final personal judgment (assuming personal jurisdiction has been obtained).646 Any time after registration, a levy may be made upon the property of the judgment debtor.
This right to immediate levy after registration without waiting until the
registered judgment becomes a final judgment of the state of registration, provides relief almost as efficient as would be the case if execution
could be issued on the foreign judgment. 647 However, the sale under the
levy, generally speaking, cannot be held until the judgment is made
final. 648 The defendant may raise any defense permitted by the state in
an action on a foreign judgment by appropriate pleadings within 60
64
days after personal jurisdiction is acquired or the notice is mailed.
Under the full faith and credit clause certain defenses can be properly
raised in a later suit on the judgment. These include lack of jurisdiction
in the court rendering the original judgment, satisfaction of the judgment, and fraud or collusion in procuring the judgment. The right to
raise defenses secures to the defendant the essentials of due process,
yet at the same time does not unduly encumber the proceeding. 6 0
640 9A U.L.A. 475-85. A few states already made such a procedure available for
suits on a foreign judgment in connection with a comprehensive summary
judgment, procedure. Other states had such procedures but did not specifically
include actions on foreign judgments among causes of actions for which
the procedure was provided. See Leflar, supra note 627, at 349.
641 1948 PROCEEDINGS:

NATIONAL

CONFERENCE OF

COMMISSIONERS

ON

UNIFORM

LAws.

1948 PROCEEDINGS OF THE HoUsE OF DELEGATES, 34 A.B.AJ. 1069, 1071.
643 UEFJA §1 (1948). See Comm'r. Note, 9A U.L.A. 476. Compare 28 U.S.C.A.
642

§1963 (1958) which does not appear to cover injunctions.
man, 324 F.2d 626 (C.A.N.Y. 1963).
644 UEFJA, §3 (1948).
645 See Comm'r. Note, 9A U.L.A. 479.
646 See UEFJA, §§4, 5 & 7 (1948). If the judgment debtor
60 days after personal jurisdiction is obtained, or if
hearing has refused to set aside the registration, the
becomes final. Id. §7.
647 See Id. §6 and Comm'r. Note 9A U.L.A. 480.
64S UEFJA §13 (1948).
649 Id. §8.
650 Comm'r. Note 9A U.L.A. 482.

See Stiller v. Hard-

fails to plead within
the court after the
registered judgment
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While the UEFJA constitutes a substantial improvement over the
common law procedure of a separate action, some prefer the registration procedure as being less expensive, more efficient and less burdensome on the crowded court dockets. Furthermore, it tends to give the
65
judgment creditor more protection. 1
To date, only eight states have adopted the UEFJA.652 Perhaps for
this reason, in addition to a desire to further simplify and speed up the
enforcement procedure, a revised UEFJA was adopted in 1964.655 Furthermore, widespread adoption by states of some form of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure which include summary judgment procedures
tend to make special summary judgment statutes superfluous.654
In essence the UEFJA (1964) is an enlarged and more explicit
version of the federal registration statute. Any authenticated foreign
judgment may be filed. The clerk of the court "shall treat the foreign
judgment in the same manner as a judgment of . . . [the court] of this
state."6 55 A registered judgment "has the same effect and is subject to
the same procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating,
or staying as a judgment of a ... [court] of this state and may be enforced or satisfied in a like manner." 656 There is provision for notice to
the judgment debtor, and no enforcement shall occur until a specified
number of days have elapsed after the filing.6 57 If the judgment debtor
shows that an appeal is pending on the foreign judgment or that the
foreign court has granted a stay, or that there is a proper ground for a
stay in the local court, enforcement of the foreign judgment can be
stayed for an appropriate period of time. 5 s To date, no state has adopted
the revised UEFJA (1964).69
In summary, there exist three methods of extending state enforcement powers against an out-of-state, unauthorized insurer; (1) the traditional common law proceeding, i.e., suit on the foreign judgment;
(2) the registration approach, as illustrated by the federal statute and
the UEFJA (1964); and (3) the summary judgment procedure as
illustrated by the UEFJA (1948). Of course, each of these has far
broader application than that which is the concern of this article. With
respect to promoting more effective insurance regulation, each method
is too broad in that it extends to foreign judgments in all matters of
651 See 17 VAND. L. RPv. 652, 655 (1964).
652 Ark., Ill., Mo., Neb., Ore., Wash., Wis., Wyo. For citations, see 9A U.L.A.

474 (1965).

9A U.L.A. 488 (1965). "Overcrowded dockets, overworked judges and court
officials, with attendant delays, inevitably tend to lower standards for the
administration of justice." Comm'rs. Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 486 (1965).
654 Comm'rs. Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 486 (1965).
655 UEFJA §2 (1964).
653

656 Ibid.
6571 d. at §3.
858 Id. at §4.
659

See 9A U.L.A. 486 (1965).
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suit. For our purposes, it would be preferable to design a statute directed
at "allowing holders of foreign judgments to enforce them against 'domestic insurance companies.' "660 To this we now turn.
Proposed Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
66
Against Domestic Insurers Act (UEFJDIA) 1
The proposed act which we are about to discuss could be patterned
upon either the summary judgment or the registration approach found
in UEFJA (1948) and (1964) respectively. In view of the advantages
of the registration procedure described above and the fact that the -National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws rejected
the original UEFJA based on the summary judgment approach and
adopted the registration method, we elected to follow the latter in developing the model statute. 66 2 A copy of the UEFJA (1964) is set out in
Appendix B, and a tentative draft of the proposed statute, the Uniform
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Against Domestic Insurers Act
(UEFJDIA), is set out in Appendix C.
(1) The first modification to the UEFJA (1964) which should be
made is to limit the scope of the act to enforcement of foreign judgments against domestic insurers. By "domestic insurers" we mean those
insurers which are either incorporated or licensed in the state in which
the foreign judgment is sought to be enforced. 663 In most cases, this
will involve an enforcement proceeding against an insurer in its own
domiciliary state. This definition would include insurers whether they
are authorized or unauthorized to do business in the state where the
foreign judgment is rendered. (See UEFJDIA § 1 (b).) Any attempt
to distinguish between "authorized" and "unauthorized" insurers in a
foreign jurisdiction may result in wasteful, time consuming questions
at a hearing and open loopholes in the enforcement scheme. 664
(2) The statute should provide that the benefits of the Act extend
not only to the insureds and the insureds' beneficiaries, but also to the
foreign regulatory agency which obtains a foreign judgment against the
domestic insurer, whether it did so on behalf of the insured or his beneficiary, or did so in its regulatory capacity. This can be achieved by defining those parties who are qualified to obtain a judgment recognized
by the statute. (See UEFJDIA §1 (c).)
d.

660 Dean, The Foreign Unauthorized Insurer: A State Regulatory Gap, Mar.

29, 1965, p. 80 (Harvard Law School thesis) abridged version appeared in
(1965).
661 32 INs. COUNSEL J. 432
Mr. James B. Dean, during his senior year at Harvard Law School, wrote
a thesis, supra note 660. Several of the concepts underlying the proposed act
in this section were drawn from his work.
662 discussed
But see Dean (thesis), supra note 660, at 84 et seq.
663 Mr. Dean suggested defining domestic insurers as those insurers "which
have assets (besides collectable premiums) within the State...." Dean
(thesis), supra note 660, at 80.
664 Id. at 81-82. "There are few, if any, reasons why such a statute would work
hardship upon companies operating fully legitimately." Id. at 81.
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It is necessary to specifically include regulatory agencies of other
States because it is the laws which they administer which can
preclude federal intervention in the area if properly enforced.
It seems only fair to provide this means to assist the unfortunate
insured or his beneficiaries who have been wronged by an insurance company based elsewhere in the country. 665
(3) In both the UEFJA of 1948 and 1964, the definition of foreign
judgment was related to full faith and credit:
In this Act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or
order of a court of the United States or of any other court which
is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.666 (Emphasis supplied.)
Under this provision the state's regulatory efforts would be rendered
impotent if the United States Supreme Court should fail to include
judgments for fines, fines for contempt, equity decrees ordering specific
performance or cease and desist orders within the embrace of the full
faith and credit clause on the basis of the"penalty" exception, the "local
policy" exception or the "equitable decree" exception. Perhaps equally
damaging, if the Supreme Court does not decide either way, state courts
may interpret the full faith and credit clause as not compelling recognition in these situations.
This hiatus can be rectified by statute. In §1(a) of the proposed
UEFJDIA, "foreign judgment" is defined as any foreign judgment, decree or order. No distinction would be made between judgments (penal
or otherwise), decrees ordering the payment of money, decrees ordering or restraining the doing of acts, etc. Thus, by statute, state courts
would be required to give recognition to foreign judgments against domestic insurers even though this may go beyond the dictates of full faith
and credit. 6 6 It is a well settled principle that a state may allow enforcement of more foreign judgments that full faith and credit compels.66 s
Thus, by statute, the impairments to the full faith and credit clause can
be eliminated.
665 Id. at 82.
66 UEFJA §1 (1964), 9A U.L.A. 488. Compare UEFJA §1 (1948), 9A U.L.A.
475.
667 See Dean (thesis), supra note 660, at 83; Comm'rs. Note on UEFJA (1948),
9A U.L.A. 476 (1965); Leflar, supra note 627, at 350. "'Judgment' should
be so defined as to include not only judgments for money claims but also
injunctions and decrees for specific performance and the like." Cook, supra
note 633, at 432. The laws of other countries, e.g., Australia, provide for the
registration not only of judgments for money, but also for orders requiring
or forbidding the doing of acts. See Cook supra note 633, at 427-28.
669 "A state court, in conformity to state policy, may, by comity, give a remedy
which the full faith and credit clause does not compel." Milwaukee County
v. M. E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 272 (1935) dictum. But see Leflar, supra
note 627, at 350, where it was said "The United States Supreme Court authoritatively delimits the full faith and credit criterion and there is no agency
which could as authoritatively fix the limits and the scope of any other
criterion."
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(4) It has been suggested that an act, such as the proposed act. be
confined to actions on judgments against "domestic insurers" themselves and not against the insurer's officers, directors, representatives
or shareholders individually so as to avoid problems incident to trying
criminal offenses against individuals in abstentia in a foreign forum.669
Furthermore, this should facilitate acceptance of the removal of the
"penal" exception to recognition of foreign judgments. This has been
done by defining the scope of the statute in terms of foreign judgments
against domestic insurers. In short, the statute is designed "to allow
relief to any foreign judgment holder, whether he be a traditional legal
'person' or a State agency, on all foreign judgments against insurance
companies" as distinguished from individuals "no matter whether the
judgments be penal, non-penal, quasi-penal, regulatory, legal or equitable, or in any other form.

' 67 0

The only judgments which would be

avoided are those which might imprison an individual on the basis of a
foreign judgment obtained in his absence.
This does not mean that indivdiuals, as distinguished from the insurer, would be left free to do as they please. Power could be exercised
over them in the nature of contempt proceedings brought in the enforcing State if the individual prevented the enforcement of the registered
judgment against the insurer. However, this would be a matter of domestic law under domestic statutes rather than a form of direct foreign
proceedings.6 71 Presumably this result could be achieved by statutory
language such as the following:
A judgment so filed has the same effect and shall be deemed as a
) court of this State.6 72 (Emjudgment or decree of a (
phasis supplied.) (See UEFJDIA §2)
This, in effect, would make the foreign judgment a judgment7 3of the
forum state upon which a contempt proceeding could be based.
(5) The proposed statute also affords the person, against whom the
judgment was rendered, an opportunity to raise any appropriate defense
by providing that a registered judgment "'is subject to the same procedures, defenses and proceedings . . .as a judgment or a decree of a

(

) court of this State... ." (See UEFJDIA §2) Such defenses would include lack of jurisdiction in the court rendering the
foreign judgment, fraud in the procurement of the judgment, and
669 See Dean (thesis), supra note 660, at 82-83.
6701d. at 83.
671

Ibid.

$72

Compare UEFJA §2 (1964). Into the open bracketed space each state may

673

insert the type of court which is to have jurisdiction under this statute.
If the summary judgment approach were adopted, the forum court would

actually render a domestic judgment upon which contempt proceedings could
be based. However, it is believed that the proposed language would give
the same result.
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satisfaction of the judgment. 674 Presumably, on the other hand, defenses properly litigable in the original action could not be raised again.
(6) The proposed statute would provide for the mailing of a notice
to the judgment debtor and afford him the opportunity to be heard (See
UEFJDIA §§3-4) This would appear to meet the question of constitutionality under the due process clause on the theory that due process
requires notice and opportunity for a hearing only once rather than a
number of times.675 Traditionally the judgment debtor cannot litigate

anew defenses which were available to him all along.6 7 6 As long as he
can present the defenses of lack of jurisdiction, satisfaction of judgment, and possibly some type of fraud in procuring the judgment, his
6 77
interests are adequately protected.
(7) Another factor may merit introduction into the proposed
UEFJDIA. When a state opens its courts in the manner suggested, it
is permitting the enforcement of a foreign insurance regulatory scheme
against its own insurers. The occasion may arise when such enforcement would do substantial violence to the domestic state's regulatory
policy. Perhaps something akin to the "local policy" exception to giving
full faith and credit to foreign judgments should be built into the statute. If so, the domestic state should have an opportunity to be heard.
This would necessitate a requirement under the proposed statute that
the insurance commissioner of the domestic state be entitled to intervene and that he be given notice of any proceeding taken under such
statute. In the proposed draft such a provision is placed in brackets to
indicate that its adoption should be considered optional. (See UEFJDIA
§§3(b), (c))
Such a provision, if adopted, should be sparingly used and severely
restricted so as not to undermine the purpose of effective state enforcement against insurers whose activities transcend state lines. An intervening domestic commissioner should be required to demonstrate that
enforcement of the foreign judgment would adversely affect fundamental domestic insurance regulatory policy. Presumably, this standard
could be met only rarely, if at all, in view of the substantial uniformity
of purpose underlying the regulation of the insurance business. The
Comm'r. Note, 9A U.L.A. 482 (1965), and Leflar, supra note 627, at
346-47.

674See

See Leflar, supra note 627, at 346. Due process has been said to be satisfied
when there was only one hearing-an original proceeding in a state courtwith no possibility of further relief. Standard Oil Co. v. Missouri ex rel.
Hadley, 224 U.S. 270, 286-87 (1912). Generally the Supreme Court has said
the notice and opportunity for a hearing are the fundamental requirement
of due process. See e.g., Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 110-11 (1908)
and cases there cited.
676 See Leflar, supra note 627, at 346. Johnson Co. v. Wharton, 152 U.S. 252,
256-57 (1894). Where full faith and credit applies, relitigation of defenses
is prohibited even if decision is obviously erroneous on the merits. Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 237 (1908).
677 Leflar, supra note 627, at 346-47. But see id. at 347-48.
675
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scope of this exception may also be limited by the federal dictates of
full faith and credit.
From a practical viewpoint, such a provision may render the proposed act more acceptable to state legislatures (and state courts) which
tend to be jealous of maintaining domestic state control and dislike relinquishing any measure of their powers. However, it may not be
needed. States might be willing to do what is necessary to preserve
their regulatory powers over insurance. It would not appear to be too
great a sacrifice to open the courts to foreign judgments in this rela6
tively confined area.

7

(8) One additional factor may warrant consideration if the proposed statute is to avoid becoming a tool of unreasonable coercion
against out-of-state insurers. For example, suppose State X, having
jurisdiction over unauthorized Insurer A, obtained a cease and desist
order enjoining Insurer A from doing business in State X until it procures a license. Furthermore, suppose that the licensing and taxation
requirements of State X are highly discriminatory against foreign insu ers. If the domestic state of Insurer A enacts the proposed statute,
in the hypothetical situation just described, the domestic state's courts
would be required to enforce State X's judgments based on discriminatory laws against the domestic state's own insurers.
To meet this particular problem the proposed model act could include a provision to the effect that foreign judgments or decrees procured by a state insurance regulatory agency are not entitled to recognition if that state's licensing, regulatory and tax laws are "unreasonably
discriminatory" as to the insurer against whom enforcement of such
judgments or decrees is sought.
Such a provision however might create a substantial "loophole" in
the statute. The defendant insurer would tend to search the insurance
laws from beginning to end in an attempt to find some provision which
could be urged as discriminatory whether or not it is relevant to the
particular action involved. One possible remedy would be to define the
exception in terms of the law(s) upon which the foreign judgment is
based. Only if the law sought to be enforced is "unreasonably discriminatory" can enforcement be avoided. 7 9 This provision would give
effect to the old maxim: He who seeks equity must do equity.
The term "unreasonably discriminatory" should not be construed as
applying to all differences in treatment between domestic and foreign
67 See Dean (thesis), supra note 660, at 80.
679The statutory language might read something as follows: "A foreign judgment, obtained by a state regulatory agency acting in its capacity to enforce
the insurance laws of the state, need not be enforced or satisfied if that
state's insurance licensing, regulatory or taxing laws upon which the foreign
judgment is based are unreasonably discriminatory in favor of that state's
insurers as against the domestic insurer." This language could be added at
the end of the UEFJDIA §2, see Appendix C.
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insurers, but rather only to those situations where there exists flagrant
favoritism on behalf of local companies (e.g., no premium tax on domestic companies and an exorbitant premium tax on foreign companies). Since the standard "unreasonably discriminatory" is quite
broad and flexible, those state courts inclined to a somewhat provincial
view may liberally utilize this exception to protect domestic insurers,
thereby seriously undermining the purpose of the statute. Consequently,
it can be argued with some force that no exception to enforcement
should be based upon the concept of discriminatory laws. Furthermore,
so the argument goes, if an insurer desires to avoid a particular state's
discriminatory laws it can do so by merely refraining from transacting
business in that state. If it transacts business in the state it should be
willing to comply with that state's laws. Of course, efforts to eliminate
the applicability of discriminatory laws can be addressed to that state's
legislature rather than carving out a potentially broad exception in an
enforcement statute.
Although the discriminatory exception would lessen the potential
of coerced compliance with unreasonable laws, the remedy may be
worse than the problem. Therefore, this exception has not been incorporated into the proposed model act. However, it may be worth some
further consideration.
Summary. If a foreign state has jurisdiction over the unauthorized
insurer, a statute such as the proposed UEFJDIA would enable the state
to effectuate its regulatory and taxation scheme. This statute would not
confer any greater regulatory or taxing authority than the states now
possess. But rather, it would, through the enforcement mechanism,
facilitate the exercise of its already existing constitutional authority.
We can see little valid objection to such a result. If all fifty states would
adopt the UEFJDIA, the means would be available for each state to
effectively enforce its insurance regulatory and tax laws. As one commentator said:
This does not seem to be too much to ask of the States because
only through total cooperation
can the States hope to preserve
6 80
their regulatory powers.

68o Dean (thesis) supra note 660, at 80. "If adopted by all fifty States, such an

Act would seem to provide that 'effectiveness' of regulation required by FTC
v. Travelers Health [362 U.S. 293 (1960)] because a means would be provided for a State to enforce its regulatory statutes on its own motion as
well as offering insureds assurance of having a remedy against foreign insurers. While the 8th Circuit in Travelers Health v. FTC said. "The Stbte
must itself be legally able to do, through its own provisions, instrumentalities
and processes, everything that is necessary to the effecting of control as to
its situation, [298 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1962)], if all States open their
courts to efforts by other States to control the unauthorized insurer, it
would seem strange if this would not meet the spirit of the 8th Circuit test
if not its literal meaning. When a State can do everything but enforce its
mandates in its own courts, and when it can enforce its mandates through
other courts, this should seem to provide the 'effective' regulation desired
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e. State or Federal Action
At least two courses of action are available to secure the adoption
of the proposed statute. The NAIC could adopt the proposed UEFJDIA, or something similar thereto, to be enacted by the several states.
While only eight states have adopted the UEFJA (1948) and none have
adopted the UEFJA (1964), these acts are much broader in scope and
are not spurred by the erosion, or threat of erosion, of state regulation
of insurance.
The second approach is federal legislation pursuant to the full faith
and credit clause provision that
Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which
such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the
Effect thereof.68 ' (Emphasis supplied.)

It seems clear that compelling the states to recognize and give "effect"
to registered foreign judgments falls within the power of Congress
under this clause.I8 2 Professor Walter Wheeler Cook came to this con-

clusion after his careful analysis of the history and the purpose of the
full faith and credit clause:
From the history of the clause, as well as from its wording, it
may be said to be clear that under any fair interpretation of the
grant of power to Congress in the full faith and credit clause,
that body can provide for the enforcement of state judgments in
other states, without the wholly useless and unnecessary process
of requiring a new suit on the same and the obtaining of a new
judgment upon which execution can be had. To the mind of the
present writer this seems a very obvious way of "prescribing" the
"effect" in other states of state judgments. There can of course
be no question that a state judgment
is both a [judicial] "record"
683
and a "judicial proceeding."
And, as has been said more recently,
The Congress could have provided for some system of registration of judgments, so that the valid judgments of one state might
be given faith and credit at once in other states without
the cum8
bersome formality of new suit and new judgment .... 6 1
by the States and necessary to depose federal power under the McCarran
Act." Dean (thesis), supra note 660, at 80-81. This same point was raised by
Stem, supra note 583, at 11.
681 U. S. CONST., art. IV, § 1.
682 It could also be argued that Congress has the power to achieve the same result
under the "commerce" clause. U.S.CONST., art. II, §8.
683 Cook, The Power of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28
YAlE L. J. 421, 430 (1919). "What does all this show? Simply that the language
of the clause was intended by its framers to give Congress the power 'by general laws' to 'prescribe the effect,' i.e., the legal effects or consequences, in other
states of the 'public acts, records and judicial proceedings' of a state. ..
Id. at 425-26.
6S4Leflar, The New Uniform Foreign Judgments Act, 24 N.Y. U.L.Q. 336, 337
(1949). See Report of ABA Committee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform,
52 Reports of the ABA 292 et seq. (1927) ; Jackson, Full Faith and CreditThe Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution, 45 COLUm. L. Rav. 1, 21 (1945).
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Since this conclusion applies to the broader question of the registration
and recognition of all judgments, a fortiori it would apply to the proposed statute which is more limited in scope.
Federal compulsion of state court recognition and enforcement of
foreign state judgments is not a new concept. Professor Cook drafted
a model statute providing for registration of foreign judgments or decrees of both state and federal courts which were entitled to be treated
as having "the same force and effect" as judgments and decrees of the
court where registered. 685 In 1927, the American Bar Association's

Commitee on Jurisprudence and Law Reform presented a comprehensive report on the enforcement of foreign judgments. The Committee
offered its own draft of a federal registration statute"8 6 following, in a
more concise manner, the proposal of Professor Cook, and recommended
that

it

be

introduced

in

and

enacted

by

Congress. 68"

Nothing

68

Finally, in 1948, when Congress recame of this recommendation.
vised the Judicial Code, provision was made for nationwide registration
and enforcement of judgments of the federal courts, 6 9 but this did not
carry over to state court judgments or decrees.6 90
To some, effectuating the proposed UEFJDIA through Congress
rather than through individual state enactments seems preferable. 691
Certainly, the prospect of securing the passage of one rather than fifty
statutes possesses some appeal. Furthermore, the federal approach would
assure uniformity.
On the other hand, Congress by virtue of the McCarran Act has entrusted the regulation of insurance to the states. Uniform statutes have
in the past been enacted due to the concerted efforts of the NAIC and
Professor Cook's statute is set out in Cook, supra note 683, at 436-40.
See 52 Reports of the ABA 319 (1927). The first section of the proposed act
provides, "Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress Assembled, That whenever any judgment, decree or order shall be rendered by any court of record of the United
States or of any state or territory thereof, having jurisdiction of the subject
matter and of the parties, requiring that money be paid, or that any act shall
or shall not be done, or establishing a status, or investing any person with authority over property, such judgement, decree or order may be registered in
any other of said courts, having jurisdiction to render similar judgments,
decrees or orders, and when so registered shall have such faith and credit
given to it as it has by law or usage in the court wherein it was rendered,
and for the purpose of enforcement or utilization it shall have the same effect
and like proceedings may be taken thereon as if the judgment, decree or order
had been originally rendered by the court in which registration is had."
68752 Reports of the ABA 292 (1927).
688
Leflar, supra note 684, at 342.
689 See p. 294 supra.
690 See 17 VAND. L. REv. 652, 657-58 (1964) for a proposed congressional statute
providing for registration of state judgments.
691 See Id. at 656. "If a federal statute should be enacted under the power given
to Congress by Article IV, Section one, actually declaring 'the effect' of sister
state judgments in all the states, the Uniform Act now promulgated would no
longer be desirable or necessary. That probably would be the preferable solution for the difficulties which underlie the extrastate judgments problem. Certainly it was the solution which was contemplated by the framers of our
nation's Constitution." Leflar, supra note 684, at 354.
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the cooperation of the individual states and the insurance industry. On
this basis we suggest that the NAIC and the states be given the opportunity to effectuate the proposed legislation, or any other method which
better promises to close the regulatory gap with respect to unauthorized
insurers. However, if the states fail to move expeditiously in this area,
whether it be the adoption of the proposed statute or some other technique to solve the enforcement problem, we do not hesitate to recommend federal acton, under the power conferred upon Congress by the
full faith and credit clause, to enact a statute embracing the elements
of the proposed UEFJDIA. As Commissioner Roddis of California has
recently said,
In those problem areas where all else fails or limitations inherent
in the state system are thought to be absolute barriers to an effective solution .

.

. before turning to the federal government for

regulation, we should consider an alternative use of federal power
consistent with modern thought in other areas of federal-state
relationships. This is the employment of federal power through
692
Congress to implement rather than to supplant state regulation.
Justice Jackson's words pertaining to extraterritorial recognition of
state law are appropriate here.
... the states have less to fear from a strong federalist influence
in dealing with this than with most other constitutional provisions. The Federal Government stands to gain little at the expense
of the states through any application of it. Anything taken from
a state by way of freedom to deny faith and credit to law of
others is thereby added to the
state by way of a right to exact
6 93
faith and credit for its own.

2. Statutes Pertainingto Judicial Jurisdiction:Enforcement Through
the FederalDistrict Courts
In the proposed UEFJDIA, provision is made for the enforcement
of foreign judgments whether procured by the state regulatory agency
or by the insured. Another approach to enhancing the viability of policyholder protection and state regulation is to confer jurisdiction on federal
district courts to hear cases against unauthorized insurers. In exploring
this route we shall distinguish between actions brought by or on behalf
of an individual and those brought to enforce a state's regulatory or
taxing laws.

6 94

It has been suggested than an insured can bring suit against unauthorized insurers in a federal district court. Enforcement of a money
judgment so obtained could then be had through the federal registration process, or the action could be brought directly in the district court
where the insurer is located. On the other hand, if the federal jurisdic692 Address by California Insurance Commissioner Roddis, given at the Annual
Meeting of the Insurance Brokers Society of Northern California, June 14,
1966, p. 27.
693 See Jackson, supra note 684, at 33.
4
69 Much of the discussion which follows was drawn from KLINE.
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tional requirements cannot be met (e.g., diversity of citizenship,
$10,000 amount in controversy) ,695 a statute could be enacted to alleviate such difficulties. 696 Such a statute has been proposed. 69 7 However,
it would appear that an individual policyholder can procure relief
through the existing Uniform Insurers Process Act adopted by all
states. 698 The United States Supreme Court has sustained the constitu-

tionality of the UIPA as well as holding that judgments obtained under
such acts are entitled to full faith and credit. 699 While this route does
not make the federal registration process available, enforcement of a
judgment against an unauthorized insurer seems to be assured. Thus,
the federal district court approach with respect to private insureds
would appear to be unnecessary.
The situation is different with respect to a suit brought by a state
to enforce its regulatory and taxing laws against an unauthorized insurer. Nothing comparable to the UIPA has been enacted by the states
on a widespread basis for the use of state insurance departments. 0
Thus, the question is naturally raised, can a state maintain an action
against an unauthorized insurer in a federal district court within the
present jurisdictional framework of such courts? If the answer is yes,
the federal registration procedure would be available or suit could be
brought directly in the federal district court located in the insurer's
home state.
Invoking the jurisdiction of the federal district courts in a state suit
against an unauthorized insurer apparently would have to rest on the
diversity of citizenship provision."1 Section 1332 of the federal judicial
code provides that:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or
value of $10,000, . . . and is between (1)

citizens of different

702
States ....

Furthermore, this section provides that a corporation shall be considered a citizen of any state in which it is incorporated. 03
As a general rule, a state is not deemed to be a "citizen" for the
purpose of determining diversity of citizenship. Therefore, a suit be28 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1966).
See KLINE 113-24.
6971Id. at 114-15. This federal act was proposed prior to the widespread adoption
of the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act and the upholding of its constitutionality.
698 See p. 210 supra.
699 See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
700 However, several states are considering adopting legislation comparable to the
Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance Statute, see p. 261 supra.
701 See generally District Court's Jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-61 (1966). The
question whether or not such an action would raise a federal question under
§ 1331 was raised and disposed of in KLINE 125-26.
70228 U.S.C.A. § 1332 (1966).
70328 U.S.C.A. § 1332(c) (1966).
695
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tween a state and a corporation of another state does not constitute an
action between citizens of different states. 70 4 However, the mere presence of the state as the titular party is not conclusive. The question is
705
whether the state is the real party in interest.
In determining whether the state was the real party in interest, the
Supreme Court said, in Missouri, Kansas and Texas Railway Co. v.
Missouri Railroad and Warehouse Commissioners:
It is true that the State has a governmental interest in the welfare
of all of its citizens, in compelling obedience to the legal orders of
all its officials, and in securing compliance with all its laws. But
such general governmental interest is not that which makes the
State, as an organized political community, a party in interest in
the litigation, for if that were so the State would be a party in
interest in all litigation; because the purpose of all litigation is
to preserve and enforce rights and secure compliance with the
law of the State, either statute or common.
The interest must be
706
one in the State as an artificial person.

While this was a removal case, for purposes of this article no distinction need be made between a case removed from a state to a federal
district court and a case brought directly in the federal district court,
since a case cannot be removed unless it could have been originally
brought in the federal courts.7 0 7 This case involved a suit by road commissioners to enforce their rate orders. In permitting removal to the
federal courts, the Supreme Court found that the railroad company
among others were the real parties in interest, not the State. Similarly,
in Blease v. Safety Transport Co., a lower court said that the state
has no interest in the litigation except the governmental interest
of compelling obedience to the legal order of its officials and in
securing compliance with its laws.70 s
Therefore the case could be removed on the basis of diversity of citizenship. These cases suggest a theory upon which a state may bring an
original action in federal district courts. 70 9 It can be argued that in an
action against an unauthorized insurer the state has no direct pecuniary
interest (in at least regulation, as distinguished from tax cases) and
704

E.g., Stone v. South Carolina, 117 U.S. 430 (1886) ; Postal Telag. Cable Co. v.

Alabama," 155 U.S. 482 (1894). Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 194 U.S.
48 (1904). California ex tel. McColgan v. Bruce, 129 F.2d 421 (9th Cir. 1942),

cert. denied 317 U.S. 678, reh. denied 317 U.S. 710 (1942) ; Annot. 147 A.L.R.

70

786, 787 (1943).

v. American Machine and Foundry Co., 143 F. Supp. 703, 709
(D. Colo. 1956). See also Annot. 147 A.L.R. 786, 794 (1943).
183 U.S. 53, 60 (1901), accord, Regan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S.
382 (1894).
70728 U.S.C.A. § 1441 (1950).
708 50 F.2d 852, 854 (4th Cir. 1931).
5 E.g., Colorado

706

709 See KLINE 129-30. A second theory based upon separating the state and the

insurance department was also suggested. Id. at 128-30. However', since Congress gave to the "states" the power to regulate insurance, the validity of such
a separation is subject to some serious doubt.
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that licensed insurers and policyholders are the real parties in interest.
Under this theory, the general rule that a state is not a "citizen" should
not defeat federal jurisdiction.
While this theory offers some possibility that a state may effectuate
its regulatory laws by enforcement through a federal district court, the
cases mentioned above are the exceptions and not the general rule.
Nevertheless, precedent does exist to make this approach worth investigating if other methods are not successful.
Even if diversity of citizenship is found, the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement of 28 U.S.C.A. Section 1332 must be met before
federal district court jurisdiction may be invoked. It is apparently well
settled that in determining the jurisdictional amount penalties may 7be
10
included where they have already occurred or will clearly be imposed.
But when a state regulatory agency seeks an injunction against an un7
authorized insurer the problem becomes more difficult.

11

Generally

speaking, the value of the matter in dispute is tested by the value which
the plaintiff seeks to gain or which the defendant will lose as the result
of the suit.7 12 In most injunction cases, the value to the plaintiff of the
right sought to be protected is determinative, i.e., the approach is from
the plaintiff's point of view.7 13 But how can these general principles be
applied to the situation where a state regulatory agency is seeking to
enjoin violation of its laws? What monetary value can be placed on
achieving this purpose? Perhaps the approach used in many nuisance
cases could be used as an alternative, i.e., the criterion of jurisdictional
amount is the value of the removal of the nuisance, in other words, the
loss to the defendant if he is enjoined.7 1 4 Although it has been suggested
that the selling of policies by an unauthorized insurer would meet the
amount in controversy test,'7 1 5 the entire question is clouded with uncertainty.
While it may be possible under existing law for a state to successfully bring suit against an unauthorized insurer in a federal district
court, presumably in the state where the insurer resides, so that the full
range of remedies is available,7 1 6 the problems involved are sufficiently
difficult to warrant the extension of federal district court jurisdiction in
the absence of the adoption of a better method.
There is little doubt that Congress has the power to broaden the
jurisdiction of the federal district courts. Article III, Section 1 of the
Constitution provides that:
See 30 A.L.R. 2d 602, 643 (1953).
See id. at 619.
712Id. at 619.
731Id. at 621.
714 American Smelting & Refining Co. v. Godfrey, 158 F. 225 (8th Cir. 1907).
715 KLINE 131 (discussing the requirement when it was still $3,000 instead of
$10,000).
716 The federal registration procedure does not specifically apply to injunctions,
28 U.S.C.A. § 1963 (1965).
710
711
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The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one
Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.
This language has been construed to mean that Congress not only can
create lower courts, but also it can assign to them such jurisdiction and
functions deemed necessary and proper.7 17 The power of Congress to
extend or curtail the jurisdiction of lower courts has been reaffirmed
by the Supreme Court.
The Congressional power to ordain and establish inferior
courts includes the power "of investing them with jurisdiction
either limited, concurrent, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact degree and character which to
Congress may seem proper for the public good. (Citing cases)."",,
Recently, in fact, a Senate subcommittee recommended legislation conferring jurisdiction on federal district courts in civil actions brought
by state regulatory agencies seeking injunctive relief against the violation of their statutes.7 19
If there is to be an extension of jurisdiction, what form should it
take? Earlier in this article, the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act
was discussed.7 20 This UIPA is aimed at obtaining judicial jurisdiction
over unauthorized insurers in suits brought by or on behalf of insureds
or their beneficiaries. 7 21 To achieve this purpose the act lists certain
activities done in the state-whether by mail or otherwise-which constitute the appointment of the commissioner as the insurer's agent upon
whom personal service of process can be made.
This same approach can be used to confer jurisdiction on the federal
district courts in actions brought by state regulatory officials. For example, the Act may read as follows:
An Act
to express the intent of Congress with reference to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States over actions
brought by the several states against insurers not authorized to
transact an insurance business therein.
Section 1. Purpose of the Act
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress hereby declares it is in the public interest that the federal
district courts have jurisdiction in any case which a State Commissioner of Insurance brings or causes to be brought to protect
717

See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 3 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 562, 571 (1816).

718 Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943). Accord, Bruner v. U.S., 343 U.S.

112, 114 (1952).

719 STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON FRAUDS AND MISREPRESENTATIONS

AGING,
DECEPTIONS AFFECtiNG THE ELDERLY
DERLY,

SENATE

COMM.

ON

720 See p. 210 supra.

721 UIPA § 1. Purpose of Act.

89TH

CONG.,

lsT

AFFECTING THE ELFRAUDS AND

SEss.,

63 (Comm. Print 1965).
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the residents of such State, against any unauthorized insurer
which, whether by mail or otherwise, transacts an insurance business therein.
Section 2. Definitions
Wherever used in this Act(a) "Commissioner of Insurance" shall include the officer of
any State, regardless of his official title, who has duties similar to
those of a Commissioner of Insurance.
(b) "Unauthorized insurer" shall mean any insurance company which is not authorized, in the State of the Commissioner
bringing the action, to transact business which is specified in
Section 3.
Section 3.

Jurisdiction

722

The federal district courts shall have jurisdiction, regardless
of the amount in controversy, of any action brought or caused
to be brought therein by the Commissioner of Insurance of any
State against an unauthorized insurer where the complaint alleges
that such insurer, whether by mail or otherwise, was or is
(1) issuing or delivering contracts of insurance to residents
of this state or to corporations authorized to do business therein,
(2) soliciting applications for such contracts,
(3) collecting premiums, membership fees, assessments or
other considerations for such contracts, or
(4) transacting other business pertaining to such contracts.
Section 4. Separability Provision
If any clause, sentence, paragraph or part of this act shall,
for any reason, be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder thereof but shall be confined in its operation
to the clause, sentence, paragraph or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in which such judgment shall have
been rendered.
In addition, it may be desirable to provide for notice to the insurance
commissioner in the 3insurer's home state and to afford him an oppor72

tunity to be heard.

It has been suggested that an act drawn so that any mail order insurer comes within its scope would, in essence, be a compulsory licensing law-i.e., compel the insurer no matter how legitimate its operations
to obtain a license.72 4 This would seem to overstate the case. Concededly,
the proposed statute requires a relatively small amount of contact with
the state for the purpose of invoking federal judicial jurisdiction by
state insurance regulatory authorities. But, such a statute does nothing
to increase the state's legislative jurisdiction--i.e., the extent of the
state's authority to regulate or tax. Before the federal court could render a valid judgment against the insurer, the prevailing constitutional
722 Based upon UIPA § 2.
7 See discussion of this same point in connection with the proposed UEFJDIA,
p. 300 supra.
724 See KLINE 132.
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standards of "doing business" (possibly "minimum contacts") must be
met. Therefore, the proposed statute is no more a so-called compulsory
licensing statute than are the statutes in each state which require insurers doing business therein to obtain authority to do so. 7 25
Under this proposed statute, the states would not be plagued with
the problems they now must confront when relying on full faith and
credit for enforcement of their laws. Suit could be brought directly in
the insurer's home district and the judgment or injunction could be
expeditiously enforced. In the absence of state action to achieve comparable results, e.g., through the proposed UEFJDIA, this approach
offers an alternative solution. Of course, Congress instead of following
this approach may prefer to implement the proposed UEFJDIA through
federal action. This would be preferable since it would utilize state
rather than federal courts to achieve the same result. Furthermore, this
would be more consistent with the philosophy of comprehensive state
regulation of insurance. As Professor Cook said nearly fifty years ago,
Of course Congress could in many cases confer jurisdiction upon
the federal courts, but there is no reason why the states should
not be compelled to open their courts, as was very clearly the intention of the framers of the Constitution.7 26
VII. ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: ENLARGING
GOVERNMENT AUTHORITY TO EXERCISE CONROL
In the preceding section on enforcement; it was assumed that the
states possess constitutional authority to exercise regulatory and taxation jurisdiction in the typical unauthorized mail order situation. But
now let us presume that this assumption is erroneous and that Ministers Life will win its case before the United States Supreme Court.
Are mail order insurers to be left to operate in the gray area between
state and federal regulation, or will means be devised or applied to fill
the so-called regulatory gap? This section briefly reviews some of the
possibilities in this area.
A.

COMPULSORY

LICENSING

Compulsory licensing has been presented in a variety of forms as
a solution to the problem of exercising control over unauthorized insurers. In essence it consists of an attempt to compel the unauthorized
insurer to obtain a license in those states where it conducts business
activities. However, the term compulsory licensing can be used in
different ways by different persons. For example, all states require that
a company obtain a license or a certificate of authority to do business
To avoid what was felt to be a compulsory licensing statute, the Kline Study
proposed an act which set jurisdictional standards in terms of practices that had
given rise to complaints such as sharp claim practices, misleading or fraudulent advertising, and benefits not commensurate with premium etc. KLINE 132.
A copy of this proposed act is reproduced in Appendix D.
726 Cook, supra note 683, at 431-32.
725
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in the state. Such statutes could be called compulsory licensing statutes.
Similarly, the statutes discussed above which make it possible to enjoin
a foreign mail order insurer unless it complies with the state's laws
could all be deemed to be compulsory licensing statutes. These broad
licensing requirements would be invalid if the constitutional standards
of due process were not met. A narrower meaning of compulsory
licensing statutes embraces only those statutes which compel compliance with the regulatory and/or taxing laws of a state, even though
that state lacks the constitutional authority to bring its laws to bear on
the out of state insurer. For the purpose of this section, the term compulsory licensing is used in this narrower sense. Such a statute might
be that of the insurer's domiciliary state or of the federal government.
1. Domiciliary State Statutes
a. Precedent
Unauthorized insurers have generated problems for insurance regulatory officials since before the turn of the century. In 1895, the National
Convention of Insurance Commissioners (forerunner to the NAIC)
Committee on Unauthorized Insurance recommended that each state
enact a law prohibiting its domestic companies from engaging in
business in any state without complying with that state's laws.727 This
same Committee in 1907 recommended that individual commissioners
revoke, or ask the legislature to revoke, the charters of their domestic
companies which conducted unauthorized insurance operations.728 At the
1914 Convention, the President in discussing possible solutions to the
unauthorized insurer question, offered several alternatives, including
state supervision of its own domestic companies and agents to prevent
them from doing business in states where they were not authorized.7 29
In the same year the Committee on Laws and Legislation presented
for consideration a bill following the pattern suggested in 1895730 In

1928, it was suggested that each state enact a law to penalize its own
companies for accepting risks from those states where they were not
licensed, providing those states had a similar law. In contrast to a
statute which simply prohibits such activity, the prospect of recovering
a penalty serves as an inducement to enforce such a law.7 3 The Committee on Unauthorized Insurance again recommended that each state
limit its insurers to doing business only in states where they have ob727

1895 PROCEEDINGS 91. The Committee also recommended that domestic insurers
report separately the amount of business done in each state in which they are
not licensed. Id. at 91.

728 1907 PROCEEDINGS 95, 96.
1914 PROCEEDINGS 27. He

also suggested that insurers prove they are safe and
solvent before they can utilize the mails and that insureds retain 5% of the
premium and remit it to insurance department when they place business with
an unauthorized insurer. Id. at 26-27.
730 KLINE 49, 1914 PROCEEDINGS 38-39 (adjourned session).
731 1928 PROCEEDINGS 105.

729

MAIL ORDER INSURERS

tained a license.7"2 Several states have passed reciprocal statutes which
prohibit domestic companies from insuring risks in states where they
have not procured a license to do business, provided that those states
in which such business is done have a comparable law.7 33 A similar
statute, without a reciprocal feature, has been passed in several other
734

states.

b. A Possible Statute
A compulsory licensing statute could be drafted to prohibit a domestic insurer from doing business in any state where it has not complied with that state's laws. However, this may not prove to be effective, as the domiciliary state may be lax in enforcing such a provision against its own companies, 7 35 especially since its own citizens are
not being hurt. 73 6 In addition, the domiciliary state enforcement agency

may hold a more stringent view as to what constitutes doing business
in another state than does the state in which the business is done. As a
consequence, the domiciliary state may fail to enforce its statute whereas
the insured's state may feel that regulatory action is needed. In short,
under this type of regulatory scheme, how can the state, in which the
unauthorized insurer is allegedly doing business, protect both its and
its citizens' interest if the state in which the insurer is domiciled takes
no action?
A possible remedy would be to incorporate into the domiciliary
state's compulsory licensing statute a provision permitting the insurance
enforcement agency of foreign states to bring suit in the domestic
737
state's courts on the domestic state's compulsory licensing statute.
This would overcome the obstacle imposed by a lax attitude in the
domestic enforcement agency. Furthermore, the foreign state can urge
its concepts of "doing business" if the domiciliary state enforcement
agency holds more stringent views, and therefore refuses to act against
Id. at 133-34. For a review of the unauthorized insurer problem, see a paper
by Wisconsin Insurance Commissioner Freedy presented to the N.C.I.C. Id. at
163-70.
733 E.g., CALIF. INS. CODE § 706.7; LA. STAT. ANN. § 22:1251; VA. CODE § 38.1-433.
The Illinois Department of Insurance recently drafted a bill embodying this
approach. See The National Underwriter, Sept. 10, 1966, p. 1.
734 E.g., MASS. ANN. LAWs §175:45; ORE. REv. STAT. §736.645.
735 Monetary penalties for violations would provide some pecuniary incentive for
enforcement
73r The United States Supreme Court quoted with approval Judge Vogel (8th
Cir.) when it said "it was 'impractical and ineffective' to 'force the citizens of
other states to rely upon Nebraska's regulation of the long distance advertising
practices of the (respondent) in the promotion and sale by mail or otherwise
of insurance outside the State of Nebraska.'" FTC v. Travelers Health
Association, 362 U.S. 293, 296-97 (1960). "The real problem revolves around
how the state in which insurance is sold by an unlicensed insurer can protect
itself without dependence upon the effectiveness of regulation in the insurer's
state of domicile." KLINE 74, n. 11.
737 A senate subcommittee recently recommended a federal statute with a provision for enforcement by the states in federal district courts. See pp. 322-23
infra. Here is a precedent for one government to permit the enforcement of
its laws by another government.
732
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the insurer. After hearing the case, if the local court decides that the
statute has been violated, it could impose fines and/or issue a cease
and desist order until the insurer procures a license in the complaining foreign state. Once licensed, the foreign state could subject the
insurer to the same laws and regulations which it applies to all authorized foreign insurers.
Furthermore, even if the domiciliary state attempts to enforce the
compulsory licensing provision, the statute would provide that notice
of the proceeding must be given to the foreign state involved and that
state has the right to be a party to the suit if it so chooses. In this
manner all parties of interest can be heard, i.e., the insurer, the domiciliary state, and the state in which the insurer is allegedly doing
738
business.
Assuming that the courts of the domestic state have a standard for
"doing business" which is consistent with or more stringent than that
of the United States Supreme Court, the question may be asked, what
good is such a statute? In this situation, if the constitutional standards
of "doing business" are not met, the foreign state could not obtain
relief either through its own courts (since constitutional standards
are not met), or through the domiciliary state's courts (since the statutory requirements are not met). On the other hand, if constitutional
standards are met, the foreign state can constitutionally proceed through
its own courts without having to resort to the domiciliary courts. This
point is valid as far as it goes but it does not go far enough.
By proceeding in the domestic state's courts under the domestic
state's statute, the full faith and credit problems can be bypassed. But
more important, it is not necessary that the domestic state's standard
of "doing business" be as stringent as the United States Supreme
Court's. (Remember, in this section we are assuming that a state lacks
constitutional authority to exert control over the typical foreign unauthorized mail order insurer.) The compulsory licensing statute could set
out its own definition of "doing business" which would be more liberal
than that of the Supreme Court. 3 9 For example, if the insurer does any
A private individual may sue for redress under the Uniform Insurers Process
Act. See p. 210 supra. See McGee v. International Life Insurance Co., 355
U.S. 220 (1957).
7 This approach seems to have a precedent. In 1941, the NAIC drafted a Reciprocal Unauthorized Insurers Act, found in 1941 PROCEEDINGS 147-48, which
imposes the duty on the commissioner to revoke the license of a domestic insurer transacting business in or accepting risks from a state where the insurer
is not licensed. "The term 'transacting business' . . . (includes) in addition
to its usual interpretation, advertising locally in any foreign jurisdiction . . .
for the purpose of solicitation of insurance business." Id. at 148. This definition of doing business for the purpose of a compulsory licensing statute
would appear to have been more liberal than the due process concepts generally prevailing in 1941. See discussion of the "mere solicitation" rule, p. 242
supra. California, for example, prohibits a domestic insurer from insuring
risks located in a reciprocal state. CALIF. INS. CODE § 706.7.
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one of the following actions in a state, it would be deemed to be doing
business in that state:
(1)

(2)
(3)

continuous or systematic solicitation, negotiation, procurement, or effectuation of insurance in the state whether by
mail or otherwise, or
continuous or systematic delivery of contracts of insurance to residents of a state whether by mail or otherwise, or
frequent inspection of risks, investigation or adjustment
of claims or losses in the state, whether directly or indirectly. (The last phrase is to overcome the independent
contractor argument.)

These are merely tentative suggestions as to some activities which can
justifiably be considered as doing business.7 40 Unlike some parts of the
definition of doing business in the Wisconsin Unauthorized Insurance
Statute, the above definition contemplates a substantial degree of activity in the state, not isolated or infrequent transactions. Certainly it
would be difficult to argue that such activities do not have an impact
and are of no interest to the state in which they occur.
Some of these activities may be insufficient, under prevailing due
process concepts, to sustain the foreign state's attempt to exercise control over an unauthorized mail order insurer. However, the domestic
state is not confronted with the same problem. The insurer, its assets
and its personnel are in the state of domicile and subject to its control.
The domiciliary state can prohibit the insurer from "doing business,"
as liberally defined, in a foreign state if the insurer does not comply
with that state's laws. Perritting a foreign regulatory agency to intervene in the judicial procedure (either as an initiator of the action or
as a third party) affords the foreign state a means by which its interests can be safeguarded.
It might be argued that the domestic state cannot exercise control
over its insurers' out-of-state activities which are of no interest to the
domestic state. However, it has been said
-

[T]he state of domicile, in granting corporate charters to domestic companies, has the power both to insist upon initial qualifying conditions and upon such subsequent conditions as are deemed
necessary to meet the changing needs. It thus follows that under
its police power the state would have the power to require741that
its domestic insurers comply with the laws of other states.

740 When the NAIC considered the adoption of the Unauthorized Insurers False
Advertising Process Act as compared to adopting definition of doing business
which would permit service of process on unauthorized insurers, the Industry
Advisory Committee recommended against the latter. See 2 PROCEEnNGS 48998 (1960).
741 KLINE 74. Former California Insurance Commissioner McConnell said, "In
practice it is a fact that the insurance supervisory authorities of every State
exercise jurisdiction over all advertising done by their domestic companies
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But, if there is some validity to the argument that a state has no
interest in protecting citizens of other states, the proposed compulsory
licensing satute could include a reciprocal provision.74 2 Then the domestic state would have a direct interest since it would benefit from
comparable statutes in other states.
It can be argued with some force that a domiciliary compulsory
licensing statute, which permits a foreign state to enforce that state's
laws against domestic companies by virtue of domestic law, is consistent with the philosophy of the United States Constitution. It will
be recalled that the full faith and credit clause pertains to legislation
as well as to judgments. Although the Supreme Court has created a
local policy exception to full faith and credit with respect to statutes,
the enactment of a compulsory licensing law by the domiciliary state
would dispose of any question about whether the state has a policy
against enforcing another state's law. Both the full faith and credit
clause and the suggested compulsory licensing statute were designed
743
to give recognition to another state's laws.
In summary, the suggested compulsory licensing statute would prohibit a domestic insurer from doing business in another state where it
is not licensed. The term doing business would be defined so as to include those insurers who, in a realistic business sense, are conducting
significant activities in the state. To assure compliance with this law,
and hence with the law of the state where the insurer does business,
foreign state insurance regulatory agencies may utilize the domiciliary
state's courts to enforce the domestic state's own law.
c. General Consideration of the Merits of Compulsory Licensing
The compulsory licensing approach possesses some definite advantages. First and foremost, the enforcement problem would be relatively
simple. The failure of the insurer to procure a license from a state
in which it is conducting activities would constitute a violation of the
laws of its domicile. Domestic disciplinary action could be utilized,
thereby bringing mail order companies within the scope of the full
range of state controls.74 4 This, in turn, could close the so-called regulatory gap with respect to unauthorized mail order insurers.
whether in the state of domicile or elsewhere." 2 PROCEEDINGS 495 (1960). Cf.
Osborn v. Ozlin, 310 U.S. 53 (1940) ; Alaska Packers Association v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 294 U.S. 532 (1935); address by Buist M. Anderson,
Extraterritorial Operation of Insurance Regulatory Statutes, Insurance Section, American Bar Association, Chicago, Ill., August 16, 1954, pp. 2-3. But
see FTC v. Travelers Health Association, 362 U.S. 293, 302 (1960).
742 The Maryland Attorney General has ruled that the Department of Insurance
has authority to require a domestic insurer to comply with the laws of another
state if that state has a reciprocal provision. As repored by The National Underwriter, Mar. 28, 1964, p. 1.
743 Of course, under the assumption that the foreign state lacks jurisdiction to
enforce its laws, the full faith and credit clause is inapplicable. The compulsory licensing statute may overcome the jurisdiction problem since it is the
law of the domiciliary state.
744 KLINE 75-76.
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On the other hand, several objections have been raised in opposition
to the compulsory licensing technique. One commentator urges that this
method is not selective. Both responsible and irresponsible insurers
would be treated in the same manner. Regulation should avoid hampering the operation of legitimate insurers.7 45 From this basic proposition,
the concept of compulsory licensing of responsible insurers has been subject to two broad categories of criticism: (1) it would increase the
cost of insurance to the insuring public, and (2) it would force a
number of companies to change their method of operations. 746
The question of increased cost of conducting the business, hence
747
higher cost to the policyholder, was raised in the Ministers Life case
and by the amicus brief filed in the Todd case.7 48 In analyzing the

validity of this so-called economic burden argument, the Ministers Life
case7 49 will be used as a representative study of the impact of state
control on mail order insurers. Ministers Life claimed that the cost
of state regulation, if it were compelled to obtain a license, would be
burdensome because it would have to (a) pay fees, (b) pay a premium
tax of 2 per cent, (c) submit its rates and policy forms for approval,
(d) file an annual statement, and (e) submit to the regular triennial
750

examination.

Fees. During the first year the insurer does business in Wisconsin,
it must pay two fees totaling $200, to cover the examination of certain
filed documents, and the issuance of a certificate of authority; thereafter, a yearly fee of $25 is charged for the renewal of the certificate
of authority, and $25 is also charged for the filing of the annual statement. 751 The fee for valuing the company's life reserves is a modest
$0.01 for each $1,000 insured.7 52 In 1961, Ministers Life paid $5,481 in
7 53
fees to the ten states and Canadian provinces in which it was licensed.
The premium income from these eleven jurisdictions amounted to
$3,374,000.7-1 Hence, the average cost of the fees represented less than
745
746

Id. at 75-76, 66-67.
Id. at 77. See Appellant's Brief, pp. 23-30, Ministers Life and Casualty Union,

30 Wis.2d. 339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966) and Plaintiff's Brief, pp. 11-17, Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Manson, Wisconsin Dane County Circuit
Court, # 111-513, Oct. 8, 1964.
7
See Appellant's Brief, supra note 746, at 21-30, and Plaintiff's Brief, supra
note 746, at 11-19.
748 See Brief for the Church Fire Insurance Corp. and the Catholic Relief Insurance Co. of America as Amici Curiae, pp. 4-6, 13-14, State Board of Insurance v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 (1962).
749 Ministers Life and Casualty Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287
(1966).
750 See Appellant's Brief, supra note 746, at 22-28, and Plaintiff's Brief, supra
note 746, 13-15.
751 WIs. STAT. §§200.13(1), (2), (3), (14) (1963).
72 WIs. SLAT. §§ 200.13 (20) (1963).
753 Appellant's Appendix, p. 159, Ministers Life and Casualty Union, 30 Wis.2d
339, 141 N.W.2d 287 (1966).
754 Ibid.
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2/10 of 1 per cent of premiums. This can scarcely be regarded as unduly burdensome.
Premium Taxes. Ministers Life suggested that subjection to premium taxes would also be burdensome. However, it was subject to
premium tax in states where it was licensed. Furthermore, in five states
where Ministers Life was licensed it wrote more business than it did in
Wisconsin where it was not licensed and has not paid the premium tax.
This suggests that the payment of premium taxes is neither prohibitive
nor unduly burdensome.
Policy Form Approval. States typically require that both accident
and health, and life insurance policies be filed for approval by the insurance commissioner. Although there is substantial uniformity among
the different states,7 55 there are some differences. Nevertheless, the
insurer must obtain approval of its policies in its home state. If this is
achieved, unless the policy is an unusual one, there would appear to
be a good likelihood that similar results would be achieved elsewhere.
But even if it is difficult to secure approval, the burdens argument is
not a convincing one. It has long been recognized that policy review
and approval has been within the state's police power as regulation in
the public interest. This interest is affected whether policies on its citizens are issued by licensed or unlicensed companies.
Disclosure of FinancialInformation. The filing of an annual statement in several states has been alleged to be burdensome.15 6 However,
a mail order insurer must file an annual statement, on the prescribed
NAIC form, in its home state. The filing of the identical information
on the same form in other states would impose no additional burden
other than a nominal filing fee.
Periodic Examination. Licensed insurers are subject to periodic
examinations, the cost of which is borne by them. These examinations
are conducted under the NAIC six zone system. A zone is a convenient geographical grouping of states. Representatives of each zone
in which the insurer does business may participate in the examination.
However, to reduce the cost, normally only those zones in which the
insurer writes $1 million or more in annual direct premiums are represented. After completion of the report, the domiciliary state sends
75
copies of the report to each state in which the insurer is licensed. 1
Under this zone system, the insurer is not subjected to a separate
examination by each state in which it is licensed. Instead the insurer,
whether it is licensed in one or in many states, is examined once by
55
756

7

See pp. 184-88 supra.
See Appellant's Brief, supra note 746, at 25 and Plaintiff's Brief, supra note
746, at 13-14.
See 1 STRAUB, EXAMINATION OF INSURANCE COMPANIES 51-52 (1953), and 5 id.
at 545-47, 569-70.
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a representative group of examiners. The same report is filed in each
state.
From the above considerations, it would appear that the exercise of
state control would not impose an undue financial burden on mail order
insurers if they were compelled to procure a license in each state where
they do business. Even if the insurer expands into several states, the
burden with respect to filing of financial statements and periodic examinations increases only nominally since information already available
is acceptable to such states. Generally speaking, the fees are nominal
and the taxes are proportionate to the amount of business written.
In addition to the objection that compulsory licensing would increase the cost of insurance, it has been criticized on the basis that it
would compel insurers to abandon the mail order method of operation.

58

This argument loses force when it is realized that many in-

surers conduct a mail order business in those states in which they are
licensed, including their home state. For example, Ministers Life has
not abandoned the mail order method of operation in those states where
it is licensed.75 9
Even if a state's regulation impedes or prohibits the mail
order method of operation, this is a questionable argument against the
compulsory licensing approach. The opinion of Justice Rutledge in
Robertson v. California, although directed towards the question of unconstitutional restraint under the commerce clause, is pertinent here.
But we are far beyond the time when, if ever, the word "license"
per se was a condemnation of state regulation of interstate business done within the state's borders. .

.

. For the commerce

clause is not a guaranty of the right to import into a state whatever one may please, absent a prohibition by Congress, regardless of the effects of the importation upon the local community.
That is true whether what is brought in consists of diseased
7 60
cattle or fraudulent or unsound insurance.
(Emphasis supplied.)
If an insurer does business in a state, it should be willing to abide by
those rules and regulations which that state has imposed for the protection of its citizens. If such controls are repugnant to the insurer's
operations, it may do its business elsewhere. As the Wisconsin Supreme Court said,
Obviously, any necessary regulation substantial enough to protect the citizens of a state will cause inconvenience and adjustments in the insurance business.76 1
See note 746, supra.
See note 746, supra.
760 Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1946)
(sustaining prohibiting
residents from acting as agents for unauthorized insurers).
7 1 Ministers Life and Casualty Union, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287, 296 (1966).
758
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Furthermore, Professor Patterson pointed out, "The licensing power
is the chief instrumentality in the control of insurance companies.""z 2
Undermining this regulatory tool weakens the protection afforded to the
policyholders.7

63

However, some qualification is necessary as to this last point. An insurer domiciled in a state having the suggested compulsory licensing
statute could be subjected to unfair coercion by another state. Such a
state might intensely and unfairly discriminate against foreign insurers in favor of its own local companies. In this situation the domestic state's compulsory licensing law would assist a foreign state
subject a domestic insurer to highly discriminatory laws. Therefore,
the compulsory licensing law might include a provision to the effect
that it does not apply in those situations where the domestic insurer
would be subjected to a foreign state's laws that are "unreasonably
discriminatory" as against such insurer.164
d. A Novel Doctrine
At least some mail order insurers do not subscribe to the view that
they should abide by the rules of the state in which they conduct operations. For example, the amicus brief, filed by two mail order insurers
in the Todd case, espoused a novel doctrine, i.e., mail order companies are the judges as to whether or not they should comply with
state laws. Referring to one company, the brief said that it became
licensed in several states "where the volume of business and the scope
of its activities have made qualification appropriate.

' 76 5

With reference

to another company the brief said "the volume of its business and the
scope of its activities have not as yet been sufficient to warrant qualification as a foreign insurer in any state."1 766 In essence, such mail
order companies urge that they be free to determine which laws they
will obey and which laws they can ignore. Such a proposition is untenable.
To urge that compulsory licensing statutes should not be enacted
because of the alleged economic burdens which would befall mail order
insurers is to argue for preferential treatment. For example, as of
year end 1964, 898 companies, associations and societies were authorized to write insurance in Wisconsin. 67 Each of these, whether
it is large or small, must meet the state standards, comply with
its requirements and pay the taxes imposed. At the same time, many
Patterson, Some Problems in the Licensing of Insurance Companies, 23 COLUM.
L REv. 536, 537 (1923).
763 "Furthermore, control of insurance enterprises through judicial machinery
would be sporadic and fitful." Id. at 538.
764 See pp. 301-302 supra for a discussion of this same point in connection with
the proposed UEFJDIA.
762

765

Amici Curiae, supra note 748, at 4.

766 Id. at 5.
7611 VAisco7,slN

INs. DEPT. ANN.

REP. 10

(1965).
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mail order insurers seem to believe that they are entitled to the same
benefits and opportunities as those companies which have complied
with the law. Implicit in their argument is the contention that it is fair
for other companies-but not for mail order companies-to be subject
to requirements enacted for the public interest. Why should an insurer
which is soliciting, selling and servicing policies in a state avoid compliance with rules and the payment of taxes while a licensed company
does comply and does pay? If there is a strong valid reason, neither it
nor its logic are apparent.
e. Implementation
Even if statutes follow the basic framework suggested above, one
serious hurdle remains. It is most difficult to persuade every state to
enact a statute of this type. In addition to the normal problems in such
an endeavor, strong opposition can be anticipated from numerous com76
panies, associations and others.

Perhaps the NAIC could be persuaded to depart from its former reluctance to sponsor a uniform bill in this area, particularly in view of
its recent subcommittee resolution which said,
BE IT RESOLVED that no insurance company other than one
operating under the surplus line laws shall solicit or write,
directly or indirectly, any insurance in any state in which it is
not so authorized, and that this Subcommittee, or other appropriate Committee, not only be continued, but that it be instructed
and empowered to go
forward with deliberate speed to imple7 69
ment this resolution.

Furthermore, in the NAIC survey,7 7 0 twenty-three states felt that state
enactments prohibiting domestic insurers from doing business in other
states unless authorized to do so, or legislation similar to the Wisconsin
or California unauthorized insurer laws, would constitute an appropriate approach.
One additional point might be noted. The suggested compulsory
licensing law enacted by individual states would apply only to domestic insurers and, hence, only to United States companies. A former
compulsory licensing attempt, which would have applied to alien as
well as United States companies, was rejected.7 7 ' The attempt to enact
the suggested statute may not generate as much industry opposition
768 See KLINE 76.

769 Subcommittee of the Advertising of Insurance Committee to study the NAICFTC Resolution, 2 PROCEEDINGS (1966). The parent committee adopted
the resolution as an expression of purpose and policy for immediate action, 2
PROCEEDINGS -

(1966), despite the industry's continued opposition to addi-

tional studies. See 1 PROCEEDINGS 222-23 (1966). However, at the Plenary
Session the resolution and committee report were referred back to the Advertising of Insurance Committee for further study and clarification. 2
PROCEEDINGS (1966).
770 See pp. 208-209 and note 193, supra.
77 See KLINE 50-51, 66-67, 76.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

f[Vol. 50

since alien insurers would not be affected. (The same may be true
with respect to the proposed UEFJDIA).
2. FederalLegislation
In 1935, Representative Hobbs introduced into Congress what was
known as the Hobbs Bill.7 7 2 In essence, it prohibited any insurer from
using the mails to solicit, negotiate or effect insurance, or for the purpose of transmitting insurance policies or collecting premiums unless
the insurer complies with the insurance laws of those states where
such contracts are solicited, negotiated, or effected.7 7 3 Violations were
punishable by fines and prison sentences, with the Department of Justice to act as the enforcement agency. Since the bill prohibited the use
of the mails by unlicensed companies, it was, in effect, a compulsory
7 T
licensing proposal. The bill was not reported out of committee. 7
Unlike a state compulsory licensing law applying to its own domestic
companies, this bill, if enacted, would have directly affected alien as
well as United States companies, because of the federal government's
control over the mails.
If the jurisdictional and enforcement problems confronting
states seeking to exert control over unauthorized insurers are not
eliminated by the Supreme Court, and if the states fail to enact compulsory licensing statutes with provisions enabling their sister states to
enforce such statutes, Congress might be inclined to act in this area.
For example, the Hobbs Bill could be resurrected with the proviso that
states in which the alleged doing of business occurs would be entitled to
bring suit on the act either independently or in conjunction with the
Department of Justice, in a manner comparable to that suggested in
connection with domiciliary state compulsory licensing statutes. If this
occurs, such a bill should define doing business in such a way so as
not to prohibit unauthorized insurers from using the mails if their contacts with the state are infrequent, insignificant and sporadic. Consideration should be given to circumventing those states having highly discriminatory state laws. 775 Furthermore, to facilitate its passage, such a
bill could exempt insurers other than those located in the United States.
Recently, in fact, the Senate Subcommittee on Frauds and Misrepresentation Affecting the Elderly explored deceptive and misleading
methods in the solicitation and sale of accident and health insurance."7 6
As a result of its investigation, the Subcommittee recommended that
Congress enact sanctions against the use of any instrumentality of interstate commerce by an insurer to advertise or sell health insurance in
violation of the regulatory laws of the state where the advertisements
772 H.R. 6452 (Mar. 6, 1935) (reprinted in KLINE 50).
73 The bill excluded newspapers, magazines or periodicals
774 KLINE 51.
7
776

For a discussion of this point, see pp. 301-302 supra.
See S. REP. supra note 719, at 47-63.

of general circulation.

MAIL ORDER INSURERS

or sales were made.7 7 To secure enforcement of such sanctions, it
was recommended that the federal district courts be given jurisdiction
over civil suits brought by the state to obtain injunctive relief after
showing probable cause that the statute has been violated.7 7 Here is
a clear example of federal compulsion to procure a license with provision for state enforcement of a federal statute.
Perhaps this or some other comparable gesture by Congress would
generate initiative and support for a uniform NAIC bill embodying
the essential elements needed for the protection of all parties. Of
course, if the states do have the constitutional authority to exercise
control, the compulsory licensing route (although perhaps adding to
the effectiveness of such control) would not be indispensable, if other
means are provided to permit enforcement.
B.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT LEGISLATION

If the Ministers Life case 779 is reversed by the United States Supreme Court, the decision will presumably be based upon either the due
process clause or upon Congressional intent underlying the McCarran
Act.780 The Court might conclude that in the mail order situation, there
are insufficient local contacts and/or state interest to meet the current
standard of due process. However, after reviewing the evolution of
due process concepts in some detail, a reversal based on this rationale
seems very doubtful. More likely, if there is a reversal, it will be
founded on the theory that Congress intended, in insurance regulatory
and tax situations, to freeze the concept of due process into its earlier
mold.
If the Court concludes that Congress did intend to retrict the state's
taxing and regulatory power by virtue of the applicability of narrow
concepts of due process, a regulatory inconsistency arises. Congress has
given to the FTC ample enforcement powers against companies
wherever they might be located in the United States.7 8' However, in
relation to the total scope of insurance regulation, it has reserved to
the FTC a relatively limited jurisdictional area. On the other hand,
Congress expressly declared its intention to vest in the states the re78 2
sponsibility for the continued regulation of the insurance business.
But if the frozen concept of due process is sustained, by virtue of
777 Id. at 63.

Ibid.
Ministers Life and Casualy Union v. Haase, 30 Wis.2d 339, 141 N.W.2d 287
(1966).
780 59 STAT. 33, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1011-1015 (1963). See State Board of Insurance
v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451, 455-58 (1962) which was apparently
decided on a congressional intent rather than a due process theory. See Professor Spencer L. ITmball's Statement to the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, Hearings April 2-5,
1963, pp. 14-16.
751 See pp. 326-330 infra.
-2 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (1963).
778
779
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congressional intent, the states lack authority comparable to their responsibilities. In other words, as to insurance regulation, Congress has
vested greater responsibilities than authority in the states and at the
same time granting sufficient (if not more than sufficient) authority
to the FTC, which has lesser responsibilities.
Inherent in this inconsistency is a logical suggestion for a remedial
approach, namely to eliminate the inconsistency and prevail upon Congress to provide the states with authority commensurate with their
responsibilities.7 8 3 This could be achieved through a simple amendment

to the declaration of purpose section in the McCarran Act, indicating
that Congress intends the current standards of due process to be applicable. For example, the purpose section might read as follows, the last
sentence being the amendment:
Congress declares that the continued regulation and taxation
by the several States of the business of insurance is in the
public interest, and that silence on the part of Congress shall
not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or taxation of such business by the several States. Furthermore, it is
not the intent of Congress that the authority of the States to
regulate and tax the business of insurance be limited 8by constitutional interpretations existing at any particular time. 1
This should remove any jurisidictional impediments resulting from a
reversal of the Ministers Life case, if based on a restricted interpretation
of Congressional intent at the time the McCarran Act was enacted.
An objection to seeking relief from Congress is the possibility that
Congress might go beyond what is asked and amend the McCarran
Act in favor of more direct federal regulation. Assuming arguendo
that the preservation of state regulation is a meritorious goal, an important question must be resolved. On the one hand, the request for
supplemental help from the federal government can be deferred to
such time as Congress on its own initiative seeks to remedy problems
which the states have been unable to solve. A request for aid to state
regulation at this late date may be looked upon as an insincere defensive
attempt to preserve state control rather than a sincere attempt to regulate in the public interest. On the other hand, the states could approach
Congress on their own intiative, presumably through the NAIC, with
a reasonable request to remove the impediment, stemming from judicial
interpretation, to carrying out the responsibilities vested in them by
Congress. If such a request is made at a time when Congress is tinder
relatively little public pressure to act in this area, the prospects for
success would seem reasonably good. To delay seeking assistance may
defer federal action, but, over the long run, it might increase the likelihood of direct federal control.
783 Cf. Kimball, supra note 780, at 14-18.
,84 In essence this is the purpose section of the McCarran Act with the addition
of the last clause. Compare 15 U.S.C.A. § 1011 (1965).
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If the Supreme Court, in the M1inisters Life case, upholds the jurisdiction of the states to regulate and tax, thereby rejecting the congressional intent-frozen due process argument, there would be no need
to ask Congress to amend the purpose section of the McCarran Act.
If the Court reverses the Wisconsin decision on this theory, the suggested amendment would be a means to obtain regulatory jurisdiction.
Once jurisdiction is obtained, however, the need for an enforcement
mechanism still exists, e.g., the proposed UEFJDIA enacted either at
the state or the federal level.
C. BROADENING THE ACTIVITIES OF FEDERAL AGENCIES
If the states fail to exert control over unauthorized mail order insurers, whether their inaction stems from constitutional limitations or
sheer inertia, the whole question need not pass by default. Several
federal agencies, although lacking comprehensive powers over insurance,
could contribute to at least a partial solution. It is not the purpose of this
article to explore this subject in depth nor to compare the merits of
such federal control with that of the states. Instead, we merely seek
to point out some alternative possibilities if the states do not generate
some solutions of their own.
1. Post Office Department
The Postmaster General, upon evidence satisfactory to him that a
person is conducting a fraudulent scheme or device for obtaining money
through the mail, may order mail addressed to such a person to be
returned to the sender marked "fraudulent." 78 5 The purpose of such
mail fraud orders prohibiting the use of the mails is to prevent future
78
injury to the public rather than to punish.

6

Under its power to issue fraud orders, the postal department can
virtually put an insurer out of business.78 7 Whenever there is reason

to believe that someone is sending fraudulent matter through the mails,
an investigation can be made and proceedings instituted including a
complaint, hearing, findings, briefs, etc. 78

Meanwhile, to avoid the

continued use of the mails for fraudulent purposes during the proceedings, the Postmaster General may procure a temporary "stop" order in
a federal district court to hold the mail addressed to the respondent at
the post office rather than forwarding it to addressee or returning it
789
to the sender. Transit is merely stopped.
785 39 U.S.C.A.

§ 4005 (1965). See generally KLINE, at 136-140.
Donaldson v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178, 184 (1948).
In United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. den. 342 U.S.
943 (1952), it was held that the Justice Department did not lose its authority to
bring a criminal action for fraudulent use of the mails by virtue of the McCarran Act. Since both the Justice and Post Office Departments possess Congressional authority over fraudulent use of the mails, this rule would also
appear to extend to the Post Office Department. See McCarter 98-99.
788 See McCarter 96-97.
786
787
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Bringing to bear mail fraud orders and interim "stop" orders, possesses considerable merit. This technique is selective in that only the
involved insurer has its operations curtailed. There is no question as
to the adequacy of the remedy. Furthermore, the remedy is prospective
rather than being a mere deterrent.
Effectiveness of this approach depends upon the willingness of the
Post Office Department to undertake such a task, as well as upon the
availability of the staff to do so. However, much of the work involved
could be handled at the state insurance department level. The states
could bring complaints to the Post Office Department's attention after
a thorough preliminary investigation. They may also be able to intervene and actively assist in the preparation and presentation of evidence
at the hearing.7 90 The Post Office Department would then have a readymade basis upon which to institute proceedings. In this manner, state
insurance expertise would be brought to bear on an insurance problem
with the federal government affording the means of enforcement. This
method has considerable merit and deserves further attention if other
791
means of regulation are not or cannot be devised. '
2. Department of Justice
The federal criminal code makes it a crime tor anyone to use tht
mails to defraud.7 92 Similarly, the fradulent use of radio or television
is a crime.7 93 Thus, it is within the power of the Department of

Justice to deter some fraudulent activities of unauthorized mail order
insurers through criminal prosecution. 794 However, the relatively high
burden of proof in a criminal action, as compared to a civil action,
tends to reduce the number of criminal suits. 799 The Post Office Department handles lesser cases under its civil authority. 796 Because the

Department of Justice acts primarily in grossly fraudulent cases,
its role in curtailing the deceptive practices of mail order insurers is
7 97

limited.

3. The Federal Trade Commission
The jurisdictional conflict between the FTC and the states was
discussed earlier. 798 Even if the states have jurisdiction over unauthor78939 U.S.C.A. § 4007 (1965). See McCarter 97 for a discussion of "stop" orders

by virtue of administrative practice prior to the enactment of § 4007 in 1960.

790 See
791

KLINE 140.
The unwillingness of the states to cooperate with the FTC, despite the joint
FTC-NAIC resolution, casts doubt on the effectiveness of the cooperative approach. On the other hand, the states may be less reluctant to deal with the

Post Office Department.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1341 (1965).
793 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (1965).
794 See United States v. Sylvanus, 192 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. den. 342 U.S.
943 (1952).
795 McCarter 98.
792

796

797
798

Ibid.

Ibid.

See pp. 200-25 supra.
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ized mail order insurers, until they devise some means of control (perhaps "effective" control is required), . 90 there is room for the FTC to
assert its jurisdiction under the McCarran Act.8 00 Assuming that the

FTC possesses at least some jurisdiction in this area, how does it
operate and what can it do?
Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act provides:
Unfair methods of competition in commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful. s01
.. The Commission is empowered and directed to prevent per-

sons, partnerships, or corporations... from using unfair methods
of competition in commerce
and unfair or deceptive acts or prac80 2
tices in commerce.

Under section 5(b) the Commission may issue cease and desist orders
after a complaint has been issued, notice of hearing given and opportunity afforded to show cause why the order should not be issued. 03
Rather than proceeding directly against an individual violator of
the statute, the FTC may choose to adopt trade practice rules as a
means to curb widespread abuses in an industry.8 0 4 If this method is
selected, the Commission may hold a conference at which trade practice
rules are developed in cooperation with the industry involved. Public
and direct notices are given to those presumably interested in participating in the conference. Thereafter, the full Commission considers
the problem and promulgates trade practice rules deemed appropriate. 05
A copy of the rules is sent to industry members who then have the
opportunity to signify intention to observe the rules. Although such
agreement is voluntary, it serves two purposes. First, when executed,
it may psychologically enhance the likelihood of adherence to the rules.
Second, those who have accepted the rules and subsequently violated
them are afforded an opportunity to explain that the violation was not
willful, while those who did not accept usually are not afforded this
opportunity. Since trade practice rules merely establish standards of
conduct and provide the basis for voluntary cessation of practices violating these standards, they do not have the force of law. Their violations must be prosecuted under the applicable statutory provisions.806
709

See pp. 201-203 supra.

80oThe FTC has jurisdiction over the sending of improper advertising material

by an insurer into a state except those which have adopted legislative provisions
sufficient to control mailing of such material. Travelers Health Association v.
FTC, 298 F.2d 820 (8th Cir. 1962).
80115 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (1) (1965).
80215 U.S.C.A. § 45(a) (6) (1965).
803 15 U.S.C.A. § 45(b) (1965). Provision is made for judicial review. See 15
U.S.C.A. § 45(c) (1965).
80415 U.S.C.A. § 46(g) (1965) authorizes the FTC to make such rules and regulations. See generally Procedures and Rules of Practice for the FTC as
amended Oct. 25, 1965, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.61-1.67.
805 See Procedures and Rules of Practice for the FTC, supra note 770, § 1.63.
s06 Id. at § 1.62. See also KLINE 146-47.
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In addition to its ability to directly regulate deceptive trade practice
rules, Congress has conferred upon the FTC extensive investigatory
authority s07 This includes authority:
(a) to investigate the organization, business, conduct, practices and
management of most corporations engaged in commerce and the
relations to other corporations,
(b) to require the filing of annual or special reports or answers to
specific questions as to organization, business, conduct, practices,
management and relations to other corporations,
(c) to investigate compliance with antitrust decrees, alleged violations
of antitrust statutes, and possible readjustment of corporations,
(d) to make public information which it deems to be in the public interest, and
(e) to classify corporations and to make rules and regulations.
Furthermore, the FTC has (at reasonable times) access to documentary
evidence of a corporation being investigated or proceeded against. The
Commission may subpoena witnesses and order the production of documentary information.808

In other words, the FTC possesses the power to initiate investigations, compel reports and subpoena witnesses on its own motion. These
are necessary adjuncts to any regulatory machinery. Thus, it is possible
for the Commission to engage in a substantial amount of indirect regulation by virtue of its extensive investigative and disclosure power. 0 9
Assuming that the FTC has jurisdiction over direct unauthorized
mail order insurers, the scope of section 5 prohibiting unfair or deceptive practices combined with the implementing powers just described
suggests that the FTC has ample means to effectively regulate false or
misleading advertising. 10 This could be done with or without promulgating trade practice rules although the latter has been done in the
past with respect to accident and health mail order insurers.sl

The

power to issue cease and desist orders against illegitimate mail order
insurers affords a relatively speedy remedy which has prospective
effect. Furthermore, this method is selective in that it operates only
on the conduct of irresponsible insurers. 8' Nevertheless, there are some
limitations on the ability of the FTC to cope with the regulatory problems in the insurance area.
807 See 15 U.S.C.A. § 46 (1965).
808 15 U.S.C.A. § 49 (1965).
809 See KLINE 145-46. Presumably the FTC can use its investigatory powers, as

distinguished from its rule making powers, whether or not the states are regulating, which in turn could disclose a jurisdictional base on which the FTC
could rest. See pp. 203-205 supra for discussion of Crafts v. FTC, 355 U.S. 9,
rehearing den. 355 U.S. 995 (1957).
810 See KLINE 146.
811 See pp. 205-208 supra.
812 See McCarter 101.

1966]
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The FTC's jurisdiction under section 5 extends to unfair methods
of competition and unfair or deceptive acts. While this would include
deceptive advertising, it may not embrace the insurer's method of
handling claims. By changing its claim practices an insurer can vary
the benefits under a given insurance policy. Thus, while it is possible
to engage in honest advertising under FTC rules, policyholders may
still be left without protection. No overall appraisal of an insurer's
claim policy can be made without considering several individual situ13
ations.
Furthermore, it is possible for an honestly advertised policy to
contain limitations and exceptions which render it practically worthless.
This may be beyond the FTC's authority to prevent since the advertisements were not deceptive or misleading. In this situation requirements as to policy approval prior to policy use, such as those employed
8 14
by the states, may be the only effective solution.
Another possible limitation on the FTC's effectiveness is its absence
of authority to regulate insurers as to unduly low loss ratios8 15 or basic
financial integrity. An extremely low loss ratio could indicate that the
policyholder is not getting his money's worth while a very high loss
ratio may suggest the absence of financial stability, which in turn,
might jeopardize the policyholder's protection. 1 6 Perhaps, the sale of
an insurance policy by an insurer whose financial condition is not such
as to reasonbaly assure prompt payment of claims when they mature
could be defined as an unfair trade practice.8 17 But how would this
rule be enforced? Whether an insurer is solvent or not depends upon
the definition of solvency. What standards should be used ?""" Furthermore, the determination of an insurer's financial condition would require a thorough examination of the insurer, something which is not,
at least at this time, within the particular competence of the FTC. It
is questionable whether the FTC would want to develop sufficient and
continuing expertise to handle the number of cases involving this
question.
In view of the broad language of section 5, one cannot say that
the limitations to the FTC's effectiveness as a regulator of mail order
insurance pose insurmountable obstacles. For example, the Commission
might define as an unfair practice the advertising and sale of an insurance policy which has not received prior approval by the Commission. Also, the Commission may be willing to staff insurance examiners
to make effective a rule as to sales by financially unsound insurers.
813 See KLINE 149.
814

Id. at 149-50.

815 Ratio of benefits paid to premiums collected.
816 See KUNE 150. Of course, a low loss ratio may

standards.
817 See KLINE 150.
818

See Id. at 150-52.

also suggest high underwriting
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Perhaps there is no practical limit as to what can be defined as an
unfair practice. If this is true, to the extent the FTC has jurisdiction
over insurance, it could become a fairly comprehensive regulatory
body.8 19 This is more likely to occur in the absence of state solutions
to the mail order problem than if the states vigorously act in this area.
4.

Summary

If the states are able to "take up the slack" in the area of regulating
unauthorized mail order insurers, there would be little reason or need
for an expansion of federal activity in this area. Without probing the
question very deeply it might be assumed that the states, due to their
long experience and expertise, are better equipped to regulate insurance companies. Presumably, neither the Post Office Department, the
Department of Justice, nor the FTC will claim superior insurance
competence to that of the states. On the other hand, inherent in a
federal agency is the ability to deal with activities that transcend state
lines. Failure of the states would not require default as to at least a
partial solution. The federal agencies are available as an alternative
source of remedial action.
VIII. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
In this article, we have attempted to place the problem of regulating
unauthorized mail order insurers in the context of state versus federal
regulation. However, rather than debating the merits of each, attention
is concentrated on the first question which must be asked, namely, is it
within the ability of the states to regulate? After reviewing some
background material as to state, NAIC, and FTC efforts, we explored
in some depth the constitutional issue of state jurisdiction. If the states
do possess jurisdiction, two basic questions arise: (1) is there a means
to facilitate the assertion of jurisdiction, and (2) how can local law
be enforced after jurisdiction has been successfully asserted? If the
states do not possess constitutional authority to regulate and tax unauthorized insurers, what alternative means of control are available?
819

It might be argued that the Federal Trade Commission Act was passed as a
supplement to the anti-trust laws and that it cannot be interpreted without
placing it in proper relationship with such laws and the philosophy underlying
them. See L. B. Silver Co. v. FTC, 289 F. 985 (6th Cir. 1923) (dictum) ; FTC
v. Beech-Nut Packing, 257 U.S. 441 (1922) (dictum) ; see also Dean (thesis),
supra note 660, at 33-34. Even if § 5 has substance apart from supporting other
anti-trust laws, when it was enacted Congress did not believe that insurance
was subject to the laws pertaining to commerce. The insurance industry grew
up outside of the anti-trust laws and such laws may not be suited for insurance regulation. Thus, it can be urged that §5 was never intended, nor should
it be used, as a means for federal regulation of insurance. See Dean (thesis),
supra note 660, at 34-35. On the other hand, the McCarran Act specifically
states that the Federal Trade Commission Act "shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that such business is not regulated by State
law." 15 U.S.C.A. §1012(b) (1965). (Emphasis supplied.)
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A. ASSUMING STATE JURISDICTION
1. Facilitatingthe Assertion of Jurisdiction
If the United States Supreme Court affirms the Wisconsin decision
in the Ministers Life case, it can be assumed that the states may constitutionally regulate and tax unauthorized insurers in the typical mail
order situation. Presumably, it would be unnecessary for a state to
enact a statute specifically directed at unauthorized insurers as a condition precedent for exercising such jurisdiction. The state could proceed to bring action against the insurer under its regular insurance
laws. However, if such a statute is enacted, the state's case may be
strengthened in marginal due process situations since the legislature
has manifestly demonstrated the state's interest in exercising control
over these insurers. Therefore, a statute patterned after Wisconsin's
unauthorized insurance law (subject to some modifications), while not
indispensable, would seem to be desirable.
The Wisconsin statute spells out in detail provisions for substituted
service of process in suits brought by the state. Most states provide
only for suits brought by the insured or his beneficiary under the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act. To meet the due process requirements
of adequate notice in suits brought by the state, other states may do
well in adopting the Wisconsin provision.
The Wisconsin statute defines doing business in terms of specific
acts in the state. If the statute were to be applied to insurers having
only isolated or sporadic contacts with the state, it may be found to
have exceeded constitutional limits. On the other hand, from a practical
standpoint, it would normally only be applied in those situations where
state judisdiction would constitutionally be justified. Furthermore, this
type of definition possesses the important attribute of administrative
feasibility.
We also raised some questions as to Wisconsin's taxing provisions
which need not be reviewed here, but perhaps should be considered by
any state following Wisconsin's lead. In short, we recommend the
adoption by the states of some of the basic concepts of the Wisconsin
statute as a means to facilitate the assertion of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, we recommend the proposed amendment in the annual
statement, perhaps in the form of an Unauthorized Insurers Supplemental Information Statement, requiring an insurer to disclose the
extent of its activities in states where it is not licensed to do business.
The accuracy of this information, provided under oath, could be reviewed through the periodic examinations. This proposal, coupled with
the provisions in the Wisconsin statute compelling disclosure of dealings with unauthorized insurers, should do much to overcome practical
administrative difficulties in ascertaining whether or not the state, in
fact, does have jurisdiction.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50

2. Enforcement
After jurisdiction has been successfully asserted and a local judgment for fines and/or an injunction is rendered, the insurance department is confronted with the problem of enforcing such judgment or
injunction. An extradition proceeding or a suit invoking the original
jurisdiction of the United States Supreme Court may offer some
possibilities in an individual situation. However, neither affords a comprehensive procedure which would be available in every case. More
promising is the bringing of a suit on the local judgment or decree in
the courts of the domiciliary state of the insurer, thereby relying on the
applicability of the full faith and credit clause for enforcement.
a. Suit Based on Full Faith and Credit
The assertion that neither penal judgments nor equity decrees are
entitled to full faith and credit, if valid, effectively blunts the enforcement of one state's sanctions in another state. However, this limited
concept of full faith and credit is subject to serious doubt. A test case
before the Supreme Court to resolve this issue seems appropriate.
From the viewpoint of the regulator, the test case approach possesses
certain practical advantages over other remedies. The regulator need
not persuade his legislature to enact a statute, the backing of the NAIC
is not indispensable, nor must other state insurance departments and
their legislatures be cajoled into cooperating. This is a "do it yourself"
approach.
On the other hand, the test case method has some drawbacks. It
could prove to be a time consuming process. The outcome is not
a certainty. If the decision is favorable it may be hedged in by the facts
of the particular case so as to render doubtful the applicability of the
full faith and credit clause in the next case. Furthermore, a suit on a
foreign judgment, when compared to the registration procedure, leaves
something to be desired as to time, expense and delay. In view of the
advantages and disadvantages of the test case route, we recommend that
a test case be brought, but that in addition one of the following remedies
should also be sought.
b.

The Proposed Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments
Against Domestic Insurers Act (UEFJDIA)
In order to enforce foreign judgment in most states, a suit must be
brought on that judgment in the courts of the state where enforcement
is sought. Because of the time, expense, delay and possible inability
to obtain personal jurisdiction a second time, a few states have adopted
the UEFJA summary judgment procedure and Congress has enacted
a registration system. The proposed UEFJDIA is based on the registration approach, although the summary judgment technique could also
be used.
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In essence, the proposed UEFJDIA attempts to remove the alleged
impairments to the full faith and credit clause. By statute, a state would
require its courts to enforce any registered foreign judgment (thereby
overcoming the penalty exception, if any), or any decree (thereby overcoming the equity decree exception, if any) obtained against a domestic
insurer( thereby limiting the scope of the act to the insurance business)
by either the insured, the beneficiary or the regulating state (thereby
assuring the ability of the state to register a judgment). Provision is
made to assure the giving of notice to the insurer and to provide him
with the opportunity to raise appropriate defenses (e.g., lack of jurisdiction in the original court). Furthermore, to prevent a situation
whereby a domestic court is required to enforce a foreign judgment or
decree which would do substantial violence to domestic regulatory
policy, an optional provision is suggested. This would require that notice of the registered judgment be given to the domestic state's insurance commissioner and that he be given an opportunity to demonstrate
that its enforcement would adversely and substantially affect the domestic state's insurance regulatory policy. If the court agrees, it need
not enforce the foreign judgment.
Ideally, the UEFJDIA would be adopted by the NAIC and enacted
by each state. If this is not done fairly expeditiously, Congress, by
virtue of its implemetation power under the full faith and credit clause,
could pass a statute embracing these concepts and compel the state
courts to give effect to them. In the absence of state action, this we
recommend.
Such a statute, whether promulgated at the state or federal level,
would enable a state to effectuate its regulatory and taxation scheme
without increasing the state's constitutional authority over out-of-state
insurers. Instead, exercise of existing authority would be facilitated by
affording a readily available enforcement mechanism. Even if a test
case should prove successful, the widespread adoption of the UEFJDIA
would lend greater certainty as to subsequent proceedings, as well as
replace the common law suit on a judgment procedure with the more
efficient registration system.
c. Conferring Jurisdiction on Federal District Courts
An alternative enforcement method to the proposed UEFJDIA
would be the congressional conferment of jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear suits brought by a state against unauthorized insurers. While it may be possible to do so under the current federal
diversity of citizenship statute, there is sufficient doubt to warrant
federal legislation. The proposed statute would confer jurisdiction on
federal district courts in an action brought by an insurance commissioner against an unauthorized insurer regardless of the amount in
controversy or the absence of a federal question. Before such juris-
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diction arises the insurer must conduct activities in the state which
are specified in the statute. These activities are essentially those used
in the Unauthorized Insurers Process Act.
Although this statute would require relatively little contact with
the state to give rise to a federal district court's judicial jurisdiction,
nothing is done to increase the state's legislative jurisdiction. The constitutional standards of doing business must still be met.
This proposed legislation, like the UEFJDIA, would avoid the
alleged difficulties of the full faith and credit clause. The state could
bring suit directly in the insurer's home district court and thereby
obtain a judgment or injunction which could then be expeditiously
enforced.
Therefore, in the absence of state action Congress has at least two
alternatives. It could confer jurisdiction on the federal district courts,
or it could adopt its version of the UEFJDIA Act which utilizes state
rather than federal courts. We recommend the latter as being more
consistent with the philosophy of comprehensive state regulation of
insurance and with the philosophy underlying the full faith and credit
clause.
B. ASSUMING No STATE JURISDICTION
The recommendations made above assume that, under prevailing
constitutional concepts, the states possess the authority to regulate out
of state unauthorized mail order insurers. If this should prove to be
an incorrect assumption, other approaches may be attempted either at
the state or federal level.
The concept of a state compelling its domestic insurers to comply
with the laws of those states in which they do business is not new.
Several states already have promulgated this type of control, some on
a reciprocal basis. The typical statute, however, suffers from a serious
defect. The domestic insurance department, which is probably overworked and understaffed, may be somewhat lax in enforcing this particular statute which primarily benefits persons outside the state. As
was suggested in the FTC v. Travelers Health Association case, the
insured's own state must, under the McCarran Act, be able to exert
effective control in order to oust the jurisdiction of the FTC. Accepting this as a valid proposition, we recommend that compulsory licensing statutes be adopted which permit the regulatory agency of a sister
state to come into the domestic courts in order to enforce the compulsory licensing statute of the domiciliary state. Since this recommendation is predicated on the assumption that the foreign state lacks
authority to regulate directly, the compulsory licensing state should
define "doing business" in a liberal and realistic sense. For example, if
a domestic insurer carries on "continuous," "systematic," or "frequent"
activities, whether by mail or otherwise, it would be deemed to be
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doing business in that state. Such definition would require a significant
degree of activity before the domestic state's prohibition of doing unauthorized business therein is applicable. Even if this amount of activity
does not give rise to the foreign state's jurisdiction to directly regulate,
the domestic state is under no such handicap. This standard, combined
with the provision that a foreign state may seek to enforce the domestic
state's compulsory licensing statute, would give the foreign state an
indirect means to enforce its laws in those situations where significant
activity justifies such enforcement.
If the suggested compulsory licensing concept lacks the necessary
widespread appeal at the state level, Congress may be inclined to compel comparable results through its own initiative. One means would
be to prohibit the use of the mails to those insurers "doing business,"
as defined in the statute, in states where they are unauthorized. Provision would be made for state enforcement of this statute in the
federal district courts. This approach is somewhat comparable to the
one suggested by a Senate subcommittee which recommended that
federal district courts be given jurisdiction to hear suits brought by a
state against any insurer advertising in violation of that state's laws.
Of course, as we intimated earlier, if the mail order insurers are
found to be within the jurisdiction of the foreign state and if the
enforcement hurdles are surmounted, a compulsory licensing statute
would not be needed.
The Supreme Court may find that Congress intended that the
authority of the states to regulate and tax insurers is limited by the
older concepts of due process. In this situation we iecommend that the
states, through the NAIC, seek federal assistance to supplement the
states' ability to regulate. An amendment to the McCarran Act's purpose section could be sought which would clearly indicate that the prevailing concepts of due process demarcate the outer limits of state
authority. Presumably, this would overturn an adverse decision, if any,
in the Ministers Life case. Even if this were achieved, however, an enforcement mechanism would also have to be devised and implemented.
If the compulsory licensing or the McCarran Act amendment approach cannot generate sufficient support for its implementation, the
next logical step would be to resort to either the FTC or to the Post
Office Department. Each offer some real possibilities to combat the
problems generated by mail order insurers. However, resort to these
federal agencies does nothing to enhance the ability of the states to
regulate the insurance business. We submit that there are feasible
methods for state exercise of effective control. Some have been suggested and recommended. There may be better ones about which we
have not even thought. But, whatever approach is concluded to be the
best, it does little good until it is implemented.
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APPENDIX B
UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS

(REvis

ACT

1964 ACT)

§ 1. Definition.-In this Act "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree, or order of a court of the United States or of any other
court which is entitled to full faith and credit in this state.
§ 2. Filing and Status of Foreign Judgments.-A copy of any
foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress
or the statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the Clerk of any
[District Court of any city or county] of this state. The Clerk shall
treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the
[District Court of any city or county] of this state. A judgment so filed
has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses and
proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment of a [District Court of any city or county] of this state and may be enforced or
satisfied in like manner.
§ 3. Notice of Filing.-(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign
judgment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall make and file with
the Clerk of Court an affidavit setting forth the name and last known
post office address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor.
(b) Promptly upon filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit,
the Clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment to the
judgment debtor at the address given and shall make a note of the mailing in the docket. The notice shall include the name and post office
address of the judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if
any, in this state. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice
of the filing of the judgment to the judgment debtor and may file proof
of mailing with the Clerk. Lack of mailing notice of filing by the Clerk
shall not effect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the
judgment creditor has been filed.
[ (c) No exception or other process for enforcement of a foreign
judgment filed hereunder shall issue until [
] days after the date
the judgment is filed.]
§ 4. Stay.-(a) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court
of any city or county] that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the
court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is
concluded, the time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires
or is vacated, upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the
security for the satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in
which it was rendered.
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the [District Court of any city or
county] any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any
[District Court of any city or county] of this state would be stayed, the
court shall stay enforcement of the foreign judgment for an appropriate
period, upon requiring the same security for satisfaction of the judgment
which is required in the state.
§ 5. Fees.-Any person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the
Clerk of Court

-

dollars. Fees for docketing, transcription or
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other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided for judgments of the
[District Court of any city or county of this state].
§ 6. Optional Procedure.-The right of a judgment creditor to
bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under
this Act remains unimpaired.
§ 7. Uniformity of Interpretation.-This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
§ 8. Short Title.-This Act may be cited as the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act.
§ 9. Repeal.-The followng Acts and parts of Acts are repealed:
(1)
(2)
(3)
§ 10.

Taking Effect.-This Act takes effect on
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APPENDIX C
UNIFORM ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS
AGAINST DOMESTIC INSURERS ACT
(TENTATIVE DRAFT)
(BASED UPON UEFJA 1964)

Be it enacted
§ 1. Definitions.-In this Act
(c) "foreign judgment" means any judgment, decree or order of a
court of the United States or of any State or Territory of the United
States against a "domestic insurer" obtained by a "qualified party,"
(b) "domestic insurer" means any insurer incorporated or authorized to do business in this State,
(c) "qualified party" includes an insured, an insured's beneficiary,
a state regulatory agency acting on behalf of an insured or his beneficiary, or acting in its capacity to enforce the insurance laws of its
State.
§ 2. Filing and Status of ForeignJudgments.-A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with the act of Congress or
the statutes of this State may be filed in the office of the Clerk of any
(
) 1 court of this State. The Clerk shall treat the
foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment or decree of the
(
) court of this State. A foreign judgment so filed
has the same effect and shall be deemed as a judgment or a decree of a
(
) court of this State, and is subject to the same
procedures, defenses and proceedings for reopening, vacating, or staying as a judgment or a decree of a (
) court of this
State and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.
§ 3. Notice of Filing.-(a) At the time of the filing of the foreign
judgment, the judgment creditor or his lawyer shall make and file with
the Clerk of Court an affidavit setting forth the name and last known
post office address of the judgment debtor, and the judgment creditor.
(b) Promptly upon the filing of the foreign judgment and the affidavit, the Clerk shall mail notice of the filing of the foreign judgment
to the judgment debtor at the address given [and to the insurance commissioner of this State] and shall make a note of the mailing in the
docket. The notice shall include the name and post office address of the
judgment creditor and the judgment creditor's lawyer, if any, in this
State. In addition, the judgment creditor may mail a notice of the filing
of the foreign judgment to the judgment debtor [and to the insurance
commissioner of this State] and may file proof of mailing with the Clerk.
Lack of mailing notice of filing by the Clerk shall not affect the enforcement proceedings if proof of mailing by the judgment creditor has been
filed.
(c) No execution or other process for enforcement of a foreign
judgment filed hereunder shall issue until (
) days after the date
the judgment is filed. [Until (
) days after the date of foreign judgment is filed, the insurance commissioner of this State may show the
1 This

is a place to insert the type of court having jurisdiction under this
statute, e.g., circuit court, or district court.
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Court that the enforcement of the foreign judgment would adversely
and substantially affect this State's regulation of insurance, and if the
Court finds that enforcement of the foreign judgment would adversely
and substantially affect this State's regulation of insurance, the foreign
judgment need not be enforced.]
)
§ 4. Stay.-(a) If the judgment debtor shows the (
court that an appeal from the foreign judgment is pending or will be
taken, or that a stay of execution has been granted, the court shall stay
enforcement of the foreign judgment until the appeal is concluded, the
time for appeal expires, or the stay of execution expires or is vacated,
upon proof that the judgment debtor has furnished the security for the
satisfaction of the judgment required by the state in which it was
rendered.
) court
(b) If the judgment debtor shows the (
)
any ground upon which enforcement of a judgment of any(
court of this state would be stayed, the court shall stay enforcement of
the foreign judgment for an appropriate period, upon requiring the same
security for satisfaction of the judgment which is required in this state.
§ 5. Fees.-Any person filing a foreign judgment shall pay to the
dollars. Fees for docketing, tranClerk of Court
scription or other enforcement proceedings shall be as provided for
) court.
judgments of the (
§ 6. Optional Procedure.-The right of a judgment creditor to
bring an action to enforce his judgment instead of proceeding under
this Act remains unimpaired.
§ 7. Uniformity of Interpretation.-This Act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general purpose to make uniform the law of those states which enact it.
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APPENDIX D
A

PROPOSED ACT ON STANDARDS

OF JURISDICTION

(KLINE)

AN ACT
to express the intent of Congress with reference to the jurisdiction of the district courts of the United States over actions for
injunction brought by the several states against insurers not authorized to transact an insurance business therein.
Section 1. Purpose of the Act
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, That Congress hereby declares it is in the public interest that the district courts have jurisdiction in any case which a State Commissioner of Insurance brings
or causes to be brought for an injunction, to protect the residents of
such State, against any insurer which, whether by mail or otherwise
while not authorized to transact an insurance business therein, engages
in any of the activities or transactions hereafter specified in Section 3.
Section 2. Definitions
Wherever used in this Act(a) "Commissioner of Insurance" shall include the officer of any
State, regardless of his official title, who has duties similar to those of
a Commissioner of Insurance.
(b) "Unauthorized insurer" shall mean any insurance company
which, although it may be authorized to transact an insurance business
in its state of domicile, solicits applications for insurance, or issues for
delivery contracts or policies of insurance, or services such contracts
or policies of insurance, whether by mail or otherwise in a state wherein it is not authorized to transact such a business, in such a manner
as to be against the public interest of such state as hereafter specified
in Section 3.
(c) "District court" shall mean the courts which are constituted
by Title 28, United States Code, Sections 81-131.
Section 3. Jurisdiction
(a) The district courts shall have jurisdiction, regardless of the
amount in controversy, of any action for injunction brought or caused
to be brought therein by the Commissioner of Insurance of any State
against an unauthorized insurer where the complaint alleges that such
insurer, whether by mail or otherwise, was or is(1) inducing by advertising or any other means residents of the
state to apply for insurance and that such advertisements or other
means of solicitation misrepresent or are misleading in regard to the
terms, benefits or advantages of any policy or contract of insurance or
the dividends or share of surplus previously paid by such insurer or
the true financial condition of such insurer or contain incomplete or
misleading comparisons of any policy or contract of any other insurer
or insurers, or
(2) issuing or issuing for delivery policies or contracts of insurance
to such residents wherein the benefits provided are unreasonable in
relation to the premium charged or which contain provisions which
encourage misrepresentation or are unjust, unfair, inequitable, misleading or deceptive, or
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(3) engaging in a course of conduct as a result of which residents
entitled to sums of money payable by such insurer under the provisions of any policies or contracts made, issued or delivered by it
within the State, have not been paid in full, or
(4) conducting its business activities or transactions within the
state in such manner as to constitute, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Insurance, a hazard to the residents thereof and to be against
the public interest of the state.
(b) The district courts also shall have jurisdiction, regardless of
the amount in controversy, of any action for injunction brought or
caused to be brought therein by the Commissioner of Insurance of any
State against any unauthorized insurer where the complaint alleges that,
notwithstanding such insurer's possible compliance with the solvency
laws of its domiciliary State, the financial condition of the insurer is
actually such that its further solicitation of applications for insurance,
issuance or issuance for delivery of contracts or policies of insurance
in such State would be, in the opinion of the Commissioner of Insurance, against the public interest in that it would be financially hazardous
to residents thereof who might be induced to become policyholders
therein.
(c) Any action instituted pursuant to this section may be brought,
at the election of the Commissioner of Insurance, either in a district
court of the State of which he is an official or in any district court
of which the unauthorized insurer is a resident or in which it may
be found.
(d) District court process, if the action is instituted in a district
court of the State of which the Commissioner of Insurance is an official, shall be valid and may be served in any other district of which
the unauthorized insurer is a resident or in which it may be found.
(e) The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from
all final decisions or interlocutory orders of the district courts, based
upon Section 3, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
Section 4. Separability Provision
If any clause, sentence, paragraph or part of this act shall, for any
reason, be adjudged by any court of competent jurisdiction to be invalid, such judgment shall not affect, impair or invalidate the remainder
thereof but shall be confined in its operation to the clause, sentence,
paragraph or part thereof directly involved in the controversy in
which such judgment shall have been rendered.

